Jacob Shapiro: All right let's make it rain, Ryan. It's it's good to have a RANE Stratfor acolyte that I didn't actually meet at my time there on the podcast. Thank you for making some time to talk about the calmest least volatile region in the world, the Middle East.
Ryan Bohl: Thanks for having me, Jacob.
Jacob Shapiro: I don't even know where to start, so we're gonna put this out fairly soon. So usually there's about a week lag between when we record and we push out, but we're gonna push this out tomorrow for a lot of different reasons. That allows me to open up by asking Turkish elections or soon.
We're following it very closely. I'm sure you're following it very closely. We're gonna have a Monday reaction podcast with another former STR fright Emory. But how are you seeing the Turkish election right now? You can take that any way you want. If you wanna talk about Erdogan's health, if you wanna talk about the polls, which have told me absolutely nothing.
Just where do you think Turkish elections are going as of today, Tuesday, May 9th?
Ryan Bohl: I will say, as a Middle East analyst, Turkey is particularly exciting on its elections because nobody else has elections in the region let alone elections that matter other than the Israelis and they have too many elections, turkey is a unique electoral experience because, and I've heard this described before, is, It's a system that's not fair, but it is free. So there is an outside chance, maybe not even an outside chance that President Erdogan and his justice and development party don't win these polls in, in some form or another.
We're gaming out those scenarios of what that looks like. And, thank God we don't have to call elections but we do build scenarios around what the outcomes could be, and these will be the closest elections since the AKP took power in 2002. There's a great deal of uncertainty.
There's no guarantee Erdogan will be the next president. And there's no guarantee that Erdogan will accept the results if they don't go his way or that the AKP will accept the results in Parliament if they don't go their way. There's an awful lot of volatility and there's a moment here where Turkey could prove it's Democratic bona-fides and has a peaceful transfer of power, and everyone can pat themselves on the back or it could go sideways and we can see versions of a Turkish January 6th taking place in the coming weeks?
Jacob Shapiro: You hit the nail right on the head. You got straight down to it. So what does that scenario look like if Erdogan and I find it unlikely that he's gonna, that Kılıçdaroğlu gonna win 50% outright in the first round, but it's possible.
But either in the first round of the second round, if Erdogan . Loses what? What do those scenarios look like for you that he wouldn't quote unquote accept it? Does it look like January 6th? Does it look more like Brazil's version of January 6th? Does it look like, Hey, all these loyalists that I stack the Turkish military with, I expect you to come and reinstall me into power.
Does it look like civil war? How are you benchmarking what the scenarios are for that particular. In that particular election result.
Ryan Bohl: I think of them as a red dragon scenario. This is low likelihood, but it's high impacted. That happens and the, in the Turkish context that we take in the January 6th example, Trump didn't control the electoral boards, which of course is spread across 50 states.
And therefore it's very hard for a particular party to control those in Turkey. The AKP controls the YSK, the Supreme Electoral Board, and it's staffed with their loyalists, so it will not be outside of the realm of imagination that it the second route, as you noted it's probable. If they're the one's gonna go down, it'll happen in the second round.
And for listeners, Turkey is an interesting system. They have first round where it's free for all. There's four major candidates, and if you don't win 50%, you have to go to a second round. And then that's where the two top contenders will run. And on that second round, if Erdogan loses they can go to the Y S K and say, find me the votes like Trump did with Georgia.
Only the YSK actually will find the votes or invalidate the votes or say that the, there was some sort of irregularity that would a, allow them to, call the election again. There's also the outside chance that. One loses the presidency, but the a k P holds parliament and then parliament held by the a KP then votes for a new poll to, to try to get their president back in and tries to invalidate it.
There's the more dire situations like you mentioned where he could try to use emergency powers, order the army into the streets, order the police into the streets to try to say, this is a stolen election, it's a foreign plot, et cetera. I think a lot of people are alarmed by that. We don't think that will be the first go-to.
They will escalate their their way of election denial, starting with the electoral board, maybe going to the courts, which again, they control the the constitutional court. The Supreme Court of turkeys full of a KP loyalists. And they would probably rule in favor of whatever court cases they brought to them.
They'll go that path first, cuz that's the least volatile, the least pushback. If they go to the path of like internal coup, it's not outside of the realm of possibility. It's obviously a hallmark of Turkish political history. But it's high risk because there's no guarantee that the military will go along with it or that enough of the military will go along with it for it to be successful. The last thing everyone wants to do is to go back to jail.
Jacob Shapiro: Yeah, literally while we're talking, somebody sent me a poll that has Kılıçdaroğlu 48 and Erdogan at 45, so that would go to a second round, but also showing you some distance, at least in the polls for the opposition candidate. But it's very hard to trust these things in general.
Definitely. In that scenario that you described about, let's say a K p, wins in parliament and then you get to the second round, do you think that AKP loyalists would be willing to do that to basically subvert democracy in that way? The example you used with the Republican Party, a lot of the reason Trump didn't succeed in what he was trying to do was because Mike Pence said no.
And there were different Republican officials who said, no, this is still a democracy. We're not going to just find you the vote. Do you think that Erdogan would ever get in a position where, he wouldn't have the votes and a K p officials would be like, look, we have Parliament, so they're not gonna overturn all of the changes that we've made recently here, but we're also not just gonna, self emulate Turkish democracy to have one person in power, a person who has shown some signs of health concerns, things like that.
Is that anywhere within the realm of possibility, or am I being too naive and optimistic?
Ryan Bohl: The analogy with Trump I think is useful. It's not perfect analogy. Of course, as analysts, we tend to think of these, trying to find one-to-one comparisons. The Trump comparison though is useful because if you imagined Trump having controlled the Republican party for 20 years, and with his personality dynamics of purging disloyal people over multiple election cycles, the analogy gets closer.
