Episode 94: Committing Geopolitical Suicide
Jacob Shapiro: Hello listeners and welcome back to another episode of Cognitive Dissidents. As usual, I'm your host. I'm Jacob Shapiro. I'm a partner and the director of Geopolitical Analysis at Cognitive Investments. It is always a pleasure to welcome back Kamran Bokhari, who is the senior director of the Eurasian Security and Prosperity Portfolio at the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy Back to the Forecast.
Kamran, as longtime listeners of this podcast, will know is a good friend, and he's come on several times and we're happy to have him on, um, this week to discuss the situation in Pakistan. Um, Kamran really also opened my eyes to some of the issues in the South caucuses. I had some awareness of what was going on there, but he really added some richness to it there too.
Um, Kamran has really been focusing on Central Asia recently, uh, and we're gonna have him back on to do just an episode on Central Asia itself, not least because, um, you know, we're, we're recording here on May 18th. Um, China had a big summit in Central Asia this week and China's. Seems to be muzzling into the region as Russia is distracted with its ongoing war in Ukraine.
But we will have Kamran back on in a couple weeks to talk Central Asia for now. Um, I'm pushing this episode out as quickly as we can. Um, it might mean that the cadence has bunched up a little bit here, so you're gonna get episodes from me almost daily here for the next, or you might have gotten episodes from me daily here for the past couple of days, but the world is just changing so fast right now.
We can't sit on this episode because Pakistan, um, well, I'll let you listen to the podcast itself, but it's a very, very dire situation there. So, um, listeners, if you wanna know more about the knowledge platform, the CI knowledge platform that we wrote, that we rolled out a couple weeks ago, please check out our website, cognitive.investments, or email me directly@jacobcognitive.investments.
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Horizon. You should consult your attorney or tax advisor. Well, this is not, this is not meant to be a proper exercise come around. The podcast has always, uh, has always tried to be conversations with friends. Um, you know, imbibing some beverage with the microphones just so happened to be on and I wish we were doing it in person, but I appreciate you making the time to come back on.
You've got, it sounds like you've got a very busy schedule,
Kamran Bokhari: but yeah, just, uh, Too much happening. And then there's daddy duty. My daughter's in 10th grade and she is, uh, she takes up a lot of my bad.
Jacob Shapiro: Um, well this is gonna be a terrible segue, but what's taking up a lot of global bandwidth in the world right now is your home country of Pakistan. Um, I didn't know who else I wanted to talk to about this because I really, I mean, I know some things about Pakistan and I've been trying to keep abreast of the situation there, but it's confusing even for somebody whose life is about geopolitics to figure out what's going on there.
Um, just sort of the lay of the land and tell me, and like maybe I'll give the listeners a very brief lay of the land, come around and you can sort of help me as we go from there. Um, Imran Hahn was this cricketer populist guy who became Pakistan's Prime Minister. At first the military seemed to like him, then the military and Han soured on each other.
He eventually gets the boot and. While he gets the boot. Also, Pakistan's dealing with an economic crisis with a balance of payment crisis and the flooding catastrophe and high prices of food and energy, all these other things. So the new government trying to get funds from the I M F Con is still out there, you know, politicking and trying to get his P T I party going on.
But in the last couple weeks, things have really escalated so, Han gets arrested by Pakistani police forces, uh, for not, apparently not cooperating with an investigation into corruption allegations. Then, um, there are protests in which apparently Pakistani military installations get attacked by protestors.
Then the Pakistani Supreme Court comes in and says, well, Han's arrest was illegal. You need to release him. He is subsequently arrested, and as we're recording here on Thursday, May 18th, according to Han. Pakistani security forces are outside his home. We're waiting to arrest him again. Um, this will publish on Monday probably, so we'll have a couple days between now and then.
For all I know he'll get arrested again and released again between then. Um, but maybe just help us sort through the lay of the land. I think it's probably too simplistic to just say this is about the military versus Khan. It's, I mean, there's the current government, there's the judiciary, there's the political parties themselves.
There's just a lot of noise here. So help us, maybe just help us at the broad outsets was anything I said wrong just now and sort of where do you think we need to watch going forward to understand what's happening in Pakistan?
Kamran Bokhari: No, I think you summed it up pretty well, Jacob. Um, look, uh, I think that the old ways of looking at Pakistan or sort of the old net assessment to use an old terminology is perhaps no longer valid, uh, because we're in, you know, undiscovered country, uncharted territory here.
Um, look, the, the military has always produced proxies, both political and militant. And the, the experiment didn't go well then, you know, they know how to deal with it Yes. With difficulty. But in the end they do. Uh, you know, the, the military as an institution, uh, remains insular to the experiment, if you will.
Mm-hmm. Uh, and so what's happening now? So, you know, before I jump into what's happening now, just take for example, uh, the, the Pakistan Muslim League of former Prime Minister Nawa Shri, uh, he was a proxy of the military not too long ago, you know, 25, 30 years ago. Uh, and he was brought to power to counter, uh, former Prime Minister, uh, the late Benze Pakistan people's party.
So the result of that was, yes, you counter, you know, the Pakistan people's party by creating a new party and backing it, but then that party goes rogue. So then what do you do? Hence the mahar coup of 1999. Uh, and, and during the Mahar era, you will recall both political parties were out in the, in the wilderness and once Mahar, uh, once after Mahar was gone, or actually even before he was formally gone, both parties made their way back in.
Mm-hmm. Uh, if you look at the militant proxies that the Pakistani military has cultivated over the decades, uh, they have, you know, there's been blowback on that 80,000 to a hundred thousand people have lost their lives in insurgency that ran somewhere between 2006, seven, all the way to 20, the 15, 16 and after a lot of blood and treasure being, uh, spent.
