Jacob Shapiro:
Bethany, thanks so much for coming on the podcast. I've read Saudi
America and The Smartest Guys in the Room in the last month. So I feel like you're a
friend of mine now, because you've sort of been a part of my life for the last month,
but it's nice to sort of meet you sort of in person, right?
Bethany McLean:
Yeah. Sort of in person as much as we can do so on a strange time, right?
Jacob Shapiro:
Yeah. So I wanted to ask you, I wanted to talk specifically about Saudi America
because there's so much involved there with geopolitics and intersecting with the
United States and oil, all that stuff is sort of in the wheelhouse of somebody who
has to deal with geopolitics. And you had a great perspective on it. To start with
though, I just want to sort of lob a softball up and also help the audience along, just
help us, what is fracking? How does it work just at the most basic level, how would
you explain it to listeners who maybe aren't as familiar with the energy industry?
Bethany McLean:
So fracking is actually a combination of two techniques that have been sort of
shorthanded into the word fracking and some in the industry detest the word
fracking because they view it as pejorative as an invention of those by those who
were opposed to the practice. But it's really two old techniques combined together
oldish techniques, one, which is hydraulic fracturing of wells, which is pumping a lot
of substance into a well in order to try to get it to eject more oil or gas. And the
other is horizontal drilling, which is having a well go horizontally instead of
vertically.
And essentially the combination of these two things enabled resurgence of both oil
and gas production in the U.S. And it really is pretty stunning back around the time
of the financial crisis, there were apocalyptic hearings in front of Congress about
impending shortages of natural gas and about the U.S. dwindling prospects for
producing oil, and what on earth that all meant. And a decade later the world
couldn't have been a more different place, and a lot of that's due entirely to the
advent of fracking.
Jacob Shapiro:
Yeah, when I was growing up, we were all worried about how gas prices were going
up, that seemed to be the conversation. And it's amazing how fast it's switched, I
don't even think that sort of the American zeitgeist has gotten on top of what it
means to be an energy superpower, which is really what the United States is. But
before we dive a little bit into that, I also just wanted to ask or at least sort of lay
out for the listeners who was Aubrey McLendon, and why did you pick him of all
people to sort of be the water mule or the protagonist for the story that you were
trying to tell?
Bethany McLean:
So the answer to the same question is the same, it's because he's one of those
characters that when you come across in what we do, what I do, you just can't wait
to write about them because he is one of those proselytizers who believes himself,
who is the ultimate salesman who causes a lot of change. Mclendon was also
Renaissance man, but he's one of those larger than life characters that when you
find them, you want to understand who they are and write about them. And in some
ways Aubrey McLendon, the company he created and founded and built was a
company called Chesapeake Energy, which just recently declared bankruptcy. But it
for a while during the heyday, was the second largest producer of natural gas in the
United States. And Aubrey was the one who, he was the founder, the co-founder
but the one who really built it to its preeminent position in an odds defying way.
Bethany McLean:
So I found that fascinating. But in a way he's an odd selection for this book. And
again, some in the industry would say that my very choice of Aubrey shows that I
was biased. He's not the guy who founded fracking, he's not the guy who invented
it. And he wasn't the leader of some of the companies who've done this well. But
what he was, was the salesman, he was the guy who got investors around the world
to put billions upon billions of dollars into U.S. fracking. And I think you can ask if it
weren't for Aubrey, the entire industry have been different because that capital was
the lifeblood of a lot of fracking. People think it's the chemicals that go into wells,
that it's the water that's used in fracking a well, but it's actually capital, that was the
lifeblood of the industry. And so I viewed Aubrey as the salesman and chief for U.S.
fracking. And that to me, was a critical part of the story.
Jacob Shapiro:
Yeah. That was actually the part of the book that for me came through the most
vividly and was the most surprising, which was, I always thought of fracking as
really an ode to us technical innovation. The Americans have figured out how to use
technology again in order to get ahead of the game. And really, I think one of the
central premises of your book is that yes, there were technological innovations and
it was incredible, but really this was about, it was really an aftereffect of the 2008
financial crisis and years of extremely low interest rates that happen to produce a
perfect capital environment for this very capital-intensive technology to actually be
useful because if the market had sort of been, I don't want to say working in a free
way because I don't think the market ever works in a free way, but if the market had
sort of been in normal pre 2008 conditions, it wouldn't matter how charismatic
Aubrey was. Nobody was going to pony up the level of capital to go into it, and that
still seems to be the case. Is that a fair reading?