And that's what Erdogan's had the chance to do, is to purge these disloyal elements. We have a kp splinter parties, Ali Babacan is a good example of an AKP old guard who's out tired of Erdogan and now has splinter parties and there's a lot of a k p officials as well as, grassroots voters that have switched to the opposition and haven't changed their ideology, but they just don't like this guy anymore.
And as a result, that's left the AKP much more loyal to to Erdogan as a person. Seeing him as a, the personality that leads this neo autumn project to restore turkey's greatness. And so there's a higher risk that this a k p as opposed to the a k P in say, 2010 or 2015 or any other previous elections.
Probably would be more likely to go along with it and try to support a subversion of the electoral process that, that I think that risk is higher. It's still not guaranteed. And I think the reason that it's not guaranteed, and this is so interesting, 2019, they lost Istanbul. They lost Ankara and these mayor races compared to one said, whoever has Istanbul controls the future of Turkey.
He drew a red line and they reran the election and they lost twice and then they accepted it. And that's where there's uncertainty in is introduced because they should have brought out the tanks or they should have bagged up these opposition mayors and had them disappeared as sub black site.
That's where they should have done their authoritarian shenanigans as a test run for future elections. Instead they let those seats go and that's where. It's hard to say. They have the capability to go that far level to subvert democracy completely. They had it in 2019 and they chose not to exercise it, and that seems to be that the calculation is that the population wouldn't go along with it.
Parts of the army would not go along with it. NATO wouldn't go along with it, the wouldn't go along with it. And you could end up with sanctions that could heavily damage the the Turkish economy at a very vulnerable moment, and that could turn your remaining loyalists against the party itself.
Erdogan is in a really tricky position where he's built an autocracy that's very hollow. It doesn't have that steel bones of institutional strength the way that say Putin's Russia does to be able to pull off these shenanigans and have a clear result that he can count on. If Erdowan does it, it will be a gamble and there will be an uncertain outcome on the far side of it.
Jacob Shapiro: Yeah, one could argue a hollow autocracy is not much of an autocracy at all. And for better and for worse I still have some faith in Turkish democracy, although I must admit that faith is being tested in real time. Before we leave Turkey, I just, I want to pick at one more scenario, which is, let's say, Opposition wins, let's say Kılıçdaroğlu, whatever round wins he has made some pretty intense promises about reversing basically everything that Erdogan has put in has put into power, whether it's Turkey's foreign policy, the executive presidency, all these other things.
Do you think that he can actually do any of those things, or do you think that Turkish foreign policy won't change very much based on who's pulling the levers at the top level?
Ryan Bohl: So on the foreign policy level Turkey is stuck as a middle power, which means it is strong enough to bully small states and not strong enough, or it's strong enough to, to bully, smaller countries like Syria.
But it can't stand up to like bigger macro geopolitical events, like the events that mean in Ukraine, things like that. It can't, it can manipulate events, but it can't shape them. So if Kılıçdaroğlu is made president and he does get control of parliament they will be stuck with the same problems that ADO one has.
They may not have the neo ottoman impulses of trying to restore greater Turkey and things like that. They may not have the, and they certainly won't have those on a domestic front. They won't be able to say abandon the Syria strategy the Syria policies because if they reverse what Erdogan has been doing in Syria and move out of the buffer zones, they invite millions more refugees to come into Turkey, and that'll be incredibly unpopular.
They, so they won't do that. They can't stop military operations in Iraq so long as the Kurdish militants, the PKK launch attacks from there their relations with the west will still be tense because maybe they get rid of the S 400 and they said that on Ukraine or they dumped it, and that makes the Americans very happy.
But they still need Russian energy. They need Russian grain, they need working relations with the Russians. And they still need to c and they're still gonna cause trouble in the caucuses with Aja Baja because they certainly can't abandon Aja Bajan after it's gained so much success that'll upset Turkish nationalists.
That would still be part of the base. So on a foreign policy level, it will probably be less seismic than on the domestic level. And then on the domestic level is a question of. How much power do they really have? If they have tree fits majority in parliament, which is very unlikely, but if they have tree fits super majority in parliament, they can roll back the executive presidency.
They can go back to the old parliamentary system. If they don't, they're stuck with Erdogan's system with a seething, angry Erdogan and AKP desperately trying to cause an early election. And trying to retake power that way which would be the, that would be the democratic path for Erdogan is just spend the next five or so years undermining this government and trying to retake the structures that he set up.
Jacob Shapiro: Yeah you mentioned Turk's Turkish dependence on Russian. I want to push back there a little bit because dependent on Russian grain. Okay. But there are plenty of American farmers and Canadian farmers who would love to export to the Turkish market, dependent on Russian energy. Yes. But we've got a lot of natural gas coming on from the Black Sea.
Oil prices are what, below 70. There's plenty of shale out there that, us other countries want to export. There's plenty of LNG apparently out there that folks want to export as well. That at least seems to be one area where you could see a shift where Turkey could not be as complacent or as pragmatic or as neutral if you had the opposition candidate win.
But I'm just, I have trouble telling myself that story and really believing it. But I'll throw that scenario at you and see if you tell me that I'm completely off my rocker or if there's anything there.
Ryan Bohl: This is what goes to a strategic disadvantage the United States has as a free market, is that we do have these resources to provide to allies.
We rarely deploy them strategically. Now, of course, cold War, they put the wheat towards the Soviets. They were doing that as part of Daytona. If the Biden administration in Congress could work together to subsidize farmers to make the prices right for Turkey then sure you could see that.
But our internal politics is are problematic at the moment, whereas the Russian system is united, if Putin wants to set a price for gas or oil or wheat and given to the Turks at that level, yeah. The leverage to do so and that, that. Unless that dynamic shifts, unless the US gets to be a lot more strategic in how it deploys, it's resource base.