Uh, They got a handle on it or you know, they were able to contain it. The problem still there, but you know, it's, it's more manageable right now. Uh, and this is all pre Taliban coming to power, the Taliban in power in Afghanistan. That whole calculus is also, uh, you know, needs to be revisited and we need to reassess what's going on there.
But Iran HA was brought in, Iran HA has been a political force for, you know, 25, 27 years. And it wasn't until the 2011 or roundabout there that the military took interest in him as a third force to break the duopoly. So first they created a duopoly, then they're gonna break the duo. That experiment didn't really took me a few years to, you know, put the party together, build it, cultivate it.
And in 2018 through very clever electoral engineering, they brought Honda Power. Now, guess what? That r we rogue as well. It, look it. There, there, there, there's a, a certain logic here. If you are a political party that is allied, that has managed to come to power, uh, with the help of the establishment, the military led establishment, you will not always be, you know, on the proverbial same page with your patron.
Mm-hmm. Uh, your calculus is different, their calculus is different. Uh, and at some point the honeymoon period is over and you find yourself at odds over, you know, things that seemingly look like tactical issues. But beneath those, tho those tactical issues is, is a broader problem, which is that a divergence of interest and therefore it's only inevitable, uh, that you run afoul of your former benefactor.
Now the, the uniqueness of Han is that Han actually and his P t I, uh, it wasn't just an one of those run of the mill. Political proxies. Uh, it was a proxy that had deep relations with the ecosystem of the military, with, you know, the broader social fabric of the military, the retirees, their families, and so on and so forth, which makes up a good chunk of the middle class.
And so, uh, for the longest time they were, these were allies. It's, it's, there's a, there's sort of a, for those who sort of, uh, among your listeners who understand what's happening in Turkey, it's kind of like what happened between the Golan and the A K P. They came together to defeat the Kalis. Once that was over, it was between them.
And I think that that's what has happened. Their ecosystems overlap. Uh, and what Han has achieved, uh, you know, is that he basically penetrated through what was largely insular military institution and its broader ecosystem. And there was lots of support and there still is, uh, han from within. You know, the serving officers at junior ranks, mid ranks, high ranks.
It's an opaque institution. There's the fog of war. We cannot tell for sure, you know, uh, what is the scale of that precise scale of that support. But he didn't come this far. By attacking Headon and calling out by name officers, the Army chiefs, the head of the ISI and his associates so publicly, something no other politician has ever done before.
And until now he was getting away with it. And I think that is the major shift that has happened in, in sort of the, the Pakistani political system that for the first time, the military's own ecosystem, its own body politic has been contaminated by a proxy, uh, in such a significant way. Now, this doesn't mean that Hanah has overwhelmed the military, but it poses a significant problem.
Wouldn't you explain, uh, to a large extent why it took them a year, actually 13 months to actually crack down on the guy, uh, because they were, you know, uh, basically link him, you know, giving him a wide birth to vent his anger and whatnot, let him talk and, you know, eventually the, the temperature became too high.
And you know, they put the incident of the attack on military facilities on May 9th after the arrest of Hahn was just sort of the trigger for this thing to come to blows.
Jacob Shapiro: Well, where, where does, where does Khan go from here? Because it seems like picking a battle with the Pakistani military for as popular or for as much as he's, as he's been able to convert some of the body politic to his point of view.
I mean, the Pakistani military is stronger and they haven't just surrounded his house with police. They're arresting supporters. They're probably suppressing dissent. I mean, if the Pakistani military, uh, feels like it is threatened, like the proxy has gotten beyond itself, won't the Pakistani military sort of cut off its own arm to, to cure the patient?
I mean, I, I feel like this is not gonna end well for him. But he doesn't, he's not acting like a man who thinks that he's in danger. He's acting like a man who se he seems to think he's holding the cards, or at least he's acting that way. Maybe it's an act.
Kamran Bokhari: So yes and no. Um, he does think that he holds the cards, um, He doubles down.
I mean, he's not a quitter. He's not one to throw in the towel. He's very competitive. People who have followed his career, particularly his cricket career, know that very well. Uh, you know, he, uh, many people may not recall or even know about this, but he actually mounted a coup against his old captain, uh, when, you know, during his cricket years and became captain.
So that's, uh, for those who have lived long enough and remember those days, or at least pay attention to cricket, are well aware of that. But there is that side to him and he's, he's not gonna throw in the towel. Uh, he firmly believes that, uh, he is, you know, he's the one righteous in this battle. He sees himself as fighting the good cause.
Uh, in other words, he's actually drunk his own koolaid. Uh, and, but uh, more importantly, he thinks that, uh, if he keeps at it, he will eventually win. Uh, you know, he, he, he, he has, he sees himself having come to a point where, yes, there'll be setbacks like the one that's happening right now with lots of defections from his party, uh, happening as we speak.
Uh, lots of party members, associates condemning the violence by the party. Uh, and they're, you know, this isn't happening organically. This is. Being, you know, this is something that, uh, you know, prompted by the military because they have influence and they're mm-hmm. Basically going to these people and say, you know, your man is out of control and you gotta decide which side you're on cuz this has gone too far.
Uh, so despite that, I think he, he thinks from his point of view that, uh, you know, right now there's a setback, but eventually I'm gonna come out looking good. And he's, he's just not one of those people who is going to throw in the towel. So, so in other words, the military did business with an actor, um, That was very atypical from the type of people they're used to.
