Jacob Shapiro: Hello listeners and welcome back to another episode of Cognitive Dissidents. As usual, I'm your host. I'm Jacob Shapiro. I'm a partner and the director of Geopolitical Analysis at Cognitive Investments. Happy to welcome simak, the Chief Military Analyst at Force Analysis back onto the podcast. Sims episodes are always among the most downloaded and most shared episodes that we have, and that's because sim offers.
Extremely rigorous and extremely good analysis of what is happening with the Russia, Ukraine war tactically, but also in general with security conflicts around the world. And we delve into some of that in our conversation as well. So thank you Sim for making time out of your busy squash schedule to come on the podcast.
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All right, SIM welcome back to the podcast. Thanks for making some time to be with us. I wish we were playing squash and having this conversation, but a last, the best we can do is look at each other through screens and talking to microphones. How's it going, my friend?
Sim Tak: Everything's well. Thanks, Jacob.
Thanks for having me again.
Jacob Shapiro: Sim, where is the vaunted Ukrainian counter offensive of 2023. We're recording on May 17th. It's a Wednesday. This will come out on Monday. Will the offensive have begun by the time this podcast posts? Has the offensive already begun in a sneaky way that I'm discounting?
Do you believe Zelensky when he said I forget if it was earlier this week or last week, where he was like we don't have enough weapons quite yet, so maybe if you want this counter offensive, we need some more weapons. It seems to me like there's been a lot of buildup towards a counter offensive and it's not there yet, and it's getting late enough in the year to where Okay, like it's summer now, like winter's not that far away.
Yeah, take that question in whatever direction you want. Yeah,
Sim Tak: There's a lot to unpack there. A lot of the things you said, like they're all different things that are happening simultaneously and affecting the way that this offensive comes together. So first off I think in the conventional sense of what people are expecting to see in this offensive, we're not seeing that yet, right?
We're not seeing the big pushes. We actually have quite a bit of information on how Ukraine is. Putting this offensive together in, in terms of units contributed to it through the the leaks that came out some time ago. And that's also telling us that those units that will make up the main offensive force are not yet on the front lines.
We can say in a very binary sense no, the offensive isn't happening yet. But at the same time, and as I told someone recently as well the offensive is both happening and not happening, right? Because there's different phases to this kind of an offensive so that, that. The tanks rolling across the line.
That's not happening yet, but that's just one part. Actually probably more a part near the end of the the offensive process where initially there's going to be a lot of preparation in terms of intelligence gathering, preparation of the battlefield, shaping the battlefield through.
Preparatory artillery fires, deep strikes and I think those are the kind of things that we're already starting to see. Especially with the arrival of the storm shadow, which has expanded Ukraine's reach for those kind of deep strikes into Russian occupied territory again.
Jacob Shapiro: What is the storm shadow?
Help me there.
Sim Tak: Yeah, that's a good question. That's, I figured that was a topic we were going to dig into today. So the storm shadow is a, Air launched cruise missile essentially. It's a weapon that that the UK has delivered to. Ukraine, it's been integrated on Ukrainian s u 20 fours allegedly.
Soviet aircraft getting Western weapon reinstalled on them. That's not always as straightforward as a. Just putting them on the aircraft they were designed for. But essentially these missiles have a range potentially upwards of 300 kilometers. There's different versions with different ranges depending on, the original versions, export versions, et cetera.
But, we can assume that whatever version Ukraine has a range over 300 kilometers, which compared to the high Mars, if you remember, that sits somewhere around 70 to 80 kilometer in range. So that's a significant increase of reach for those kind of strikes. Also quite powerful.
Weapon quite a bit of explosives packed into it with a capability to even penetrate bunkers, underground targets and things like that. Not that's something that occurs that often currently in, in the conflict with Russia, but it's a, it's a capability you have.
It's better to have it. And not to need it, then the other way around. So yeah they've gotten these these storm shadows very recently. The process of integration is probably going on since last year. But we've seen a couple strikes especially in the luhansk area that do appear to have been conducted with these storm shadow missiles and we're certain to be seeing more of those in the near future.