Turkey will go with whoever's cheaper, and at the moment, the Russians are offering discounts. And that doesn't mean that they like the Russians. They've fought several proxy wars with them in Syria and shot down one of their jets in 2015. But the Turks are cheap and they are like any other buyer on the global market.
They're looking for the cheapest goods possible, especially core commodities like like oil and wheat.
Jacob Shapiro: Great. Let's turn to the Gulf. The Gulf is probably the part of the Middle East sorry, SA Saudi and Emiratis and Qataris. They just bore me cuz it, it feels like nothing changes, but a lot has been changing recently.
I haven't been able to just sit there and be bored lately because you've got Saudi Arabia and Iran making nice and. Maybe we're gonna welcome Syria back into the fold with the G C behind that and even Cutter has been brought in back from the cold. I, you recently wrote a piece On Rain that I just read about the selection of a new crown prince and the u a e and tensions between the UAE and Saudi Arabia are also very hard to get to the bottom.
Bottom with. So when we're thinking about some of the major changes that are happening in the Gulf h help our listeners orient themselves what is changing, what isn't changing, and how do you think about this region going forward, especially in a world where the United States is producing its own oil and it's really Asian countries like China and India and Japan, South Korea, that are becoming dependent on those Middle Eastern oil supplies.
Ryan Bohl: I guess one of the areas that's changing the most is, the fractures in the global oil market and global energy market caused by the Russian Ukrainian war. It used to be, the Cold War, you did have two oil markets. You had east versus west. You could buy soybean oil by being a communist.
Or you could buy American oil or Saudi oil by being a capitalist. And we're shifting a little bit back towards that, which really benefits countries like Saudi and the UAE and Qatar because they're able to still sell to everybody. And that kind of gives us an idea of, if you want a barometer of the emergence of the multipolar world order you can stick it right in Riyad and that's a place where you can sense.
How countries are viewing, what is smart geopolitics in the 21st century riad? It is not picking sides. It is Saudi first. It is intern, prioritizing their internal development. It is selling oil to the Chinese for as long as they possibly can. It's cooperating with the Russians for price stability, and it's buying guns from the Americans at scale for as long as they'll let you do that, and it's leveraging your position as an energy man.
As an energy producer. To avoid pushback from anybody when you invariably upset them with your independent foreign policy. It's about Saudi Arabia, the uae qar, all learning to live without the Ajis of the United States in the region. And we've seen, these seismic events like the Iranian attack on ake in 2019.
Was a demonstration that America will not ride to the rescue for the Gulf Arabs anymore. It will if Americans are tired of dying in, in, in wars for oil or whatever appears to be wars for oil. And so these Gulf Arabs are on their own. And as a former expatriate of the United Arab Emirates I know that it is a dream of many expats to see the Gulf.
Arabs have to sink or swim on their own. And they're moving into that moment where their development models, their political models, their strategic models, their defense strategies. Are all going to work if they can make them work and if they can't we are already seeing consequences for that. OCA 2019 was a good one.
The Houthis attacked Abu Dhabi never happened before. That was a wake up to the the Emiratis. In fact, there was a good article that just came out about how the Emiratis, they didn't turn to the Americans for their air defense after that attack. They turned to the Israelis and the Israelis provided them with this new spider air defense system because the Emiratis normalized with the Israelis, not because it made America happy, but because the Israelis have great air defenses and great intelligence.
And the Emiratis need a replacement for the Americans who are no longer as reliable. At the same time, there's a lot of folks that say, oh, China's gonna take over. This is a new Cold War. Everything that China does out there is a net loss for the us but we tend to frame it as America's losing interest.
Like you said, it's a boring regent sometimes because politics doesn't change if we don't get elections and they don't make a lot of moves necessarily all the time. But at the same time, The Chinese moves, as glacial as they are about the, these development of interdependence and independence and making a more complicated map, one that's harder for people to fit into their political boxes.
And I think that's probably the most dynamic, most interesting part of the Gulf is that it was such a reliable pro western block. Now it's becoming selfish and I don't think people necessarily know how to frame that narrative
Jacob Shapiro: We'll get to Iran in a second here.
But I what you said about, the Emiratis and the Saudis, sinking or swimming on their own policies I really want to hit on Saudi Arabia there because Mohamed bin Salman has these grand plans and vision 2030 and they're gonna make, all these. But for a country that geopolitically speaking really doesn't have a lot going for it.
Yes, Saudi Arabia has oil, but you go down the rest of the geopolitical checklist. Water we don't have that, like modern industry don't have that. Sure. They buy lots of weapons where the soldiers that are actually gonna use the weapons it's society is really, I mean it's this weird unholy alliance between.
Wabi clerics and tribes that are going back and forth, none of that is the recipe you would think for a country that's going to do particularly while going forward. And yet they have these plans it looks like, to become a modern, sophisticated, more culturally open CEN business center in the Middle East.
Is that possible? Marco Puch, another Strat four alum, has been on this podcast and he has said, he's looking at Saudi Arabia as the, i, I think he actually compared it to the Maji restoration, and I didn't know what to say when he said that cuz it seemed so silly. But Mohammed bin Salman's made more progress than I ever thought.
I thought when he started locking up Saudi princes and hotels and shaking him down for money, that he wasn't gonna last very long. But not only has he lasted, he seems to be getting stronger by the year and some of the things that we're talking about here, Seemed to be coming to fruition for Saudi Arabia.
So is it all a mirage or are you more optimistic about Saudi's future?