Bethany McLean:
Yeah, I think that is a fair reading. And that's what made me so interested in that
too, because I started actually as more of a fan of fracking, honestly, and it's odd
how much the work on the book changed my mind, but I saw it the way you did is
this incredible technological innovation that had unleashed transformation in
America. And I was a little skeptical of environmentalist who criticized it because I
thought, well, you're plugging your beautiful Apple iPhone in your electric car, into
something that requires electricity. Don't all of us who live on the coast or in cities
where we're insulated from what it looks like to produce energy, pretend that we
don't care about it, but we actually have to. Anyway, so I saw some hypocrisy in all
of that, but it was a question of money in the end, and we had come across this
paper written by the Energy Institute of Columbia that said basically the key
ingredient in fracking was capital.
Bethany McLean:
And if it weren't for the 2008 financial crisis and the resulting era of low interest
rates, you can question how big fracking ever would have become. So the story is
as much a financial one as it is a technological one, if not more. And I do think to
some degree, that's still true. One of the promises when I wrote my book was that
the technological innovation was going to continue. And even though it wasn't
profitable at the current time to frack, technological innovation was going to make
it insanely profitable. And you know what, that's still a possibility, but thus far, those
innovations haven't proven out, many of them actually backfired.
Jacob Shapiro:
Yeah. Once we start getting into the land of this is all going to work once we've
discovered the thing that we haven't discovered yet, it starts feeling weirdly like
Theranos or something like that. But yeah, there was actually one statistic in there
that jumped out at me that I even wrote down for my notes, which was that I think it
was Goldman Sachs or somebody was saying that it was going to cost 58 billion just
to keep production levels at their current level in 2023. And that was kind of mind
blowing. And when you look at the way markets are now freaking out over interest
rates now hitting what 1.6% everybody's freaking out. If interest rates ever actually
really started running up which eventually they will, maybe it's two years, maybe it's
eight years who knows in the post COVID economy, it feels like that's the stopwatch
on the fracking industry. Because as soon as that actually start happens, all the
things that you laid out, doesn't make sense unless like you said, they get some
miracle beamed into their brains.
Bethany McLean:
Well, stopwatch has already run out in some ways, because even before COVID
came along investors were losing patience with fracking companies and the
mechanics that had made the whole thing work had broken down. And the
mechanics that people say, well, wait, this is unprofitable, then you have to be
wrong because then no one would fund it because then no one will make money.
And say haha, no there are lots of ways for people to make money off business that
is fundamentally unprofitable. See Exhibit One, the subprime mortgage crisis, a lot
of people made money out of something that was fundamentally destructive and
ultimately extremely unprofitable. The same is true of fracking in the sense that it
was sort of a game, a private equity firm could essentially fund a fracking startup
where people would assemble land. And then that private equity startup would get
sold to an already public company.
Bethany McLean:
And investors in the public market were willing to buy the company stock because
they believed the promises that eventually this was going to make money. And it
was growth at a time when very few things were growing. So it's almost kind of like
an internet startup game where you say, well, it's losing money, but it's growing
really fast so I'm going to pay a lot for it this growth. And debt investors were
willing to fund it because they said, wow, I can get slightly higher returns on this
debt than I can on safer debt. So yes, I'm willing to buy the debt of these companies
in this ultra low interest rate environment. And so the private equity people could
make a ton of money because they'd fund this company and then they'd sell it to
the public company.
Bethany McLean:
And the people along the way could make money, even though the enterprise itself
was fundamentally unprofitable, but that started breaking down, as I had said, even
before COVID because investors in the public equity market started to say, wait a
minute, that this is never going to work. And you guys are getting rich and
executives are getting rich and we're going to get left holding the bag. And we
want to see returns before we're willing to invest anymore. So even the debt
markets were starting to get suspicious. And even in the run-up to COVID the
funding had slowed way down. And then with the oil price crash in the wake of
COVID, basically all came to a stop. And so the question is open, what happens
now? You've obviously got much higher oil prices, which would make some fracking
profitable, but not at the scale that it was before. And it's still unclear whether
investors are willing to come back to the market. So we're at an interesting
inflection point right now I think.
Jacob Shapiro:
Yeah. Well, and that gets to the whole sort of crux of the issue, which is the reason
we have high oil prices is because the Saudis want there to be high oil prices, and
they're reducing production in order to keep the price artificially high. And that's
one of the reasons I said that thing about Americans not really understanding the
zeitgeists of what it means to be an American superpower, because it was around
this time last year. I think it was right before COVID got nuts where a lot of these
shell companies were presenting to the Texas Railroad Commission, which for
listeners, they regulate energy in Texas, not the railroad, it's confusing, but
whatever. And they wanted them to limit oil production and all the free market folks
were out in force saying, oh, this is terrible, this is communism. This is this, that, and
the other thing, but there was one great quote from some older gentlemen I'm
forgetting his name.