And I think those strikes which are targeting Russian logistics operations farther away from the frontline, those are going to help shape that future offensive. They're going to help degrade Russia's capabilities and, Fighting off the offensive, if that makes sense.
Jacob Shapiro: I, I have this, you're talking about, British missiles on Soviet aircraft, and I'm like thinking of, when you have to plug in your laptop charger and you need an adapter when you're going from one country to another country, is that what this actually looks like?
Do you need the adapter to put the British missile onto the Soviet aircraft, or is it much more complicated than that?
Sim Tak: In a physical sense, yes, there is that element. Like you, you have to. Be able to physically attach and detach the missile in its intended manner. And of course, the, the parts that are created to launch a storm shadow aren't created to fit onto an s u 24.
I think that's usually the more. The easier part of integration that still needs to be developed, tested. Things have to be safe. You don't wanna be flying around with missiles that get randomly disattached or don't disattached when they should. Sure. A lot of problems can occur but there's also a level of integration into the avionics of an aircraft and that, but that depends on how a missile actually interacts with the aircraft.
Because in the case of the storm shadow, and I think previously we've had a similar example when the. The harm missile. I don't know if you're familiar with that, but that's an anti radiation missile. So a missile that homes in on radio frequency emissions. So radars, essentially that's the main goal.
But earlier in the conflict US harm missiles were integrated in some. Former Soviet or former Russian aircraft that Ukraine is flying as well. But the advantage with these kind of missiles is that you can actually set their targets before you take off. So you don't have to set the target from the plane, which means that you can skip some of that direct integration of the computer systems of the aircraft with the missile.
So they, they might not necessarily have to communicate at that level. In the air. And then sometimes it can be just a mechanical integration where you need to, be able to tell the missile that it is being launched, that it should launch and then physically release it. But, I'm not an expert in the exact configurations of these missiles and aircraft.
But that's, as far as I understand the kind of levels of integration that happen there.
Jacob Shapiro: Maybe you're not the expert on this particular thing, but you've forgotten more about this than I'll ever know in my lifetime. And I love this idea if somebody has to go make the converters that you have to use to put British missiles onto Soviet airplanes.
I, it's big business
Sim Tak: actually. If you think about prior to this conflict the NATO integration of Eastern European countries that were initially all equipped with former Soviet equipment A lot of times it was a lot cheaper to start to develop ways to fit western munitions into Soviet weapons than to, get new fighter jets or new air defense systems altogether.
There's some similar work going on that could help Ukraine as well, for example modifications that would allow. Western anti-aircraft missiles to be fired from S 300 systems, for example. So things like that can massively extend the utility of those systems that Ukraine has but can't get the ammunition for.
Jacob Shapiro: Yeah, I know it's big business and we'll get to this in a little bit cause I want to ask you about the German military aid package that Shoals announced, I guess it was last weekend, cuz it sounds to me like, like the German military industrial complex just realized that, oh, we actually have a big opportunity to sell weapons, not just to the revamped German army, but to the Ukrainian army as well.
But before we get to that broader stuff, On the storm shadows. I'm not a weapon specialist, but I do know that the first step with analyzing weapons and their usage is what are you actually gonna use that weapon for? So you talked about, destroying bunkers or they hit targets in luhansk.
What is Ukraine gonna use the storm shadows for? What is the goal here? Is it take back Mort's territory in Eastern Ukraine? Is it push Russia all the way back to the border? Is it we want to take Crimea while we're at it? Wh where do you I guess the question is, what do you think the goal is for a Ukrainian counter offensive, and how should we think about what their goals are based on the weapons that they're receiving and asking for?
Sim Tak: There, there's a lot of ways that can go right, and I think there's two main two main likely objectives that that Ukraine can be playing with. And I've got my own opinion on, on, which is the the smarter or more likely one here, but essentially a lot of people have talked up until a few weeks ago actually.
It seems to have quieted down now, but a lot of people have been talking about Ukrainian offensive in the direction of Crimea with the the goal being to reach Crimea and to get really close to eventually recovering control of Crimea. There are some advantages to an operation like that because you're essentially attacking in a direction that is not currently the center of mass of that Russian military capability that is inside Ukraine.