Ryan Bohl: It's always fun to watch your years go by. Seven years is not very long for 2030 now. And it's been seven years since they declared it, but it seemed like the distant future at the time. And in that time, You have seen probably with the mixed bag of Saudi future development is going to be unfold, neon the super city they're gonna build with the massive line.
That'll be a bizarro tourist attraction. It could be a white elephant. I am willing to bet that it's population is gonna be nowhere near their projections for 2030. Besides, tourists popping through and journalists, having to do the junkets there. They're gonna definitely miss big on some of these projects and they will miss big on things like Saudiization within the economy.
Getting Saudis to work in the private sector is a Herculean task because you and I as Americans, we've been brutalized by capitalism to do our jobs. Saudis on the other hand are not and that's part of their social contract, is that it's never too difficult to necessarily maintain your standard of living in these Gulf Arab states.
They've been trying to find subtle ways to convince people, but it won't work. Human nature is, we will do what is easiest. And I would behave no differently if I knew that my unemployment benefits were, so assured as they are in Saudi Arabia. So they will struggle on some of those fronts.
On the other hand, There place Dubai gives hope that there is a governance model and an economic model that can work. It's based on tourism, it's based on technology. It's based on developing very hyper-specific comparative advantages. The most recent one for Dubai is hosting Russian oligarchs that desperately wanna find a place to put their rubles so they're dumping into the foam jamira.
So nobody in Dubai could've planned for the oligarch surge in part of their development model. So all that a place like Saudi Arabia can do is try to plan as many plants as it can to be as useful as it can for a future it doesn't know. Now, as you noted, water is a problem. Technology can solve water problems.
Hence the reason that they may end up normalizing with the Israelis who are fantastic with their water management. Yeah. That would be an area that they would have, a great incentive to, to build relations with at the, on the other hand, Israel is, we were, we may talk about a little bit later, may go in a direction where normalizing is not.
Achievable for the Saudis, and then in that case, they may end up with a water crisis. They may end up with existential challenges that make it so that they have to shrink their development model. They have to shrink their ambitions. They have to just basically survive the rest of the 21st century until external developments come along that might allow them to improve their situation.
In 2030, I fully expect it to be a 50 50 scorecard. Some things will be great and some things will be terrible. People will be impressed by amusement parks and possibly some headquarters moved to Riyad. On the other hand, people will be like, I knew it when they point to Jetta Tower, that's supposed to be the tallest tower of the world and it won't be completed.
And they'll be like, yeah, that figures. But at the same time, that doesn't mean Saudi revolution. It doesn't mean the collapse of the monarchy. But the other problem is over time, If Vision 2030 doesn't work out, if the development projects don't work out, Saudi Arabia's political economy will get poorer and poorer.
And that is a recipe for change and. How does that unfold is hard to say. Forecasting the end of the Saudi monarchy is an industry in and of itself. There is a possibility that they navigate the next few decades with their authority intact. But they will probably have to take advantage of geopolitical events happening beyond and get lucky several times and have allies that are willing to bail them out when things go wrong.
In addition to building up their own resiliency. But I'm not gonna call it utopia, and I wouldn't call it, mad Max Armageddon either. But I think it will be disappointing in, in, in some regards to some people. And it'll also be impressive in what they do achieve to others.
Jacob Shapiro: Yeah. Apparently they're also gonna have competitive advantage with soccer and golf, and I don't know what their next sports are, that they're gonna try and produce there too. And maybe that the world will respect them because all the great sports athletes are gonna go there and get paid hundreds of millions of dollars.
I'm not sure. Let's talk about the elephant in the room though, because. The, the historical power in this part of the world is not Arab sheiks in Riyad. It's Iran. Iran is sitting there. It's a global pariah in part because of its own domestic politics. In part because it's challenged, it challenged the US at the wrong moment instead of waiting for the multipolar era.
Did it turn the unipolar era? We can go into why Iran is backed into the way that it is, but in general, this is Iran's sphere of influence. When Iran is powerful, usually it's the one. That is dictating things here. And when it's coming into problems, it's usually coming into problems with Turkey, not necessarily with Arab states around it that are so strong.
How do you, in the context of all that, how do you explain this Saudi-Iranian rap? Rushmani. And where do you think we go from here?
Ryan Bohl: Rapprochement or Detant was definitely done at the end of an Iranian drought. That the Iranians have proven, and even as recently as I think a week or two ago, they can grab tankers in the Gulf.
They can hit Saudi cities. Through their proxies. They can hit Emirati cities they can hit the Israelis they can shoot at American soldiers and they can do this really sophisticated harassment strategy against all their rivals that turns up the temperature without exploding. And they've actually turned it into an art form.
I remember in 2019, they used to run around in a panic whenever a golf tanker was grabbed because we were like, ah, what's President Trump gonna do? Is he gonna nuke Tehran? And the Iranians in that era were experimenting. Now they're experts at it. And. This is an era where the Gulf Arabs are coming to terms with, this is where they live.
They're, if they want their development models to work, if they want, intelligent professionals from the rest of the world to move to Riyad or Abu Dhabi and help run their economies. They can't have Iranian drones hitting their cities every couple of weeks. They certainly can't have in the news headlines that Iran's about to attack Saudi Arabia or the UAE.
So Dayton makes a lot of sense because their development models matter more to them than the sectarian and geopolitical rivalry with Iran, which they can't really win anywhere. As you said they're not the the bigger power. Their populations are too small. Their resource bases are too small.
Their economies aren't developed, and they're totally reliant on the United States for defense and the US doesn't wanna go with to war with Iran. They, the US fought two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, both Iran's neighbors. I guess you could call Iraq a half victory given how things have gone. But they definitely lost in Afghanistan.
Jacob Shapiro: That's very kind of you, I would call that an out and out defeat.