Jacob Shapiro:
I apologize, I'll have to go put it in the intro. Well, he said, "No, it's called pro
rationing, we did it from 1950 to 1972 when the U.S. was an energy superpower. Just
everybody who remembered how to do it is dead." And that's really the only
answer when you're trying to get the price up is to have the government come in
and say, actually, no, there's a cap on production. And it was strange to me to see
those fracking companies appealing to governments and government regulatory
agencies to do that, and then getting dismissed by the same people who would
usually support them. It's a whole interesting mix, isn't it?
Bethany McLean:
Yes, it is. And I find that fascinating too, because it actually would have been in
many ways in fracking companies best interest to limit production and get a higher
price because then they could have made money on the oil that they did produce.
And certainly for the environment, it would have been a lot better because one of
the really disgusting things that happened is as fracking really took off, was that a
lot of the natural gas that came out of wells was just being flared, meaning burnt off
into the sky because there was so much of it. And because natural gas prices were
so low as a result of the surplus coming from fracking, nobody could make money
on it. And when you think about that substance that only a decade earlier, it was
precious and we were so worried, it was in short supply.
Bethany McLean:
It's not just being wasted at great environmental cost, it really is quite astounding. I
won't use a more pejorative word, I'll just stop at astounding. So it would have been
in their best interest actually to limit production, but then it becomes a fascinating
thing about when, which is the question raised by the pandemic too, is when does
our purportedly free market, which I agree with you isn't really free, but when is it
counter productive? In the sense that Saudi Arabia could just say, all right, this is
what we're going to do with production, but the U.S. has thousands of independent
companies that can do as they do please.
Bethany McLean:
And it's very difficult for a government regulator to say, "Hey, it'd be in all of your
best interests and the country's best interest if you limited production." But the
problem is it isn't in the individual executives best interests. And so that's why they
don't want to do it because many of them, at least until recently got paid based on
production growth. And so they all said, but wait, we can make lots of money under
the system as it is, who cares if our companies don't make money. And if we're
depleting a natural resource that is called non-renewable for a reason, it's nonrenewable but they didn't have to care.
Jacob Shapiro:
Yeah. And I don't know when folks decided or when it became convincing to people
that capitalism meant growth rather than capitalism meant profitability, because it
really does feel like in the U.S. economic system right now, it is all about growth.
And that was another one of the interesting parallels I thought you brought out in
the book, which is, we know about Jeff Bezos and Mark Zuckerberg and all these
tech CEOs. Some tech companies are doing great, some tech companies are worth
a lot of money, even though they've never produced any profit at all. And quietly,
all these shale tycoons are just making billions on the side and nobody's talking
about them in the same way, but in some sense, they're part of that same economy.
There's something going on here that's beyond just the energy industry or just the
tech industry. It's that, however, the system is set up right now is meant to reward
growth, whether it's good growth, bad growth, profitable growth, all that other kind
of stuff. And at some point that rubber is going to have to meet the road in the
future. I would think.
Bethany McLean:
Yeah, that is such a fascinating point. And again, so well said, and I think that
transition started to happen. It's not accidental that it's correlated with lower and
lower interest rates because the lower interest rates mean that future cash flows are
worth more money and today's cash flows are worth less. And in a super low
interest rate environment, the one thing you want to bank on is growth. And so I
think that's part of the switch, but it's also a cultural one, because you had so many
people who have made so much money out of growth, whether it's profitable or
not. So it's a really interesting convergence of a cultural moment with the financial
one, each one enabled by the other.
Jacob Shapiro:
Yeah. And I also want to go back to the thing you were saying about the Saudis just
being able to cut production because you also mentioned this in the book where a
lot of these companies they're competing against countries. So you're competing
against Petrobras, what's his face, I shouldn't say what's his face. Bolsonaro just
appointed his own former general to be the president of Petrobras, we all know
what he's going to do with thing. Aramco is Saudi Arabia, Rosneft okay. Russia is an
enemy, you can expect them to oppose you, but Brazil and Saudi Arabia, two of the
U.S's closest partners in the last couple of years. And the state owned oil companies
don't care at all about the shale producers, they actually probably want to cripple
the U.S. oil market.
Jacob Shapiro:
So there's this interesting thing here where the geopolitical relationship might tell
you one thing, but then when it actually gets down to the industry level, things are
bad. And the reason I wanted to bring that back was because I feel like one of the
threads that kind of pulls throughout the book, and I can't tell which way you come
down on it. It almost feels like you're having a conversation with yourself at times
about it, but it's whether energy exports are a good thing for the United States or
not. And it seems to me that this gets back to the sort of cultural understanding or
awareness of what power or vulnerability energy has.