So it might be an easier offensive, but no of offense was truly easy at this scale, of course. Just wanna caveat that But I think it also raises some questions. Okay if you are going to push to Crimea, and that means along the way places like Mil Tok, and. Would be liberated.
It, it would remove that whole land bridge element from the from the equation. The only connection from Russia into the into Crimea would be the Kirch Bridge as well as naval transport. So an air transport. So really complicating that logistical connection. But then when you sit there, when you sit at the bottleneck on northern end of Crimea, you're gonna face a situation where, Troops are very concentrated of both sides.
And where there's going to be some questions about how well Ukraine might be able to stand up against Russian air power in a situation where they've just positioned themselves much closer to all of those air bases in Crimea, right? Which is something that increases the potential sorting rate by the by the Russians, et cetera.
So in that kind of an offensive, to help back to your initial question about the storm shadow. How do you use that? How does it fit into these operations? In that kind of an operation? Having the storm shadow means that you can use that to suppress that air power artillery and other kind of operations that Russia might run inside Crimea to target those concentrations of Ukrainian forces around that bottleneck.
So essentially it means, you can target all of the logistics inside and around Crimea. So you can also target the Kurz Bridge again and try to shut that down. But you can also directly target the air fields. You can target any kind of concentration of Russian Forces, headquarters, et cetera make it really difficult for Russia to hang on to Crimea.
So that's one, one big idea I think that people are looking at. Now the other one and personally I think it, it is on the longer term, the more probably the more fruitful one. Would be to focus on that eastern front where Russia has gathered that that mass of forces around the areas like Bmu, but also as far south as Vlada where fighting is still continuing as well of the ika between the two.
And then north of north of Buch you've still got heavy fighting going on around places like Mina Ions, et cetera. This is the area where Russia has been focusing that winter offensive. It hasn't been a very convincing offensive in any part other than the streets of Bmu itself.
But by focusing and offensive in that direction, the goal would be not necessarily to make this. Symbolic gain of opening the door to retrieving control over Crimea. But instead the goal would be to destroy that capability that Russia has left. If Ukraine were to be able to take out of the equation, all those different units, including Wagner that's fighting there, including the 76th V D V and including a whole number of forces.
The Naval Infantry has got some. Some allegedly higher quality forces in those areas as well. If you can take those out of action that increases your probability of success down the line as well, because Russia will be even more limited in which capabilities it can shift around how it can fight you in other areas.
It might make an eventual offensive in the direction of Crimea easier as well. Now and in that kind of. Offensive, of course. The main goal of using the storm shadow or other similar weapons would be to directly assist in destroying that Russian capability. So it takes on a similar shape and targeting logistics in targeting command structures maybe even air defense depending on how tactical they want to go in the use of these kind of weapon systems.
But essentially the use of the system would then be focused on disrupting the specific Russian unit's ability to counter that offensive rather than making the area of Crimea a living
Jacob Shapiro: hell. It sounds to me like you think the latter is what Ukraine is aiming for. Am I reading
Sim Tak: you right?
I honestly don't know. I've gone back and forth trying to. Read indicators of where they might be going. Sometimes I I was seeing indicators for a while that suggested they might actually be trying to push towards Crimea. I think now more recently, seeing those storm shadow strikes in Luhansk that might rise the idea of maybe these are preparations for an offensive in the eastern direction.
But if tomorrow we see storm shadow strikes in Crimea that whole indicator gets wiped away again as well. So it's I think obviously Ukraine is going to keep these plans very close at hand. We'll see it when it starts developing. And it's even entirely possible that we might see Ukraine probe in both these directions and Decide to commit to whichever one chose the most potential at that time.
That's
Jacob Shapiro: actually a very reassuring thing you just said because I was a little concerned because it seemed like everybody and their mother knew exactly when the Ukrainian counter offensive was coming and everybody knew what was gonna happen and that you are reading the teas here and not sure which avenue or which direction Ukrainian military is going for.