The typical politicians, those who are futile in nature, come from, you know, large agrarian holdings to, you know, major businesses and whatnot. I'm talking about, you know, the, the old pop, uh, the usual suspects or the old class of politicians. Uh, this guy's very different and he's given, he's given them a tough time.
But at the end of the day, you're right. Look, you can't come to power on the back of the military and then within, say, what has it been four years, uh, gain enough power to turn against them and hope to succeed. No, uh, obviously you're gonna be cut down to size. I think he, uh, he's, he's seen a, a setback. We we're not sure what's going to happen to him.
Uh, what he has writing for himself, and something I should have mentioned earlier is that he's the most popular politician in the country. Yep. Uh, and it wouldn't be an exaggeration that if elections were held today that he would, I'm not willing to say that he may get a two third majority, but that is the fear of the establishment, that if he gets that, then they're, you know, it'll be much more difficult for them to handle the per, uh, Han.
But he will, uh, you know, win a large, a comfortable majority. Uh, and that's the problem. And that he think, he thinks that that is his winning card and he's gonna leverage and milk that for all it's worth. He's not going to give up. He may be forced, uh, into a position that is uncomfortable, but eventually he, he, I mean, he, see, look, he's 70 years old and probably, well a little bit over 70.
Uh, He, I mean, he sees himself. He's building a legacy for himself. He wants to be remembered as a great leader of the country. So this is an man you can't wheel and deal with. In the normal way of that, the Pakistani military has gotten used to wheeling and dealing with the usual politicians.
Jacob Shapiro: I have to confess that when I'm 70 years old, um, I hope that I'm on a beach somewhere, drinking little drinks with little umbrellas in them.
I, I have a hard time with all these politicians, you know, Erdowan and Biden and Trump running around. They're old and they're, I, I wouldn't want to do it if I was as successful as these guys, I'd be somewhere else, but maybe that's not why I'm a politician. Kamran, if I could, if I could zero in a little bit more on what you just said, cuz I don't have a good sense of this.
Why is Han so popular? Because it's not like he's presided over a period of. Particularly good economic policy for Pakistan. If anything, I mean the Pakistan economy, which should be actually really well suited for this multipolar world that we're, you know, emer entering into Pakistan, has great strategic location.
Hundreds of millions of people, well educated, lots of natural resources, and yet, Pakistan's running out of money. They can't afford energy. All these things are happening to them, and they can't take advantage. They look across the border at India and the distance between India and even Bangladesh, Pakistan continues to expand.
Those two countries have a lot of economic dynamism that Pakistan just doesn't have. And it's not like Han changed anything there. So what, what is the source of his popularity? And maybe you'll go back to the Turkey comparison, which, you know, Erdogan at first gave good economic policy, but then he's developed this emotional bond with a large part of the Turkish electorate that votes for him in spite of their own economic interests.
Is is that what Han has? He has this emotional bond with the people. I, I have trouble sort of parsing through why people are so enamored with him or have such feelings of loyalty towards
Kamran Bokhari: him. So that's a great question. Um, and the answer is that, um, people don't necessarily love him or, uh, support him for who he is.
But he is perceived by a vast majority of people. Uh, and keep in mind that, you know, the, the bulge is growing in Pakistan. Mm-hmm. Uh, and new. There are at least, uh, um, um, from what I've seen as many as 18 million new voters who are going to be participating in the next election. That entire, uh, strata of society, uh, is sick of the usual politicians is sick of the military's intervention in politics.
Uh, and they see in hon, hope so. Yes, he hasn't delivered. But then the question is, look, he wasn't allowed to deliver. Uh, even when he was in power. Uh, you know, people can point to him being encumbered by the army, by the intelligence services. Um, you know, he kept saying, look, I'm going to put away and lock up all these people, the crooks and the thieves.
Uh, basically his political audience, but yet he couldn't. And so they, they, they, people have sympathy for him, that he's fighting their good, their fight. Uh, they really believe in what he says. Uh, and he's been really, really savvy in terms of being able to build a narrative. Um, you know, he is, uh, he's, you know, Pakistan's Trump.
I mean, he can, he has his loyal following. And then there are a large number of people who may not love him and, but they hate the other side. And they say, Hey, we game chance to be up everybody else at more than once. So let this guy come in. And then there are those who say, you know, if he wins, he wins because we want democracy in this country.
So let it be, this is everything, you know, all of this benefits him. So he's riding this wave, so he's not, uh, he hasn't delivered anything, in fact, on delivery. You know, one of the arguments that is made is that if he wasn't thrown out of office with the void of no confidence in April of 2022, uh, he would not be so popular today.
Um, plus there's the political machine that he put together. Um, he has appropriated the narratives that historically were developed by the military in the intelligence services. And he is, well, you know, a, you know, his machine is probably the most efficient when it comes to the use of social media, uh, and narrative building.
They're, you know, great info operators, if you will. And so it's, it's, it's a latent sentiment. But it's also the leveraging of that sentiment through skillful is, is, and his team is, uh, you know, a large number of young people who, uh, are ambitious, energetic, tech savvy. Uh, whereas the old political parties, they're like, you know, dinosaurs and they don't have comparable machines to, to go out.
They're still doing politics the old way. So all of this explains his, his popularity just not so much love for him. There are, there is that core cult-like, if you will, following, but on top of that, it is the hatred of everybody else that lets people gravitate towards him. Yeah. Or directs bef
Jacob Shapiro: Well, where does Pakistan go from here?