Jacob Shapiro:
Because all the countries that I just named and all the countries that are dependent
on oil exports, it's usually not good to be dependent on oil exports. We're in a
market that's fundamentally oversupplied to now, so it's even worse than it was
before. And it just seems to me that actually, if you're dependent on selling oil, the
consumer might have a little bit more leverage than you're willing to realize than
the actual producer. So if I threw all that at you, so where do you land on whether
and how exports should be part of what's happening with oil and natural gas in the
United States?
Bethany McLean:
Well, first of all, yes, you were absolutely right. I do have a lot of conversations in
my own head, as a matter of fact, I have to be careful that I don't start having them
out loud as I'm walking down the street or otherwise in public places. But anyway,
so it really is fascinating because as a result of, back to your point about the free
market, that there kind of is no such thing, there was a ban on oil exports since the
1970s, when America first began to worry about its dependence on foreign oil. And
the fact that there was a ban on oil exports flies in the face of everything anybody
might say about the free market. And that got overturned actually in the final days
of the Obama administration of all things. And it's another fascinating element of
this that we can come back to if you want to, which are the politics around shale
because the Obama administration was every bit supportive of it, if not more so
than the Trump administration was, oddly enough.
Bethany McLean:
But it got overturned in the final days of the Obama administration as part of the
omnibus spending bill at the end of 2015, and nobody even really noticed it was
happening. It just was sort of snuck in to the final bill and nobody paid attention to
it. And it's this momentous change in policy to allow oil exports. I talked to the
lobbyist who had orchestrated it, and he said that after it passed everybody left
town and he went out for a Manhattan and a steak by himself because it was viewed
as such so not important. You're right that I am mixed about it. But I'm probably
less mixed now than I think I was, on the one hand being able to export natural gas,
certainly weakens Russia's stranglehold over Europe, or at least it theoretically
should. Because Europe is so dependent on Russia for its natural gas, that's a
geopolitical nexus or hotspot or whatever you want to say.
Bethany McLean:
And so the idea that the U.S. could export its natural gas to Europe and therefore
free Europe from it's dependence on Russia is a really compelling one. One that is
more difficult to realize in actuality than it sounds because exporting natural gas, it
is after all a gas, is really complicated and really expensive. Since you have to build
huge multi-billion dollar facilities to both convert the natural gas into a liquid, and
then reconvert it into a gas. And right now that is not happening or wasn't
happening at nearly the speed that people had projected, but there is something
compelling and it is really expensive and it makes American natural gas quite a bit
more expensive than Russian natural gas.
Bethany McLean:
But there is something compelling about that, I am an American and there is
something compelling about that. On the other hand, I think the most pivotal
conversation, or one of the most pivotal conversations I had for the book was with
Charlie Munger, everybody knows who Charlie Munger is, but dear God, if I can have
half his brain power, understand, when I'm at age, I'll settle for just a smidgen, that
would be amazing. But he said, "Look, there's still no substitute for the products
that we need for agriculture and for fertilizers and agriculture is every bit as
important, food security is every bit as important to a nation as energy, security."
Those are my dogs.
Jacob Shapiro:
Happy to welcome them to the podcast. Do you have conversations with them too,
I'm sure as well.
Bethany McLean:
Very inspiring. Anyway, but he made the point that there was still no substitute for
fertilizer and for the ingredients that are in fertilizer. And so until there was a
substitute, whether it's the sun or whatever else, what were we doing to take these
precious products and sell them outside the country at a time when oil prices were
so cheap by historical standards. His point was shouldn't we be buying everything
we can from other countries that are willing to sell to us and conserving our own for
a time in the future when we might need it. And so in a way, exports and our
rampant out of control, unprofitable production became for me almost a microcosm
of everything that's wrong with the current American economy in terms of shorttermism,
value and growth over sustainability, and just the unwillingness to plan for the longterm.
Jacob Shapiro:
Yeah. It makes me long for a party or even just a political faction that is actually
conservative in the literal definition of that word that wants to conserve resources
or conserve position. I don't think there actually is a real conservative party from
that point of view in the United States. I don't know that there ever has been, the
United States has always been so forward-looking and so driven on the future that I
don't know we've ever actually paused and thought about what we were doing for
five seconds. But the point about exports though, I don't know, I'm thinking more
and more about this, because I think the Russians are actually more dependent on
the Europeans than vice versa, because as you said, it's really expensive and really
complicated to take natural gas elsewhere. If the Europeans were just like, nah, we'll
go get LNG from somewhere else.