I assume the Russians aren't sure either, and Ukraine is trying to make sure that the Russians don't have an idea of where they're actually gonna leverage their forces. Before we turn to the Russians, cause I wanna spend some time talking about the Russians. But I was listening to a War on the Rocks podcast with Michael Kaufman.
And one thing that he's been great, since the beginning of this conflict. He got a lot of things right in the beginning that I didn't get right. But one thing he said on that podcast recently that really stayed with me was he talked about how, Ukraine has been training all of these units for a counter offensive, and then Russia has been, bringing up conscripts and soldiers and trying to reposition all these other things.
And his point was basically just, this is chapter two of the war. In some ways this counter offensive, we're gonna see. Soldiers on both the Ukrainian side and the Russian side thrown into the battle who haven't fought before. These are fresh troops, troops that really haven't faced each other.
So you, everything we've learned in the past year about these armies yes, you have to keep that in mind, but these are also new armies and there's gonna be new forces to deal with there. And I guess the question that I'm searching for is first of all, do you agree with that framework and then before we leave the Ukrainian forces, how do you rate the quality and effectiveness of Ukraine's army?
It's been, over a year that this war has been going, probably Ukraine's biggest disadvantage is the numbers. They just numerically can't take the kinds of losses and can't pull up the kinds of reserves that Russia can throw into a meat grinder conflict. How do you rate the quality of Ukraine's forces here over a year into the conflict with all this training, all of these weapons that they've gotten?
Yeah. H how are, what is the quality of the Ukrainian force right now?
Sim Tak: First off, let me say definitely al also a fan of a lot of the things that Kaufman has been doing. He's a, he is putting some great material out there and I tend to agree with that assessment of, this, we could look at this as a new war with new armies facing each other.
I think one of the challenges for each side is going to be managing to just how much of a degree that will be the case. And what I mean by that is that as new forces are being trained you're going to want to transfer all of that institutional knowledge, everything that has been learned before and throughout the conflict to those new forces.
So some of the things that are being done there, for example is taking troops from existing units and redeploying them in these new units where they are operating together with new recruits and things like that. So the more successful they will be in Kind of mitigating that freshness effect of these new units the more effective they will be on the battlefield.
And I think I would assume, and maybe that's a little bit of a dangerous assumption, but I would assume that Ukraine supported by NATO and the training programs where a lot of native countries have extensive experience in, in training foreign forces in, in a very Very intelligent manner.
They understand the pitfalls of training these new units and I, I think that level of support and the way that Ukraine is tackling this will put them in a better position to field a fresh army that still has a significant amount of institutional knowledge carried over while when we hear the stories about Russian mobilized forces getting almost no training, if any.
Even barely able to use the weapon systems that they receive, if they receive any. So those kind of stories make me think that the Russians will not be very effective in bringing that kind of institutional knowledge to the frontline. And I recently was told by someone, some of the examples of how it, it seems that in a lot of Russian units commanders at the levels of colonels and majors.
So essentially commanders of companies and battalions and higher up that those are responsible to actually go down to the tactical level on the front line to tell forces exactly how to take up their positions, how to conduct certain operations. Things that normally in a Western army you would have.
Your junior officer corps your lieutenants and captains be responsible for. So that also tells me that in the Russian Army, they have a real problem as they're pushing more and more people in to maintain that level of institutional knowledge. Because it, it seems that most of it tends to exist at the ranks.
That are not directly engaged in combat at this point.
Jacob Shapiro: And this is a good segue, I think, to turn to Russia's forces. While you're talking, I can't help but think about the historic and, historical analogies are limited, but I can't help but think about the Korean War.
Which the Korean War it's a terrible name for that war. I've said this before in the podcast. It was really, there were two wars there. There was the Korean War, which lasted about three months, and then there was the first US China War and. What China had was just millions of people that could be cannon fodder and like you said, throwing soldiers in without training them in some times without weapons, but just so they could get millions of people charging the hill against the United States, which, which had inferior forces, but better technology.