Ryan Bohl: The Americans didn't do well in either of those countries and have no interest in repeating it in Iran. And so the Iranians have learned how to rattle everybody's cages without causing the nuclear option, including to the Israelis who are probably.
As sophisticated, if not more sophisticated on the covert level and certainly a better conventional military power, a against the Iranians. And in that context, the Gulf Arabs have to learn how to get the Iranians to stop rattling their cages because they need those folks to move there and they need the investment to come in.
They need the tourists to show up. And if that means giving the Iranian symbolic victories as well as real victories, like just accepting that Iran is gonna be the major power in a place like Lebanon and that, Saudi's proxies there. Have no say and there's nothing Saudi can do about it if that's the trade off.
I think Riyad is willing to make that Nabu Dhabi, they have this dream of building a South Yemen to turn it into a proxy state and, and have ports there and tourism and split the country in half. They're pairing back those ambitions too, because that was why Abu Dhabi got hit by the Houthis, was because they're of their involvement there.
So they're pairing back ambitions. They're going back to their borders and they're hoping that the Iranians are too constrained by other geopolitical events to go after them anymore.
Jacob Shapiro: And where do you, where do you see Iran let's say out to 2030, do you think that, obviously a lot is gonna depend on when Ham passes away. For all we know he could be around for another seven years. And it seems like a lot of the internal conflict within Iran is gonna get shaken out when you get that next transition at the Supreme leader level. But you've explained what the Gulf States get out of rap hoshman with Iran.
It's less clear to me what Iran gets out of this whole situation. H how do you see that and how do you see Iran? I would think they would be jealous of these development models. They would be wanna be the country that's having all this development and be the economic center of gravity in the region.
Ryan Bohl: And, if Iran could ever get out from underneath the US sanctions net, they probably would be, they'd be one of the most dynamic economies in the region. They'd be rivaling Turkey maybe with some of turkey's own, political dysfunction as well, like running inflation, things like that.
But Iran would be a dynamic powerhouse if it could get out of the sanctions. Nat. Ideologically it's trapped in a position where it can't negotiate in a way that it would get out of the sanctions. So it's stuck with that position. But what the Iranians are getting out of Deton with the with the Saudis, with the Emiratis.
One, it's interesting cuz the Iranians have gone into Ukraine. That's now a front for them as well. It's not a massive project. It's not as important to them as say, Syria or Lebanon or even Yemen. But it is now yet another proxy theater that they are involved with and that is a drain on resources.
They're trying to prop up the Russians and make sure that war effort doesn't collapse, as with what limited tools they've got. So they're trying to maintain good relations with the Russians and maintain support from the Russians. And that results in them having a little bit less firepower to use against the Gulf Arab state.
So some of it's pragmatism, military pragmatism, that if they want to continue their proxy strategy that is now expanded in Ukraine, they do have to pick their target better. And it's not really clear what more drone attacks on Saudi Arabia would necessarily win them at this point other than international ire.
The potential that the United States finally does get sick of it and launches retaliatory strikes on Iran itself. And of course, Saudi's relationship with China also matters. It's no accident that China was the one that brokered the daytop between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Not only could the Americans never do so because they're hated by the Iranians but the Chinese very much want these gold air of oil markets to be stable.
And in that sense, Since China is one of the prime purchasers of Iranian oil, despite sanctions they're one of their major trade partners on a defense level, there could be greater cooperation there in the future. And Iran would like nothing more than to get some Chinese military bases inside of Iran as a further security guarantor Iran has a strong interest in making sure that China's opinion matters or that China's opinion is positive of them.
So the Iranians are. They are a multifaceted and interesting system where they've got like multiple political poles. They have their ideological wing, which is pushing them into these proxy theaters, ex, Possibly people say that it's imperial overreach, but there is a constraint on them that they can only be in so many proxy theaters effectively at a given time.
That's one area to consider. And then of course there's also the domestic constraints. There's a rising tide of younger people. Who don't like the system, they don't wanna wear the hijab. They are connected on the internet. They haven't liked the system for 10, 15 years. And there's only so much that power that they can deploy to keep that rest of generation under control.
So they're learning to do trade offs. They're trying to not compromise their ideology as much as possible while at the same time dealing with the world that they live in. The harassment strategy is a good example of that. They're still fighting their rivals, but without pausing wars that they would lose.
And that's that marriage between I R G C, hardline ideology and your hanni let's still speak to the to the Westerners in spite of the fact that we don't really care for them.
Jacob Shapiro: I saw somebody sent me a great map, I think it was yesterday, that's or I'm sorry, it was a chart and it was, number of countries or say it was like proportion of global GDP that is under US sanctions right now.
And it just keeps on going up until the right. So I think the, that your point about Iran is that, when it's Russia by itself, that's a pariah state. When it's China by itself, that's a pariah state. North Korea by itself, a. Add in Iran to that. Now we're starting to talk a little bit like let's add an Venezuela, let's add in a South Africa.
Like suddenly you start to get the picture of certainly not an order that's gonna be near as rich as some of the other multipolar orders in the world, but you, it starts to get more realistic. And you also mentioned, Chi China needs the oil markets in the Middle East to be stable.
Good luck, Beijing. I wish you all the best of luck in managing that going forward. Before we move to to Syria I think the reason we actually ended up. Connecting on this was because we were not debating, but talking back and forth about Israel's most recent elections. And I've, I did a solo episode on this a couple of weeks ago, and I think most listeners know that I'm pretty pessimistic about Israeli geopolitics in general.
But I thought I'd, just ask, cuz you, you mentioned Israel as. Being, a very sophisticated covert actor here. I think that the region looks, I would be very scared if I was an Israeli strategic decision maker, and I'd be scared, number one, because the environment's much more uncertain.