Jacob Shapiro:
We'll call Qatar, we'll have Turkey build some kind of pipeline, we'll get it from the
Americans. The Russians, who else are they going to sell to? They're going to sell it
to Uzbekistan, I guess maybe China's going to consume some of it. I think it
actually, when you have that producer and consumer relationship, it gets leveraged,
it sets bounds in the relationship. I don't think it's a coincidence that Saudi Arabia
has been doing whatever it wanted in recent years while the U.S. hasn't been as
dependent on Saudi oil anymore. Yes, there's this rhetorical relationship and all of
this baggage going back years, but when you actually disconnect those things,
Saudi Arabia doesn't listen to what the United States does. It saws its people into
different body parts and does horrible things with human rights, it invades Yemen.
Jacob Shapiro:
It does all this stuff, it doesn't care what the United States has about anything
because that's not what matters. What matters is that Saudi is now is selling to the
Chinese, selling to the Japanese, selling to the South Koreans. They're the ones that
sort of have the leverage. So I just don't know if when U.S. policymakers are
thinking about this, if they're appreciating what it means to create a sector that is
dependent on foreign consumption.
Jacob Shapiro:
The reason or not the reason World War II kicked off, but the proximate reason that
the United States got involved in World War II was because the United States said,
"Japan, you can't have any oil anymore," that's what sets that whole sort of thing
off. So I don't know, it just makes me nervous when we start thinking of energy as
this geopolitical tool that can just be used willy nilly. And also that the goal is to
say, "No, Russia, you can't sell any gas here, you can only get your gas from here,"
because then you're just going to isolate them and they're going to be completely
cornered. But I don't know, I go back and forth on it. It's hard.
Bethany McLean:
Yeah, I go back and forth on it too. It's an interesting question. When I talk to
former Obama administration officials, they were adamant that the Obama
administration did not want to use energy as a geopolitical threat because America
had said for years, don't do that anymore, that's not smart. And so then comes the
Trump administration, which starts talking about energy independence, and as this
grand idea, which itself is a fraud, and we can talk about that. But it was a real
change. And I think the questions you're raising are really interesting, and they're
ones that I sort of thought about for the book not to give myself too much credit,
but one is this role of commercial relationships, which actually can be a good thing
because that dependency creates a kind of mutual dependency that then helps
prevent wars from breaking out because at least at its best, but yet it can flip
around and become leveraged to be exactly the opposite.
Bethany McLean:
So it's not clear cut that a commercial relationship is always a good thing that will
prevent war, sometimes it becomes a tool in causing war as you point out with
World War II. But the other thing I definitely thought about for the book is what's
the cost of a failed state. So it was a conventional view that energy independence
would make the U.S. safer and more secure, but I think it's the opposite for a couple
of reasons. One going back to Munger's point about long-term safety and security
versus short-term.
Bethany McLean:
But also if Saudi Arabia does disconnect from the U.S. and stops carrying what we
think, or if it becomes a failed state as a result of U.S. oil production, and Saudi's
inability to fund itself in the face of low oil prices are fresh and became a failed
state. Or if places in Africa that were dependent on oil exports, as their economies
collapsed, that's not actually, it doesn't make the world a safer place. It's easy to be
a chest beating American and say, American power rise, everybody else fall, but it
doesn't work that way. Failed States are really, really dangerous to all of us. So I
started to think about that as I worked on the book as well.
Jacob Shapiro:
Yeah. And there's something about that too, which is this myth of self-reliance,
which maybe it was possible at one point in time, but the global economy is not set
up that way, the American economy is not set up that way. So maybe you can be
energy independent technically but you're never going to be independent for
everything that you need, even if you're going to do solar, if everything's going to
be solar and wind, you're still going to need rare earths. And we don't do rare
earths here right now, so you're going to have to go and get them in
environmentally unconscionable ways in places like Chile or China, anywhere else.
The fact that we pay $500 or $800 for an iPhone is only because we can mine
minerals from all the way across the world with child labor, doing it out of Congo,
all that other kind of stuff.
Jacob Shapiro:
You can't really disconnect yourself from the global economy and not completely
transform the way things are going. And there's something in the American psyche
about wanting that self-reliance not having to depend on anyone, whereas
American power really is actually built on the idea of connecting everyone.
Everybody gets to play by the same rules. And as long as we can all sort of
participate together in a reasonable way, everybody's going to be enriched. That's
actually how American power has been sustained. And yeah, it's been interesting. It
started in the Obama administration, it was interesting to watch it continue in the
Trump administration where we sort of got into a defensive crouch and just said, no,
we don't want to be out in the world. We just want to be ourselves. We want our
own energy. We want our own this, it's just not a realistic viewpoint. I think if you
want to maintain the U.S's position and quality and standard of life in the world
right now.