It sounds to me like you're describing a situation where Russia has su superior force, even if the force is not of particularly equality. Ukraine has the better technology, and I bring up the Korean War first US-China War example because, That ended in stalemate. The demilitarized zone today is just about where, the demilitarized zone was in 1950 or 1951, whenever the war started.
Russia's forces you alluded to this quote unquote counter offensive. It's been one mistake after another. And we've even got these reports of, the guys with Bogner. Challenging Putin in public and all this dissension within the Russian military ranks here.
Can Russia keep this up? Is Russia in danger of getting beaten back or does Russia have the advantage of superior forces and it can just throw people into this meat grinder and is probably betting that it can throw people into it longer than Ukraine can either throw men into the battle or have enough weapons from the west to fight the battle.
Sim Tak: So Russia has a tremendous resource in its population that provides it, that mass on the battlefield. But I think we need to be very clear about how that is not an infinite. Resource. And especially if we're comparing that to historical conflicts the value of that kind of mass reduces over time because the level of sophistication of warfare goes up, right?
Strictly mass translates into less and less advantage on the battlefield. If that mask cannot be trained if it is not skilled or e even simply, able to use basic modern technology like like cell phones and, applications to control drones and things like that.
The more intelligent your mask, you're mass as the more trained it is the more capable it is going to be on a modern battlefield. So I think in that regard A lot of that mass that Russia has is being negated by the level of skill that is being developed on the Ukrainian and extensively supported by its Western allies, obviously.
And that kind of leads to your point about, is that a stalemate? Do those two elements lift each other? But what I wonder about is where does that ability for Russia to keep mobilizing people, to keep pushing that mass into the battlefield? Where does that end? Because we know for a fact that it can't be infinite.
There, there is some stretch on Russia's ability to force people to join the military, but at some point, the people, and even in Russia, sometimes the people revolt. And when they like the Kremlin is constantly going to have to be assessing how far they can push things without risking things, getting out of control.
We also have to keep in mind 2024, we have a presidential election coming up in Russia now. I know what everybody listening is shouting at me right now. I understand it's not a real election. Putin's going to win by default and things like that. And that may be true because the Kremlin does control the the electoral legislation to a significant degree.
Even if they don't commit voter fraud they're going to select who is allowed to run. So that already makes you win before the ballots open. But. The elections are still going to be a very significant reflection of the kind of stability that exists in Russia, the kind of support that the government has, and that is something that will reflect on the position of that government.
Towards the other power brokers in Russia. So when we're talking about the economic elites, the the security factions, et cetera they are constantly putting their trust in Putin and those around them to run the country in a way that is favorable to them. I think a lot of that trust has been degraded due to the current conflict.
But if there start to be real concerns about. Potential popular dissent and things like that. I think some of those factions might start to withdraw their support from Putin, start to look for ways to get rid of him, and that's where that Russian political system. Despite the electoral realities where that Russian political system can get very very sensitive.
And I think that's something that you were already alluding to when you were talking about Prigozhin sending his his harsh messages to Moscow out on the the worldwide web. It's clear that there is tension between those elites in Russia. It's clear that some kind of conflict is brewing.
I think so far it doesn't look like anyone's actually been willing to to take up arms and do something about it at that level of of Russian politics. But anything that, that the current government does That could push it further that way is going to be something they're gonna think very hard about.
So all that is to say, just to bring it back to the point I was trying to make is I think, I don't think Putin has an endless source of mobilization. And at some point he's going to have to say, no we can't force people out of their homes, recruit them into the military because People are gonna come after me.
Jacob Shapiro: I feel like the conventional wisdom has been that the longer the war goes on, the more it favors Russia because they have those numerical advantages and they can, endure more suffering. I've made that point before with audiences and clients and also on this podcast before. It sounds to me, look the, it sounds to me though that sort of what you're saying actually would challenge that idea, and this is where I want to bring in, let's get outside of Russian Ukraine right now, because I thought That three what was it, 2.7 or 2.8 billion euros.
I think it was 3 billion US dollars military aid package that Germany announced last week. That's basically, the amount of support that Germany's offered in the entire war up to now in one fell swoop. And, what a. What a progression we've seen from Germany. It's been probably too slow for lots of observers and certainly too crow for the, too slow for the Ukrainian government.