You can't just rely on the United States and everything's gonna go fine. And number two, domestically, Israel's coming apart at the seams. It looks to me. And there's a reason that. In history, Jewish control over the land that is Palestine whatever the politically correct words that are, I want to insert them there.
I don't wanna offend anyone, but there's a reason that Jewish control over that part of the world doesn't happen very often. The planets all have to align in a perfect sort of line. And then, the Jewish forces themselves have to not be fighting with each other the whole time to be. Subject to external forces, and in some ways, the most disturbing thing about Israel's geopolitical futures today, modern Israel, the society is squabbling with itself.
It looks like you're getting real cleavages in the society. You're not gonna get that kind of societal unity that you would need in this more kind of this more difficult and volatile world that is coming at them. I guess that's not a question. I'll just throw it up. You just say, where do you see Israel go?
How does Israel work into all this? Because it looks, if it was just the external problems, you could see how Israel can play that, but it's very hard for me to see how Israel balances the external issues with the internal issues and going back and forth between them.
Ryan Bohl: And, I think what sparked our initial conversation was talking about how, American millennials, there's a poll saying that they're losing the luster of Israel for the first time.
They think Palestinians are, they have more sympathy for the Palestinians according to Gallup than the Israelis. And that is a shift, and it's, I think it's emblematic of that multipolar world. We can go, and I'm sure you've talked about this before, going back to why does America care about Israel?
The best strategic reason was. That it helped counter the Soviets backed Arab states of Syria and Egypt. Way back in the day, there was a clear rationale. Soviets are gone. Syria has eaten its own tail, or, burned itself alive. The Egyptians are an American ally who can't fuel their tanks without American military aid.
That argument doesn't make sense anymore. Now, the Iranians still do right there. It's a mutual enemy. They're both concerned about it. The Israelis will take risks that the Americans won't, they'll get gather intelligence. The Americans won't. That is still a driver. But there's always an open question of, how much does the United States care about Iran?
If it also doesn't care about Israel, especially if Iran is making nice with the Gulf Fair of States and making sure that oil is able to get out. At what point does that cause a strategic divergence? And then there's, as you mentioned, the identity crisis. Lots of ultra-Orthodox people within Israel having kids, a lot of secular Jews that are not, that is going to cause a demographic reckoning in the 2040s of 2050s where the ultra-Orthodox could be a plurality or even a majority of the population.
They're not the Israeli economic ministers and the Central Bank are all like, we define ways to integrate the Ultra-Orthodox into the economy and get them into schools and get them the skills that they need so that we can meet the 21st century. And that is a political nightmare to do. There's a former resident of Brooklyn, I can tell you that there it is very difficult.
To navigate that political landscape of how do you get a religious community to secularize particularly when they're well organized and they elect politicians and they control elections as they do so well with the ultra-Orthodox parties with Israel. And then I guess the last thing is Israel are, our overlying assumption is that Israel is drifting towards a one state solution like Trump overtly said, the quiet part out loud.
And he said, Hey, there's a one state solution, peace plan. And the Israelis are slow walking towards it. The problem is that even the Israelis themselves, their plan for the Palestinians is political, not strategic. And what it looks like it'll end up being, is something like a reservation system where the Palestinians have no political rights and they have no freedom of movement and they have no economy whatsoever.
And they're just left in limbo while Israeli settlements are built up around them. And that's gonna make the apartheid accusation stick a bit better. And it's also gonna look strategically unnecessary to outside actors like the United States. Like, why are you doing this? Oh, because your elections be dictating that this should be the outcome.
Why should we be tolerating that so on and so forth? And it increases that debate. And if Israel doesn't have a strategic utility like it did against Soviet back, Syria it becomes easier in Washington to criticize the country. And that's just, that's shift in sentiment. Is so interesting to look at, because it's not the same as saying they're gonna sanction Israel into oblivion and that they're gonna help the Jordanians run them into the sea or anything like that.
But it, it doesn't mean that the Israelis aren't gonna be developing a defense industry with, say, the Saudis, with the Chinese, with God help us with the Russians by the 2040s or 2050s because their defense relationship with the United States may have broken down or may have become nuanced or may become complicated the way that say, Turkey and the United States as defense relationship is complicated, and then Turkey feels the need to develop backups to its NATO alliance.
Jacob Shapiro: Yeah, you described integrating the Ultra-Orthodox as a political nightmare. I would describe it as science fiction. It's not gonna happen. You're not gonna integrate them. You're not gonna convince them to do anything different. The founders of Israel thought, That the Ultra-Orthodox were a dying breed, that they would eventually go away and that their ideas would be considered antiquated and they didn't need to worry about them.
And in some ways, that was their biggest strategic mistake. They didn't realize that no, actually in the long run they see a longer game here than you, and you can't just ignore them because they'll eventually outnumber you. And you mentioned about the plurality coming by 2040. If the Israeli left or the Israeli center's not gonna deal with the 20% of the population that is Arab, and the parties and the con, that they send into the, or want to send in into the Knesset, then that religious plurality in some ways is already here.
That's why BB keeps winning elections because he just keeps on assembling the same plurality. And the only moment where you had. This weird, we wouldn't call enough Tali Bennett Center or left, but he led some kind of coalition with the help of Arab parties to try and make things a little bit different.
But the, the questions of the mil, I remember now the question about the millennials was why we connected on Twitter and I said smugly to you and the way you can only be smug on Twitter. You can't actually talk, like we're talking right now on Twitter. I said, ah, it doesn't matter what the millennials think.
Speaking as a geriatric millennial myself, it matters about hardcore interest. And you know the US yes, you don't have the Soviet Union anymore, but. If you've got Turkey and Iran rising and you want a balance in the region, Israel, strategic real estate, you can imagine some new argument for having Israel existing between them.