Bethany McLean:
Yeah, it was funny to me that was definitely an intellectual journey of sorts, the risk
of sounding completely full of myself. But that I went on during writing the book
because I started thinking energy independence was a real thing. And wasn't it this
grand notion that we could produce all the energy that we needed. And then as I
started to think about it, I thought, but oil prices aren't set by the Texas Railroad
Commission anymore, the way they were in the heyday of American oil production,
they're set on global markets. And so there's no such thing as energy independence
because the price that Americans pay at the pump is always going to be dependent
on something happening around the world. And so this concept doesn't exist. And
then I thought more if energy independence is created by production, that is
fundamentally unprofitable.
Bethany McLean:
And so in and of itself, it's dependent on flows from the capital markets and the
willingness of global investors to fund an unprofitable enterprise, then that's not
independent either. It's completely dependent on the appetite of global investors,
on where interest rates are, on what other investment opportunities are available.
So I thought this whole thing is a mirage, and yet you hear energy independence, at
least you heard it repeated over and over again. And it was some sort of idealized
statement that at the time the words were invented actually meant something, but
they got stripped of their meaning over the ensuing decades. And yet we kept
saying them like a talisman.
Jacob Shapiro:
Have you, this is not related to Saudi America, have you been watching this Netflix
show Occupied?
Bethany McLean:
No. Should I?
Jacob Shapiro:
You should. It's about, I think I recommended this in the last podcast listeners, so
I'm sorry for repeating myself, but it's this Norwegian French show where the
Norwegians have created some way to have completely clean energy and the EU
and Russia gang up, and basically invade Norway and force them to keep pumping
oil and gas to the rest of the EU. It's really great, it's
Bethany McLean:
Oh, fascinating. Okay, I'm going to watch that. That'll be next on my list. I'm
watching Russian Doll right now, which I find fascinating and interesting, so I can go
from Russian Doll to Occupied.
Jacob Shapiro:
Yeah. So it'll all make sense. But but back on track, before we sort of talk about
some other stuff I wanted to zoom out and just ask you, so what do you think about
the future? You actually laid out three scenarios from IHS at the end of the book,
one of which was called rivalry. It was this free market of energy, sort of future
autonomy was another one, which was basically a rapid shift to renewables. And
then the third was vertigo, which was this boom bust cycle that prevented a
transition away from a less carbon intensive economy. The book came out in 2018, it
feels to me like we're in vertigo. As somebody who does geopolitics for a living, I
see the boom bust cycles, I see countries like India and South Africa still dependent
on coal, have no incentive to move to anything else in the short to medium term,
especially with how volatile international politics is becoming. Where did you think
we were in 2018 when it came out and where do you think we are now? And then
where do you think we're going? I guess a three part question there.
Bethany McLean:
So the the humbling thing about working on this book was that I realized everybody
who's made predictions about the oil market in the past has mostly one thing in
common, which is that they've been wrong. And so I stayed away from predictions
in the book, which is why I was so happy when I found that IHS scenario, because I
thought it made things very clear without me having to actually make a prediction
of any kind. I do think we've moved closer to vertigo. And certainly with the
pandemic has exacerbated that in the sense that oil prices plunged, and now they're
back up. And there's an argument that because oil production has been curtailed so
badly, both by the failure of fracking and by the underinvestment over the past
decade and other forms, more conventional forms of oil production that we can't fill
the hole.
Bethany McLean:
And so the idea that we are going to continue in this blissful period of low oil prices,
where nobody really had to think about it was contingent on fracking's continued
growth. And if that's over and we have to turn back to more conventional sources
of supply, we might suddenly be back in a world where oil shortages seem like a
real thing, and that could lead to huge spikes in the price of oil. But we probably are
on the way to a future where most of our energy needs are met by renewables.
Bethany McLean:
So those spikes are going to conflict with this idea that the age of oil is coming to
an end, and you don't have to have it come to an end. You just have to know that
it's coming to an end for the price to go into secular decline. So you have these
basically competing forces battling with each other. And I don't know, but I guess if
I had to place a bet, I would bet now on continued vertigo and possibly huge spikes
in the price of oil and that the cost of energy becoming a discussion here that we
haven't really had since the 1970s.
Jacob Shapiro:
Yeah. It feels that way. It also feels like the United States has some agency in this
question. And I think that's maybe why I was so drawn to your book and to this
topic in general, maybe it was why you were too because the United States by
virtue of its incredible energy wealth it can move markets if it wants to, it can define
incentives for different industries or different parts of the industry if it wants to. But
it's going to have to get away from this idea that everything's going to work itself
out the way it is in the market right now, that's not going to work. If that's the way
we go, it's vertigo I think no question, maybe 10, 15 years, we get our act together
when we're forced to.