But just go back to January, 2022 when right before the war started, Germany was sending helmets because they didn't wanna send weapons to Ukraine because they still had this idea that they were gonna be able to have Nord stream two and have relations with Russia, but be in NATO and do all these other things.
Now we've got all off sho saying, yeah we don't need anybody to tell us we need more tanks and more of all these other things. We're gonna have German. Military, industrial companies, we're gonna start JVs in Ukraine, we're gonna start building weapons systems there, and all these other sorts of things.
That to me, sounds and Marco Pich cousin Marco has been on the podcast a few times. He's talked about how he thought eventually, the Germans would take the natural gas from Russia and the conflict would turn around and I was always arguing with him. I think things have changed a little bit, but Shoals and the German government always made me doubt myself because they were so limp risk about their support for Ukraine.
But, It looked to me like that military aid package that was Germany coming out and saying, Hey, we're like when the defense minister says, we're gonna do whatever it takes to help Ukraine win this war. That sounds like it's whatever it takes. And if Germany is committed here and Germany's gonna build.
Ukraine weapons and supply them with all the technology they're gonna need and things like that. That to me says maybe time is actually on the side of the Ukrainians. Maybe as the Russian forces eat themselves alive it's really Ukraine that can draw this out, and maybe Ukraine doesn't have to do the counter offensive right now.
Maybe Ukraine can just drag this out and get stronger and stronger and let the Russians tear themselves to pieces. Tell me what you think of that emerging narrative. Cause I'm trying it on for size. I'm not even sure if I believe that story I just told myself, but how does it sound
Sim Tak: to you?
No, there, there's some big thoughts that I definitely agree with. Just to tackle onto what you were saying at the end there, in, in terms of Ukraine being able to stretch out this war and just wait until it gets bigger and bigger I don't think that's an option. Because every weapon system that they wait for, Is resulting in a number of deaths on the battlefield that they have to accept because they haven't ended this war yet.
So there's, I think the capacity the human capacity that the Ukrainian military has. Runs out long before they reach that kind of overwhelming force through various different armament schemes from their allies. So I, I don't think that's an option to wait for it.
I think to a certain degree, even the current or currently anticipated offensive it's going to be a very important marker in just how much support Ukraine can expect to continue to receive from the West. I think. People have been putting a lot of resources in there. You mentioned the example of Germany, which made a tremendous turnaround during this whole conflict.
But the us, the uk, France Spain, Denmark even Belgium Meadowlands, everybody. Is jumping on this and I, I forgot to mention a lot of the Eastern European I need to go through the list to make sure everybody is thanked in order here. But the but the reality is ev everybody in NATO and around NATO has really come together to, to support Ukraine's capabilities.
But if that doesn't translate into some kind of success, I think a lot of that, the political support. For the massive amount of resources that goes into that is going to start to withdraw at some point. And I think we talked about that last year as well, which was something that I was really afraid of happening during the winter for that western support for Ukraine to start to wither and essentially cause Zelensky to be out there on, on on his own.
I think that's still a risk. We'll have to see what happens with all of these current packages of support that are delivered. This offensive is something a long time in the making. There's a lot of effort that has gone into it, not just in, in terms of material resources, but also training programs, different kinds of integration.
There's it's a really massive test case for everyone to see. Whether the support can be sufficient to make Ukraine successful. So I think we'll have to see it at some point before the winter, cuz then everything will shut down again. So I don't think they can afford to wait.
Jacob Shapiro: And Mother, just to stop you there though, I think the risk is bigger with the United States and we're seeing that with Biden decided he needed to cancel a meeting of the quad, so the India, Japan, the United States, Australia, he decided he needed to cancel a quad meeting of the leaders of the quad because he had to come home and deal with the debt ceiling negotiations.
I, I think us support is very precarious, but just listen to what we've talked about here. We've talked about this German military aid package. We started off talking about storm shadows from the uk. I'm sure Macron doesn't want to be left out, so he'll come up with something French that he can claim is better than what both of those sides are coming through.