But I think you're right to point out that the millennial American experience is very different than the millennial Israeli experience. That they're completely different things for the American millennial. We were listening to Three third Eye Blind and all these great bands and everything was great and the world was gonna be ours and there was gonna be peace.
And that's not what Israeli millennials experienced. They were going through the infas and serving in the military. And in some ways they're very jaded. And I think there is this kind of break between them. I don't know how to explain. The media's focus on the Israeli Palestinian issue, it's depressing, it's terrible.
I, in some ways feel worse for the Palestinians than almost any group I feel for in the world because everybody takes advantage of them. The Israelis take advantage of 'em. The other Arab states take advantage of them and their own leaders take advantage of them, and nobody actually stands up and fights for them.
And I don't wanna do comparative suffering here, we've also, we've got a civil war in Sudan. We've got a civil war in Ethiopia. We've got famine in the Horn of Africa. We've got Uyghurs in Xinjiang, we've got the Rohingya in mien. Like when you start to go down the list of like really horrible things that we should be spending as much time talking about and we don't, but it's all about, oh, but the Israelis and the Palestinians, again, it's like how many years of evidence do we need to see that this whole Israeli Palestinian issue, it doesn't even matter to all the countries in the regions. That's why it's so depressing to be a Palestinian. Cause no one gives a crap. And I dunno, I think you're exactly right, like it the future not only has nobody cared about the Palestinians like.
Their future. What future do they have? Palestine's gonna be a couple areas where they let them live as a majority, like you said, with limited rights. And then the Israelis are gonna take everything else over and it just seems like nothing is really reversible there. So maybe that causes, the United States and some of these other countries to reconsider ties with Israel, it hasn't, it didn't cause them to say, oh, we don't like the Saudis chopping people's hands off from the street we're not gonna buy that or it's a difficult thing figuring out which ideological points are gonna matter to people at a given point in time.
Ryan Bohl: But I will say Israelis in a, Israel's a very small country by the size of New Jersey, and every Israeli is aware. And they're aware of how fragile the state is, as opposed to Americans who can blase their way through 20 years of war and barely notice outside of their newscast.
Israelis are aware that the survival of their country is tied to, foreign support. It is tied to good relations with their neighbors. And if those start to get upended, that's where you see pragmatism rise, at least in the past. Now, what we don't know is whether or not this rising, millennial Israelis, like you said, you're perfectly right to say.
Israelis had a rough time of it. They saw the millennials saw the Gaza withdrawal in oh five and they thought, okay, this is gonna be a nice concession. Instead, Hamas took over and now is rock. Helping carry on rock and fire and recurrent wars. So having that level of cynicism makes a great deal of sense.
It's a question of whether or not the, is how these future Israelis would respond to, say a George h w type who says, you know what? My politics has changed. It would probably be a Democratic president, I would imagine, but a future Democratic president in the 2030s or 2040s says, you know what? My constituents don't care if I send you military aid.
Unless you do X, Y, and Z for your Palestinian policies. I can be the president that finally solves this issue, and if you don't do it, I'll cut you off. And I, say Iran is no longer as important or Iran. Has helped stabilize the oil market and therefore its ideology may not matter as much in the Americans.
The United States could have fought a war with China by then, and they simply have no interest in the Middle East. Who knows what the geopolitics of that era would look like, but there could be a moment where the Americans try to pressure Israel. And then it's a question of will a traditional Israeli pragmatism rise up or will this more ideological religious nationalist population that we see emerging in the current government?
Will they say like Benmar Ben Ga, the National Security Ministers, has said, we don't need anybody. We can take care of ourselves. And we both know that's not quite true. But some people will choose to believe that. And I guess we don't have the answer to that question. We just have the scenarios of what likely to happen by, 15, 20 years down the line.
Jacob Shapiro: And again I'm being very cynical about this because it's hard for me to be anything but cynical about Israel. Probably because I'm a little too close to it, to be as objective as I normally am, but that's why Israel needs Iran to be a boogeyman in some sense, because if Iran in the United States make up.
It's not just that, Israel's worried about them getting nuclear weapons. It's that the whole strategic logic of the Israeli US relationship goes away. If Turkey and Iran are balancing a regional balance of power what purpose does Israel serve? If the United States really is worried more about, a New Jersey sized island in the South China Sea rather than a New Jersey, sized little strip in the Middle East, which, That you can hear the cynicism there because Netanyahu's done a very good job of developing Iran as he's the guy who can resist against Iran.
He's the one who's been identifying the threat very early on, and that message has resonated, I think with a large portion of the Israeli electorate.
Ryan Bohl: In the other, near term immediate challenge for the Israelis is that their relationship with the United States is getting more and more partisan with each electoral cycle.
The Democrats are becoming the party of the Palestinians. Republicans are becoming the party of Netanyahu. If that continues by the end of the decade, you could have dramatically different US policy towards Israel based on who's president, based on who's in Congress. And that also, even a moment like with the Iron Dome vote I think that was last year, the year before, maybe it was in 2021, where they briefly blocked an Iron Dome vote, and that shocked all the Israelis across the spectrum that the Americans could dare do something. It didn't end up sticking. They sent it anyway. But moments like that could become policy based on who's in charge and that also. Will be a telling moment to see how Israeli governments decide to react to it. Because they could say, we'll just wait for the Republic. That's eventually gonna happen.
We'll eventually get our guy back in the office. Or if it scares them, in a certain state, scares them strategically straight. And he starts to develop more pragmatic policies that would shore up that relationship. Or do they develop alternative backups? China, Saudi, Turkey. All of those countries they could develop defense relationships with on a deeper level if the United States has decided that it has simply lost interest with with the Israelis.