Jacob Shapiro:
But it feels like the United States has a chance here to be proactive and to be a
source of real positive, I don't want to say positive and good, that makes it sound a
little too fluffy, but it has a chance to really sustain the global economy and the
international order that it's already built by allowing that transition to be more
seamless and to use different parts of it. But it's going to really have to be a
philosophical and a policy shift at a very deep level. And I just don't see anybody
thinking about it or talking about it that way right now, they have other things to
deal with too, I mean we're in a pandemic.
Bethany McLean:
It is really interesting because you're right, that we just don't focus on energy the
way we really should. And when you think of how critical it is to all of our lives, in
fact that battles over access to energy have caused most wars throughout human
history, this is a very big issue. And yet it just doesn't get the attention on the
national level that it should. I do wonder, when you look at the pandemic, the fact
that we now have vaccines as a direct result of Operations Warp Speed, which is
the government essentially creating a market. It to me proves the lie to this notion
that capitalism exists separately from government decisions, that there is such a
thing as a free market, because in a way, the fact that there are vaccines way before
anybody thought was possible, it's the best of entrepreneurship and innovation, but
yet it took a government commitment to creating a market to make that exist.
Bethany McLean:
And so why can't you bring some of that same thinking to the energy sphere, but
the United States has never had an energy policy. I also think geopolitically, there's
something scary about it for all of us, but particularly for America, because we do
have so much access to non renewables. And the geopolitics in a world that is
powered by renewables are very different, getting to think about that. Nobody even
knows what that looks like, and it's kind of a fascinating, scary unpredictable new
world. And so if you're thinkers who are mired in the century of geopolitics
surrounding energy, that dictates strategy and choices in the world to suddenly
transition thinking in an entirely different way, it has both necessary but I think also
frightening.
Jacob Shapiro:
Yeah. And I also, as long as renewables is dependent on things like cobalt or lithium
or rare earths, we have a picture of what it would look like. It would look like the
1950s and 1960s, which brought us wonderful things like the Korean War and the
Cuban Missile Crisis. And Congo usually gets swept under the rug here, all weird
competitions in far away places, because on the map they had some access to
resource or a political ideology that was important, and it was important for the
heavyweights to sort of duke it out. So as long as renewables require some of those
minerals that are scattered around the world, it probably looks like that.
Jacob Shapiro:
Probably looks like the Chinese and the French and the Americans running around
in Africa, running around in places in South America, trying to get those resources
out in a way so that they can have their renewable grid et cetera. And the weird
part is that in just the span of 10 years, because of the fracking, the United States is
in the position of having oil if it needs it, and having hydrocarbons if it actually
needs it. And that's what gives it such agency. We can either use that to try and
create a global system that is more sustainable, or we can use that to screw over
the Chinese or screw over whoever we don't like. It really is a choice at that level I
think.
Bethany McLean:
That's really interesting. And yes, and I think there is also the subtext of what you're
saying is that there is this rosie renewables aura where we all think isn't it going to
be a better, pretty old world once renewables have eclipsed non renewables, but
maybe not. When you think about that scramble for rare earth materials and the
ugliness involved in acquiring them and mining them and the waste produced by
making solar panels, there is room for a policy that thinks about all of that and
creates a nuanced mixture of energy sources that doesn't lead to a really ugly fight
over rare earth materials.
Jacob Shapiro:
Yeah. Trying to find nuance in 2021 is pretty hard. I feel likeBethany McLean:
Oh man, that is definitely the thing that went missing this year. If it existed before
our 2021 murdered nuance.
Jacob Shapiro:
Yeah. But it's depressing too because the road to hell is paved with good intentions.
The reason we have nuclear bombs was because scientists in the 1920s and 1930s
thought they were going to discover a new renewable source of energy that was
going to be free for everyone. That's why we started researching that stuff in the
first place. So take that as a warning listeners for if we continue on this path, things
are not going to go well. Bethany I'm conscious of time, and I wanted to pick your
brain for just a couple minutes about Enron, if that's cool, if we can switch gears for
a second. I'm betraying my age a little bit here, Enron's like one of the first sort of
political things that happened when I had memory or consciousness of what was
going on really, and was aware of what was going on, but didn't really know a lot
about it.
Jacob Shapiro:
Just sort of knew some bad thing happened, in my household I don't think there
was that much Enron stock, but I think there was a little Enron stock based on some
of the feelings I was feeling at the dinner table. But when I picked up Smartest Guys
in the Room after finishing Saudi America, I was thinking, and it started off this way,
I was thinking, Oh, this is going to kind of be like Halberstam's Best and the
Brightest. I used to think that the U.S. was stupid about Vietnam, and then I read
Best and the Brightest, and I still thought they were stupid, but I felt like everybody
was trying to do the right thing. I could see how they got trapped into thisBethany McLean:
Let's go back to your quote.