Kamran. I mean, there really hasn't been substantive change in this country for. Decades, half a century. I mean, it's basically just been the same story repeated over and over and over again with different characters. Is, is Pakistan just sort of condemned to this eternal return of the same bullshit forever?
Or is, is there some kind of change that could happen with Pakistan in, in the context of this conflict? Or could this get worse? Could we get, are we looking at a real civil conflict within the country? Um, what, what are our signposts for going forward?
Kamran Bokhari: I think that it's gonna get worse than before it gets better, uh, and a lot worse because, you know, let's just look at the financial leagues of the country.
You know, e everybody has a different number, uh, but, you know, let's, it's safe to say that Pakistan needs at least 20 to 30 billion, uh, of assistance to get back on its feet. Two's just not, the money is not there. There is, nobody is willing to cuff up that amount of money, even collected. There is no incentive.
Look, United States, there are reasons why the United States historically, uh, aided Pakistan to the tune of tens of billions of dollars because there was a, an interest. So in the ni, the first trench of money, or the first period of close US Pakistani relations is the sixties, the height of the Cold War.
Pakistan is a frontline state. So therefore Pakistan becomes the beneficiary of alon of US financial assistance. Mm-hmm. And military assistance. Uh, you fast forward another couple of decades. In the 1980s, you have the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that becomes the driver for yet another long period, 10 years of a large infusion of financial assistance.
Uh, you can fast forward further to the Mahar era between, you know, 2001 and 2007 eight. You have the post nine 11 and it's aftermath. That becomes the basis for which, uh, the United States again, pumps money. There are, there is no basis for which there is no appetite in the United States to help out Afghanistan.
There's no reason the world has changed. The United States has cut its losses, Afghanistan and has moved on. There is the Russian and Bo in Ukraine. There is climate change. There is China. There are a host of other issues that just we're sucking up the bandwidth. That's the United States, uh, China. I mean, China has already poured, you know, tens of billions of dollars in its signature b r I initiative called the China Pakistan economic corridor.
And they're not seeing any return on their investment. In fact, they're looking at losses, you know, and so if you're the Chinese and you're looking at this situation, would you want to invest more money here? No. Nope. Then if you go to the Arab states, the Saudis and the Ammas are probably the most closest of allies of the Pakistanis, and they have a lot more influence in Pakistan.
Then do the Chinese and the Americans, uh, they're looking at this and saying, oh my God, you know, what are we dealing with over here? I mean, recently the Saudi finance minister, and it was a hint to both Pakistan and Egypt, indirect statement that we are no longer in the business of cutting checks. You know, we will invest, but we wanna see reforms.
Who are they saying that to? They're saying that to the Pakistanis because that's where, you know, they just, you know, I don't wanna say a blank check, but something close to it and say, okay, here brother, you got problems again. Here goes solve your problems. Uh, that's over. So, so Pakistan's problems are not improving.
Uh, uh, uh, you know, are, are growing larger, they're not being addressed. Uh, so that's a huge, huge, uh, dilemma for Pakistan. Then you've got, you know, a Taliban one Afghanistan, but you don't have relations with India in, if you had some trade relations, you could say, okay, maybe, you know, we can work something out here that's not happening.
Uh, so where is this country going? I, I, I think, you know, and I hate to say this, but I think that. If the Pakistanis cannot get their act together and soon, uh, it's not beyond the pale to say that we're looking at a failed state situation.
Jacob Shapiro: A failed state with nuclear weapons no less, no
Kamran Bokhari: had nuclear weapons.
240 plus million people ordering nuclear, bordering two other nuclear weapon states and Afghanistan and Iran. Well,
Jacob Shapiro: ironically, I mean, that might be the interest that actually does get the foreign or the international community involved here because if suddenly, you know, the Pakistani government is not there to take care of, of Pakistani nukes, I mean that does have major, major global issues.
Kamran Bokhari: Yes. I mean, you know, one of this is kind of like the Chinese strategy. Uh, you need, if you want to go do business anywhere you in your China, you want to be able to go into a state that's mal. A Malibu state, by definition is one that isn't very strong. Mm-hmm. The problem is the Chinese put in money and it becomes even more weaker and they lose, you know, in other words, the Chinese are hoping that, you know, citrus parus, nothing will change.
All things being equal, everything will go on the same and we're, we're gonna be able to make money that doesn't happen. Be, and we've seen this, and even today, there's an article, uh, in, in the press about how, uh, Chinese debt has led to, you know, has had devastating effects on many countries. Pakistan included, Sri Lanka included.
Uh, you know, there's, there's a mention of Mongolia, although I'm, I, I know very little about what, what that relationships looked like. But the point is that if you, if you're the United States and you're worried about nukes, You, what can you do? You need a partner in country. If the partner is at war with itself and there is no coherent partner to work with, then how are you?
Who are you going to give money to? How are you going to do that? And let's say you are able to find the partner and that, but past experience tells you that it's not worked, then you know, you don't really have a solution. So, and then we've never had in the history of the species, the situation where a, you know, a nuclear weapon state fail.
The closest thing that comes to mind is the implosion of the Soviet Union, but, Soviet, the union included, it was replaced by the Russian Federation. Now that reality is also changing and we have to worry about, you know, if a defeat in Ukraine needs to Russia be destabilizing, what does that mean? And in the case of Pakistan, uh, you know, at least Russia, there is some institution.
There's, even if it is autocratic and not, and there are resources that if, you know, you can sort of still stand the degradation. Here there are no resources and degradation is picking up pace.
Jacob Shapiro: Yeah. Last question on Pakistan before we sort of turn to some other parts of, of the Muslim world. Um, obviously there is so much water under the bridge between Indian Pakistan, you know, not least of which is, you know, Muslim versus Hindu.