It sounds like Europe is at least ponying up and Europe has a lot of capacity. It has to rebuild before it can do that at scale, but. Maybe it's the best case scenario for Ukraine that as the United, as support from the United States might start to wane because of the domestic political cycle in the United States, that European countries are now starting to step up and they've had a little bit of time to think about this and maybe direct some investment that way.
That's, ultimately in the long term, if Ukraine has any sort of viable path to independence and being rebuilt, it's through the eu. It's not through the United States or anything like that.
Sim Tak: Yes, exactly. And that's exactly where I wanted to go actually with the the upcoming US elections as well.
We talked about Russia having that election in 2024, but the US has one as well. And waning support from Biden might be the most positive outcome Ukraine can hope for, depending on how that election in the US turns out. And I think, in the event that Trump gets elected president again, things are looking very poorly for Ukraine.
So that's something that, that they're gonna have to be aware of. The fact that was actually,
Jacob Shapiro: no. Hold on. I wanna play with the two. Do you do you think that would be bad for you? DeSantis I think is very clear. He's his stake deposition as, I'm not gonna support Ukraine indefinitely and I care about things like Disney and debt and blah, blah, blah.
Trump. I have no idea to parse what he thinks. On the one hand, at that town hall, he was like, oh I'll fix it in 24 hours. But at the same time, like he also. Trump hates looking weak. And so he would probably relish the opportunity to quash all the, oh, I'm with Russia and golden showers and this, that other thing.
No, I'm coming in, I'm gonna finish the war. I'm gonna really finish. I, he's a total wild card to me. So I guess from the sense that yes, he is, Ukraine would have to be worried about the volatility there. But I don't think, if I was in Moscow, I don't think I would be sitting there like looking forward to a Trump presidency, cuz God knows what he would do for all we know.
He might go. 180 degrees the other direction, and he can, because he's the one in the Republican party that can say one thing and do another and not get punished for it.
Sim Tak: No, that, that's a very fair point. It's not guaranteed which way a Trump presidency would would affect the war. But I think that the fact that you have a wild card like that in the, or a loose cannon, let's call it that, or the fact that you have a loose cannon in the, a loose storm in White House.
Yeah. That itself is a great source of. Instability for Ukraine. I think yeah, without wanting to make a call about which, which US candidate is better for Ukraine or anything like that I don't mean to try to Send out electoral advice based on the situation in Ukraine there.
But but the reality is that can shake things up. And the us you know, despite all of the Europeans ponying up as you were saying the US is still by far the biggest supporter of this entire Ukrainian capability. When you express it in dollar amounts. They are massively larger than anyone else combined.
When you are talking about specific weapon systems like the high Mars munitions javelins there's very key technologies that are coming from the US that Ukraine would miss very dearly if they couldn't get their hands on them anymore.
Jacob Shapiro: Yeah, no, that's a fair point too, that also raises, I think the issue of China, and I know this is a little further afield, but the Russian, I don't think the Chinese, correct me if I'm wrong, I haven't seen evidence that China's supporting Russia in a military way, but the Russian economy such as it is, would not be standing of China.
Wasn't there buying, Russian commodities and having trade with Russia and things like that. But that's another really dis disturbing signal I think for Russia over the past couple of months. She. Finally had that phone call with Zelensky, and I think China maybe is looking at the map and say okay, how?
How do we position ourselves if Ukraine does win this war? We don't want to just be stuck in the, we supported Russia camp in general, and if you get any kind of. Weakening of I, I don't think we can call it support, but if China becomes less ambivalent about the war and more, Hey, Russia, you really need to figure this out because we don't wanna see state collapse on our borders and you can't win this war, so figure out what you're gonna do.
Or we're gonna have to make our own decisions. It seems to me like that's another thing that has to weigh considerably on how Russia's thinking about proceeding forward here.
Sim Tak: Definitely, and I think that. China has been very careful in positioning itself all the way since the beginning of the war. I don't think that China has ever really shown itself to be supporting Russia's military operations in Ukraine.