Jacob Shapiro: Yeah. Let's, last topic before I let you get outta here. Syria, which I have to confess, I haven't really thought about Syria in and of its own right for quite some time. The last time I really remember thinking about Syria, I was still at Stratfor, and I remember John Carey had just come out and he was thundering away about how the Syrians had crossed the red line on chemical weapons usage and that the United States was gonna get involved.
And I remember I had a, I forget if it was MSNBC, I went on some interview and I said this shows that the United States is about to intervene in the Syrian conflict. And that made me look really bad because Obama watched it back and there was no red line. And I tell that story all the time to remind listeners that I may be smart, but I don't get things right near a hundred percent of the time.
I'm good enough if I get them 51% of the time. But ever since then, Syria has just been. Really a morass really depressing morass of civil war. There hasn't really been any kind of real movement, different proxies on all sides doing their own thing, but nobody really has an upper hand. But the last couple weeks I feel like we're getting the first real sign and it's coming outta the gulf.
It looks like that. Arab States wanna rehabilitate Syria, they wanna bring Syria back into the fold, and they're willing to stomach Bashar Assad for as long as Bashar al-Assad is with us. And if you start putting Syria back on the table that's very interesting cuz that's a country that has to be rebuilt.
That's a country of tens of millions of people. It's a country that is historically projected. Plenty of power and influence throughout the region. So are we looking at Syria coming in from the cold? Is it a little bit too early to be thinking those in those terms? Even if it does, is it just gonna be a proxy battleground?
Give me a little bit of orientation with Syria because I confess it's been a while for me.
Ryan Bohl: So the normalization process is happening on a diplomatic level and it's bilateral, so it's country to country. And it's because a lot of these countries have pragmatic problems. That engagement with Syria can solve one of them.
Jordan just killed the Syrian captain Pepe Escobar the other day in an airstrip. And it was right after they had voted to remit them to the era of league, and that was probably either a quid pro quo or ahman calculated that Syria would not escalate in response after having done the goodwill at the air of League.
So Capon is a major problem. Damascus makes tons of capital, it floods the Gulf Arabs, it floods Jordan, highly addictive. And they wanna combat that. The only way you're gonna do that is to deal with the government that does exist within Syria. That is Bashar a Assad. The other thing is for the most part, many of these governments didn't exactly object to Assad crushing the rebellion.
They objected to Assad being allied to the Iranians. But now that Assad has come out on top, they have to work to rebuild relations with Assad to see if they can get ways to do that. And they've got plenty of money to do that. What they can't do is get past the US sanctions. There's still a very tight US sanctions that it doesn't cost the Americans very much to deny everybody else trade to Syria. So the sanctions from the United States are likely to stay in place for a while but the Gulf Arabs can try to send humanitarian aid to Syria.
They can try to build up influence in Damascus. And reduce Iran's ability to turn Syria into a gigantic Iranian military base. And that's another one of their goals. And then the final part is refugees. Turkey has 3 million refugees. Nativism is rising. There was the whole banana incident a few years ago where Syrian was able to eat a banana, but an ordinary tur felt like they couldn't afford it, and it caused mob violence on a video.
These countries in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, they all host millions of Syrian refugees that they wanna send them home. They won't go home as long as the Civil War is continuing, and they won't go home so long as they believe they can be conscripted into the Syrian army. They'll be thrown into one of Assad's, awful prison pits.
They won't leave. And even Lebanon that's really tried to get rid of them has barely made a dent in their million plus refugees over these past few years with these draconian laws to send people home. They just can't do it without causing a political scandal that they're sending people straight back to their deaths.
So the way to get Damascus to ease off of those draconian policies is through engagement. So they're getting used to it. They accept that he won. They don't exactly mind his tactics, but they want assad's support to fix their drug problems, fix their refugee problems. And become, if not pro Arab, at least less Iran dependent than they, than he has been in the past.
And those are long-term goals. Now, mind you, the US sanctions that is still there, there's still several hundred US troops in the Northeast. There's several thousand Turkish troops in the north. There's still a long way to go before Syria is truly normalized. And there's an open question If the more Assad is normalized, how much closer does he get to the Omar Al Bahi path in, in Sudan, won the Civil War and, wiped out Darro and was a genocidal maniac that survived Israeli airstrikes but couldn't survive the factionalism that followed in the peace he was able to win the wars, but lose the peace and in the classic sense.
And will Gulf Arabs build up enough influence in the country where they can destabilize Assad and maybe replace him with one of his lieutenants or cause a KU deta in the long run? That's an open question as well. How about the Syrian Kurds? Is there any hope for the Kurdish underdogs in the region that have carved out a little autonomous zone for themselves?
Unfortunately, I think that's where your geographic determinism kicks in. They can choose to be conquered by the Turks or they can choose to reintegrate with Damascus once the US leaves. And as Americans we tend to leave we will eventually come withdraw from that mission. And the SDFthe Syrian Democratic forces who are Kurdish dominated.
They've already made a lot of connections with Damascus preparing for that day. They would prefer not to happen anytime soon. They would prefer it to be a slow process so that they could. Build a good relationship with Assad. So they still keep their autonomy and they keep their language and maybe keep their security forces.
But they don't seem like they're gonna get that if the US pulls out anytime soon. So they're trying to delay it for as long as they can. And unfortunately, I think that Rojava the Kurdish enclave there is going to end up under somebody's control probably, sir. But if that doesn't go well, Turkey we'll be pretty like that occupied when the United States leaves.
Jacob Shapiro: Reminds me of the old Christopher Hitchens joke. Somebody asked him once if human beings have free will, and he said, of course. We have no choice. So Ryan, thank you so much for coming on the podcast. I really appreciate it. I hope you'll come on again soon and yeah, thanks. We appreciate your time.
Ryan Bohl: Thank you, Jacob. Thanks for having me.
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