And I mean, we could go on forever about why, um, the division ha why partition happened. And I don't wanna go there per se, but the only thing I wanna ask is, isn't this India's problem ultimately, if India's going to be this great geopolitical power and be self-reliant and do all these things that it's talking about, um, doesn't India sort of have to solve this problem?
Because India's really the only, I mean, no other great power in the world or aspiring great power in the world, whether you're Brazil or Turkey or China, like nobody else has. A country with 200 million people with nuclear weapons. That is your sworn enemy on the border that you don't talk to, you don't really have relations with.
So isn't it India's problem is, and is there really anything India can do here? It
Kamran Bokhari: is India's problem. If you look at it, empathetically, put yourself in the shoes of the Indians. Uh, this is a nightmare scenario. Here you are trying to be, you know, the fifth largest economy of the world emerging as a geo-economic power.
Uh, and you, you know, have problems with the Chinese. You're trying to maintain, uh, you know, an independent foreign policy while you are aligning more and more with the United States, and you've got your own problems. I mean, the world is a complicated place in which you are emergent. And next door you have this state that is committing geopolitical suicide.
Uh, and, and, and, and you are. Looking at this and saying, oh my God, what are we gonna do about this? Uh, the the reality is there's not much the Indians can do about it. What are they? I mean, they can hope for the best. Uh, then there's the, you know, the, the other complication, which is that right now, uh, Pakistan is, is in, you know, is tanking.
But, but India also is turning into, or as turned into, you know, what many would call a majoritarian democracy and anibal democracy, uh, where you have the rise right wing, Hindu nationalism. That, and between Pakistan's problems and then beyond Pakistan lies the, you know, the. The, you know, the scary emirate of the Taliban.
So this, this is a, a contiguous land mass that has problems in the entire sort of western slang of India, uh, is mired into uncertainty to a least, if not outright crisis and conflict. Uh, so it, it's, it's how do the Indians deal with this, uh, will depend a lot upon how the Pakistanis deal with their own situation.
Because at the end of the day, uh, India has to deal with whoever is in power in Pakistan, uh, uh, can the military. And that is one of the problems. I mean, the end of the sheriff era proved one thing that the military, uh, you know, his ability to hit reset, uh, and, you know, peop its dominant position in the political economy.
I is waning. And, and this experiment, you know, that, uh, has exploded in their face, in the face of the military experiment called Iran. Hah. Uh, is, is is further, you know, uh, if you will, uh, highlighting that dilemma that you, you don't have a political system, uh, that can function, uh, with and, and you can't have the military come in and, and hit the reset button cuz it doesn't have the reset button anymore.
This, this situation can't be reset and you just, there's just so many stakeholders. Now, you know, one of the reasons why Imran Han was arrested by paramilitary forces. Uh, is, you know, because, you know, the courts were giving him a pass. It's not that they gave him a pass after he was arrested, but they were giving him a pass because that's just the way the legal system works.
Just because there's a politician that you don't like and is not doing the kind of things that you want him to do, uh, or, or is threatening your interest, uh, you just can't lock him up. So, you know, there's, there's a, a, a, there is democracy in Pakistan. There's a democratic side to Pakistan, but then there is also this autocratic side to Pakistan and the, the, those two universes aren't able to coexist in.
Uh, and, and, and the coexistence was there because the military kind of maneuvered an engineer. Because the civilian space was wheat. Pakistan was a much different country in decades past, there weren't a whole lot of people to begin with. Hmm. The the dollar was not at 300 rupe. Uh, you know, the Pakistani currency hadn't devalued.
The economic situation was far back. We did not have social media and just, you know, that the level of public frustration wasn't there. Now, all of this is happening. What are Thes supposed to do? I mean, they just have to hope. They, they, they, they, they're, they can hope that, hey, in the end, uh, this doesn't completely.
Go out of hand and you know, there's some method to the mathes.
Jacob Shapiro: Well, on that uplifting note, um, why don't we turn to the South caucuses. Um, you were the one who said, as we were talking before we got on the podcast that you wanted to talk about the South caucuses. There's a lot going on there. There's, you know, Armenia, Aja Neg Karaba.
This is one of the areas where Russia's, um, lack of success in Ukraine creates a power vacuum because Russia used to be the dominant power here. Now Turkey and Iran and other powers are, are seeking to, um, to push their influence into this area. So what, what is happening in the South caucuses that catches your eye that we should, uh, be telling the listeners about?
Kamran Bokhari: I think that, uh, we're not paying enough attention to, uh, the South caucuses because of, uh, not just the Russian weakness, uh, but also because. Served by John. Uh, and, and this is before the Ukraine,
December of 2020, was able to alter, radically alter the balance of power in Nagorno Karaba and the broader and by extension of the broader south caucuses by taking large chunks of Al Karaba from the Army helped by the Turks. Uh, and so that was a game changer. A, it signified that Russian influence isn't what it used to be.
Uh, and the Turks saw the opportunity that they helped them with military and intelligence through military and intelligence means, and they enabled, uh, the victory that the others by Johnnys, uh, got over their historic rivals. The arm mediums one that does is not only does it show that Russia's not an influence there, and then you have the, the, the, uh, the added effect of Russia's dismal performance in Ukraine.
So you have that dynamic happening, uh, Armenia and, you know, can no longer rely on Russia. Uh, because although if you read today's papers, apparently Tremlin has invited both the others by Johnny President, uh, Mr. Ali and Mr. Russian. Uh, they are median prime Minister to come and for negotiations. Uh, but the reality is that the Russians can't shape the outcome of that region.