Jacob Shapiro:
Yeah. But I could see how it happened. Smartest Guys in the Room, I just got
increasingly angrier the more I read, and by the end I was ready to light myself on
fire. It didn't feel like there was any goodwill anywhere, it just all felt like a bad joke
in some ways. So I just wanted to ask, how did you stay sane? Am I being too strong
there? I'm sure that there were people within the system and the system itself
victimizes people in different ways obviously. But it just felt like there was a lot of
bad will there that it wasn't that people got convinced of some bright future, but
that really people were just doing bad things and taking advantage of a system that
let them do that.
Bethany McLean:
That's interesting. I don't know, maybe I'd become, oddly enough maybe in the
almost two decades since I wrote that book, dear God. And I've become more
forgiving in some ways, maybe because I've seen so much more. And so if that was
my attitude at the time, it is less so now. And that to your quote again, the road to
hell is paved with good intentions, I do think there was a lot of fervor to change the
world at Enron, but it was mixed in a particularly American way with a desire to get
rich now. And so when those two things combine and people can delude
themselves, that they are making money for a grand cause that is revolutionary or
changing the world, see fairness, that's the most dangerous form of self-delusion
that there is.
Bethany McLean:
And I think that's what pervaded Enron was that combination. And I guess I have
some... I think it leads to a great deal of damage in the world, but I get it from the
human perspective because it happens time and time again, and forms both small
and large that we camouflage our own ambitions to ourselves in this greater sense
of societal good or revolution so that we can justify terrible things that we're doing
while lining our own pockets. And that's just the story that plays out time and time
again.
Jacob Shapiro:
Yeah. One of the questions I had written down, and then after I wrote it down, I
realized it was a stupid question, which was I wanted to ask you if you thought
there could ever be another Enron sort of type event again. But then I was like, well,
but we had the 2008 financial crisis and then we had Theranos and I'm sure we're
going to have three others with all the stimulus that's come through, somebody's
going to misappropriate that or use it in some kind of fraudulent way. So it sort of
feels like we haven't actually learned anything either from Enron, that the lesson is
not taken.
Bethany McLean:
Well, it's actually really funny because when the global financial... Well it's not
funny, but when the global financial crisis was brewing, I sort of dismissed warnings
that we were headed for something really bad because I thought I wrote about
Enron. That's my financial crisis in my lifetime, nothing like this is going to happen
again. That was the story it's done, maybe when I'm 90, there'll be something else
that's like that, but that's a cataclysm like that. And since then we've had just any
number of things, obviously, and they seem to be happening at an accelerated pace
vis-a-vis the past, or maybe it's just that it's recency bias and it's just the time we're
living in that we see it happening. So it feels more like it's happening more now.
And I haven't actually done an empirical study to know which is the correct take on
that.
Bethany McLean:
But for sure, I think the forces that created Enron are the same ones we've been
talking about now. Short-termism for sure which still pervades our system to a
shocking degree, despite the fact that we've been talking for at least two decades
about how damaging it is. This idea that visionaries can be excused for all of their
moral failings and that we can't ask questions of visionaries because they're so
great and grand that they'll figure it all out. That's Theranos, that's Elon Musk to
some extent, and that's still an open question how that plays out. But no, I don't
think we've learned any of the lessons from Enron.
Jacob Shapiro:
Great. That's the exact uplifting note I was hoping to close on. That's oneBethany McLean:
I still have plenty to talk about, and I still have plenty to write about. Can you
imagine how boring a world it would be if everybody functioned as they
purportedly should?
Jacob Shapiro:
Well, I'd sign up for a little bit more of a boring world.
Bethany McLean:
Yeah. No, I think we've had all the excitement we can take for a while and we'll do
there.
Jacob Shapiro:
Before I let you go, what are you working on next? What's on your mind right now?
Bethany McLean:
Joe Nocera, my longtime colleague who edited the Enron book and who I wrote All
the Devils are Here with, and I are doing a book on the pandemic and it is less blow
by blow of the Trump administration's failings and more of an economic look at the
factors that hindered our response to the pandemic, what went wrong, what went
right. And the fundamental changes that we're going to come out of this with.
Jacob Shapiro:
Okay. Well, you'll have to agree to come back on and talk about that when that
book comes out.
Bethany McLean:
I would love to, this has been fantastic. Thank you.
Jacob Shapiro:
Thank you so much Bethany, for taking the time and we'll see you again, cheers.
Rethinking wealth
Copyright 2023
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