Turkey is, as you said, you know, uh, has punched into what was a, clearly a Russian sphere of influence. But then there's also the Southern Board, which makes it, which is in my opinion, are more interesting. I think that the Russians will realize that they need to focus on Ukraine and if they can, if they need to fix the situation for themselves in Ukraine, and if they can't do that, then.
You know, the south caucuses is, is also going to become a problem for them. So the, the order of priority over there is Ukraine first, then South caucuses, in fact, south caucuses and the north caucuses depends on the outcome of the Ukraine caucus. Mm-hmm. So Russia is not paying attention beyond saying, Hey, come, you know, we'll mediate and you're gonna have, you know, we'll have dinner together and tea and whatnot and drinks.
We'll talk about this. That's the extent. But what's really happening now because of the weakening of Russian influence is that Usai John now has a much longer border with Iran. Those territories that were under the control of, uh, the Armenians. Uh, they're, they have been taken over by the US Baja, and this is a problem for the Iranians.
Uh, and at, at a time when Iran is going through its own, uh, you know, historic evolution and, and the state is weakened. Uh, we, you know, the protests seem to have, uh, died down for now. Uh, but you know, the sentiment isn't going away. Uh, we've talked about you and I in, in previous podcasts about how, uh, the, the internal regime evolution, uh, is, is, is an inflection point.
So it comes as a, this, all of this in the south caucuses on Iran's Northern Flank comes at a very bad time for the Iranians. Now the key here is to realize that ethnic azeris who lived. And straddle that border with others by John and the South caucuses form Iran's largest minority, 25 to 30% ethnic azeris.
This terrifies the I R G C and the, and the regime as a whole, uh, because, you know, they're weak right now. And if somehow, uh, you know, looking at their, uh, co-ethnic brothers north of the, uh, border succeeding and then seeing the regime weaken, will there be a rising amongst ethnic azeris? Were Iranian citizens.
And what does that do to the regime? Uh, the other thing here is that until now, uh, the legitimacy or sort of the glue with which the Islamic Republic held all of its. Minorities, uh, you know, perhaps no more than 55% of all Iranians can claim, uh, Persian heritage, uh, ethnic heritage mm-hmm. Near Persian, Nate by culture and language was, there are large minorities, uh, we just mentioned the Azeris.
There is the balochi in the southeast. You have in the southwest, the Avazi Arabs, you have Kurds are, you know, straddled between the Azeri population and the Iraqi border. Uh, and these are arrested populations until, for the longest time you held all of this together, lieu of Islam, because this is an Islamic Republicans bureaucracy, a theocratic, parliamentary republic hybrid.
Weird hybrid. But you got along, you, you were getting by. Now that the people are completely done with the theocracy, there's no patience for it, and they're, we're seeing the rise of the I R G C trying to hold things together and have, or at least affect the soft landing for the regime. Once es no more, uh, the question of the minorities comes up.
I mean, are we, so if Islam is going to be somehow replaced with Iranian nationalism, then what about these sub nationalisms. And what is their, they'll demand their share of power if this is going to be, you know, uh, if, if Islam is no longer the thing and which is no longer because people do not subscribe.
Uh, and, and one has to wonder, you know, to what extent, uh, even in the best days of the Islamic Republic, uh, were, uh, you know, the, all these minorities subscribing to the national narrative, which was so heavily, uh, you know, rooted in theocracy, shi, Islamist theocracy. If that's no longer the case that these people wanna share their power, how will the regime deal with that?
So I think we're looking at a north south, uh, you know, reality dynamic emerging in the south caucuses. It's not just, I mean, we're, we're looking. At, uh, the south caucuses, the trucks are looking at south caucuses. The hazard by Johnnys are looking at the south caucuses as sort of this, uh, corridor by which she can have this, you know, east west trade, the trans Caspian corridor, or otherwise known as the middle corridor.
That's the frame that they're looking at. They're looking at bypassing, uh, you know, Russia and, and, and asserting their, their sovereignty even more with Russia weakening. But what about the Southern flank where you have a major, uh, state like Iran, uh, in evolution? How does that, this is a transnational problem, mind you, that it was as recent as the 18, the, the, the mid 18 hundreds that the Russians took the south caucuses from the Persians.
So it, it, what I'm saying is that we're at a historic moment here that that is unfolding, you know, which way the ships fall, uh, is anybody's guess, but I'm trying to highlight something that I see as, as really, really, uh, dramatic and potentially game changing for the region.
Jacob Shapiro: Come on. There are many reasons I love you and, uh, chief among them is the fact that for you, the mid 18 hundreds is extremely recent.
Um, but I have, I have a bunch of different thoughts that I, I wanna throw in there. The first is that, um, You know, I don't think Nagorno, Kaba and all these, you know, azaris and all these terms that are probably confusing to a lot of listeners who haven't spent time thinking about this. Um, you might think this is just sort of, you know, two nerds geeking out about geopolitics, but this is actually very significant to global supply chains and even to global markets.
Um, on the CI knowledge platform, we actually, uh, put out a report a couple months ago about how, because of the Rush Ukraine war, if you look at air freight roots in the world, they actually have to go on a pretty narrow route that goes through Ezra Baja. So if you had a kinetic conflict in this part of the world, you would see air freight roots, um, really start to shut down and you would have a lot of bottlenecks that would come up that you wouldn't really be able to solve because with Russia, Ukraine, if something happens here, it's actually a choke point that you should be thinking about in those terms.
So this has broader import in general. Um, The notion of Iranian nationalism, I mean, that almost sounds almost like an oxymoron to me, Kamran, because the, the great history of Iran and of Persia is that the way it gets all of these populations around it to quote unquote submit, is that it lets them do their own thing.
That that's sort of what made, you know, the great Persian empires of the past. They would, they would, you know, give a certain amount of independence and autonomy to local populations, understanding that Iran, the center, was where economic prosperity was located. And I get the sense Iran can't really make that argument today because there is no economic prosperity in Iran.
It's a pariah state. They've isolated themselves. There's no nuclear deal if you're an azari living in Iran. O Baja probably looks like a much more modern, much more advanced, much, a much greater financial economic opportunity there in general. And it also struck me the way you talked about this, um, you know, looking East, west and trans Caspian.
Just today we're recording on Thursday, May 18th, there's this report about the Russians and the Iranians agreeing to build a rail link as the Russians try and establish this north south corridor through Iran to the Persian Gulf and get access to, um, you know, the world's oceans. Uh, that, that seems asinine to me.
The idea that Russia's suddenly gonna let bygones be bygones with this historical rival in Iran, and it's gonna be able to project power not just in the South caucuses, but through Iran on a rail link that's gonna get all the way to the Persian Gulf. I, I just don't know what the decision makers in the Kremlin are smoking right now, but I mean, those are just some thoughts based on what you said, but I thought I would ask, um, And you can tie this back to sort of the broader points.
Um, there was that very strange report or that very strange development in January where the Azerbaijani embassy in Iran was attacked and people died in that attack in general. And it seemed to really cause a diplomatic problem between Iran and Azerbaijan. And it hasn't really gone anywhere since then.
I was actually sort of expecting things to get worse and it's just gotten very quiet. Do you have any insight about what that particular thing was about and then sort of zooming out from that, you know, what is, you talked about Iran and maybe Iran coming apart at the seams, but let's say the Supreme leader, you know, passes away in the next couple of years and the I R G C takes control.
Are you also raising the possibility of a conflict between Ezra Bejan in Iran where Iran might actually want to get involved here and or reassert itself in the south caucuses? Because that sounds awfully dire to me.
Kamran Bokhari: So the, a great question. So. Uh, that was a weird incident where this person came in and shot up, uh, you know, people at the, uh, Azer by Johnny Embassy in Tehran.
It really, really not. Look, you know, Baku and Tehran relations were never good, you know, and so the, the Iranians, you know, for both for offensive and defensive purposes, for the longest time for decades, tried to export, uh, you know, their revolutionary ideas. Uh, trying to leverage the fact that 65% of all, uh, others by Johnny Nationals are of Shia persuasion.
Sec, from a sectarian point of view, trying to push those theocratic radical Islamists Shia views. Uh, in a society that was otherwise secular. Uh, and that really created problems. And th this was done right after the implosion of the Soviet Union. Uh, and it was an opportunity. The Iranians saw, they were successful, there was pushback.
Uh, and, but part of it has to do with the fact that. An independent other by John and Europe on your northern slang, when it was a Soviet Union, was the Russian empire. It didn't really matter. Uh, they handed over, you know, in the Stan and Mank in the 18 hundreds, the Persians handed this territory, you know, uh, over to the Russians.
It said, Hey, we're done after having controlled for, for centuries. Uh, but now that Azerbaijan becomes independent and you have an ethnic azeri population that is, you know, not exactly well knit into the theocracy that is the Islamic Republic, then therefore, if it's also a defensive measure to go and promote your own, you're trying to insulate yourself.
Say, okay, if OER by Johnnys are experimenting or dabbling in our ideology, then that ins insulates our population from the reverse effect of secular ethnonationalism being, you know, uh, cultivated or promoted. Uh, so this is something that's been happening for a long time After that embassy incident, the, you know, suspicions and that acrimonious relationship just spiked, uh, both sides have expelled diplomats in recent months.
Uh, first it was the, uh, the Ozo by Johnnys and followed by the Iranians. And there's been an incident in which an MP in Ozo by John, uh, was, uh, there was an assassination attempt on him, which the Oza by Johns have, you know, indirectly accused the Iranians of trying to engineer. Uh, so relations are bad.
The I R G C and the, the regular armed forces are both have done exercises, uh, on that border ever since. The turn of events in Nag Karaba of, uh, in late 2020. So yes, I am saying that there, the, the, the likelihood of consulate between us by John and Iran is growing. What? I'm not ready to predict that it will happen, but the probability is rising.
Given everything that's happening both north of that frontier and south of that frontier. The conditions are, are conducive unless there's some form of an arrangement that assumes that both sides can reach an understanding. Uh, and therefore, you know, we're, we're looking at a potential conflict here, hopefully proven wrong.
Jacob Shapiro: I can't imagine that Azer Baja would be willing to go this route unless it either had ironclad promises of support from Turkey or ironclad promises of support from the United States. So is is, is Azerbaijan drinking its own Kool-Aid or does it feel like it has a security patron that is gonna have its back if it wants to take on an actor like Iran in the region?
Kamran Bokhari: So, um, I don't think the Azerbaijan is looking for a fight. I don't think that they're, you know, gonna go in and, and initiate one. I think they're going to be defensive. If you have, if you are OER by John, it's like Turkey and Syria. You know, if you're OER by John and south of your border, there's commotion and the regime is in flux.
What does that mean for your side of the border? Our ethnic, A area is going come in as refugees. I'm just throwing out a hypothetical scenario here. Mm-hmm. That they will have to react to that. There's also the fear that then, this is what the Ajas feel and my conversations were. They're senior officials.
They, they say that, you know, Maybe in an, uh, the Iranians become so threatened by what has happened that they initiate a conflict. So then what do we do? Plus you have to understand that there is an Israeli factor in all of this. Yeah. Other by John just opened up its embassy after having decades of diplomatic relations.
But no actual embassy in Tel Aviv. They opened their embassy a few months ago, and that's not the only place where the Israelis have opened an embassy, uh, sorry, where there's growing diplomatic relations between, uh, Israel and an, uh, the northern neighbor of Iran. The Israelis have opened an embassy in Tur Stan in recent weeks as well.
Jacob Shapiro: So have they, I I missed the, is are, did they have a, a party DJ'ed by Gur Gooley himself, or, uh, or did they let the Israelis, uh, DJ the
Kamran Bokhari: party? I think that, uh, foreign minister, Mr. Cohen was there for that. If I, okay. If I remember the reports, uh, accurate.
Jacob Shapiro: So, but you just made my day. L l listeners, if you're not aware, Turkmenistan is really the weirdest country in the entire world.
Go, go onto YouTube and just search Gur Goi, new Year's Eve. Dj, you'll thank me later, but, sorry, come on. Go on.
Kamran Bokhari: No worries. Um, so, uh, so you have a situation where the, there's enough there to frighten the Iranians. Uh, you have pressure from the Israelis. The Israelis are now typing relations on your northern flank, your old ally Russia that you've been relying on to the so in, so as to, uh, as a tool to which you could manage relations with the US is itself mired in, in a major problem.
This is a new world for the Iranians. They're suddenly feeling very lonely. Uh, and China isn't ready to jump in. They don't, why would they? Uh, and so you have to fend for yourself and in times like these, uh, there are miscalculations bad decisions. So what I'm trying to say here is that we're the conditions again, you know, inside a rod.
On its Northern Flank, globally speaking, or as such that it increases the likelihood of a conflict between Baku and Tehran.
Jacob Shapiro: Um, Kamran, I, I could talk to you forever and, and I wanted to talk about Central Asia, but honestly I don't want to do it. I don't wanna shortchange it because it's such a big issue. So my instinct is maybe we'll have you back on and we will just do a Central Asia episode, but before I let you go, um, just your quick take on, on Turkey's elections and what the result means for the future of, of the Turkish Republic.
Take that question in any direction that you want.
Kamran Bokhari: So I think, look, um, clearly ados day, day, best days are behind him. I think I said this in one of your shows earlier as well. I, I still hold to that opinion because. If Adovan has to go into round two to win an election, that's not very, as you know, that's, that shows that he's not as popular as he used to be.
It was easy for him to breeze through and get the 50% and, you know, it was like a, a given that hey, who, who can defeat ado? And despite the fact that he actually had his main rival, the, the mayor of, uh, Istanbul, Mr. Iam Olu disqualified. Yes. And Mr. Hilu is not exactly a very, very charismatic po uh, politician is more of a compromised figure for the combined opposition.
And yet he polled 45% of the vote. And we need to go into a second round shows that Mr. Ados. Uh, isn't his influence and his popularity isn't what it used to be. Now, does that mean he's
Jacob Shapiro: gonna, well, come on, it was now 45. It was 49.5. So
Kamran Bokhari: he almost got to 50. Yes. But, but he, he, he, he had 45. I'm talking about Mr.
Klu who
got
Jacob Shapiro: Yeah. Closer. I'm sorry. Yeah. I thought, I thought meant near to
Kamran Bokhari: one. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And so, but I'm not saying Avalon can't win. He, he will likely win again because in the second round, but that doesn't change the fact that his problems are still there. His best days are behind him. He's somehow not going to win again and turn Turkey around.
Uh, and so I, I think that this doesn't change much for the trajectory, the overall trajectory of Mr. Adon and his popularity. Uh, and if he wins again, then that's going to create more public iron. Uh, and people are gonna get more frustrated. And if half the country is frustrated with you, it's not a really good situation to be in.
Yes, you can, you know, the, you can go to, uh, Mr in and got 5.3 or something percent of the vote and say, Hey, I'll offer you a cabinet position. Why don't you, you know, uh, step down in my favor and have all your voters vote for me so I can get passed in the second round on May 28th. That is very likely.
That doesn't solve the problem, nor does it solve, but nor does it change the fact that you are still a weak president, even if you somehow managed to get reelected.
Jacob Shapiro: Yeah. All right. Well come Ron, we'll call it there and we'll have you back on hopefully in the next couple of weeks. And we will do an entire episode just on Central Asia because I know it's a topic that's dear to your heart.
It's dear to mine. We just did a long sort of deep dive on Uzbekistan here on the podcast series two, so, and I know that you're, you're bound for Tosh Cant soon. So thank you for making the time and we'll have you back on very soon to pick up where we left off to talk about Central Asia. My pleasure,
Kamran Bokhari: always pleasure to be on your show.
Jacob Shapiro: Thank you so much for listening to the Cognitive Dissidents Podcast, brought to you by Cognitive Investments. If you are interested in learning more about cognitive investments, you can check us out online@cognitive.investments. That's cognitive.investments. Uh, you can also write to me directly if you want, at Jacob Cognitive Investments.
Cheers, and we'll see you out there. The views expressed in this commentary are subject to change based on market and other conditions. This podcast may contain certain statements that may be deemed forward-looking statements. Please note that any such statements are not guarantees of any future performance and actual results or developments may differ materially from those projected any projections, market outlooks or estimates are based upon certain assumptions and should not be construed as indicative of actual events that will occur.
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