Not materially, but all, not even politically. Like they, they have tried to maintain a relationship with Russia. As you mentioned, they have a very strong. Economical intertwinement. But I think that China is very careful in not putting itself in the same bucket that Russia is in as being the aggressor upsetting the international order in this way.
And it, it's a bit odd because at the same time we are constantly talking about the potential risk of conflict around Taiwan which would see China do. Or undertake similar actions as Russia did against Ukraine. But I think we can probably learn something about how China is thinking about situations like Taiwan.
If we look at how it is positioning itself relative to Russia in this conflict with Ukraine. I, and I'm not a, I'm not a China specialist but to me from the little. Bits and bobs that I get here and there. It seems to me that China is trying to to stay out of the role of being a belligerent.
Jacob Shapiro: Yeah. This is a good, we can do a two minute tangent on this. Do you actually worry about China attacking Taiwan over, let's say the next two to three years? Is that a scenario that worries you? I've I'm on record as saying it doesn't worry me at all, and it doesn't worry me at all because I look at China's capabilities and an amphibious assault against a hard target like Taiwan with Japan and.
The United States and Australia and all these other countries sitting there to support doesn't seem to me like China has the capability to even be thinking about that and diluting itself into victory. And until Chinese decision makers and military officials can make the case that no, we stand a very good chance at winning a war like that, it, it feels to me like that's not gonna happen.
So it's more like a seven, 10 years from now thing for me, rather than worrying about it in the next one to three years. Is that also where you're at or do you think I need to re-look at my assessment of the capabilities of the Chinese military?
Sim Tak: That's the exact reasoning that I had.
And I think you were following as well about Russia last two years ago.
Jacob Shapiro: Yes it was, but and this, this gets down to where Putin and individuals matter in geopolitics because even though Russia didn't like you were right, like Russia didn't have the forces to do this. I was right.
It was strategically a really bad idea. But Putin locked himself in that room with the really long table during Covid 19, and somehow told himself this story that it was good, and he had absolute power in Russia. And he basically said, all right, we're gonna do this. And people blindly followed him.
China has many virtues. It has many disadvantages. It doesn't seem to me like Xi Jinping has ever shown that kind of capacity for self delusion. At least he has. He hasn't shown it quite yet. But I take your point that if Xi Jinping locks himself in the room and starts believing that China really could do that, that it would go that way.
But that would end in the same way that we're talking about now. Like it wouldn't end with Chinese conquest of Taiwan. It would end with. An embarrassment for China, and I don't think the Chinese Communist Party could last as long as this Russian government has lasted if it was losing a war in trying to reunify
Sim Tak: with Taiwan.
I think what you're, what you raised in the beginning of that response is exactly the thing to be looking for the, what is the essential difference in styles of decision making in China and Russia? How does that. How much power does he really have? How much influence does he really have over this kind of decision making?
How much how much input do military specialists have in that kind of decision making and how well do they know their job to be able to inform that kind of decision making effectively? If we were to assume that yes, that is radically different in China than it is in Russia, like then yes, I, I could very easily support a line of thought that says yeah it's not that likely for China to suddenly go at Taiwan.
But again I don't know that to be the case, so I, yeah, I have to assume that it is at the very least possible.
Jacob Shapiro: Yep. All right. We'll put the tangent aside and let's say, last question, get you outta here on this. All right, so it's May 17th, 2023. Describe the battlefield as you think it will be on December 31st, 2023.
Sim Tak: That's a very tough one not knowing where the Ukrainians are going. But let me put it this way. So if let's assume that the Ukrainians are going to focus on on eroding that Russian military capacity of those core units around, around Eastern Ukraine. Then I would say by December we'll be in another kind of winter calm down following an offensive expansion of territories controlled under controlled by Ukrainian forces.
So I think we might see additional parts of the Russian border secured by Ukrainians. At that point. We might see a number of places that were lost over the past year of fighting. Bmo Seve, donk places like that might be coming back into Ukrainian hands.
Possibly. We might even see the pressure start to rise on Don Nets itself, the city of Don Nets because we have a lot of important battlefield that are essentially along the different edges of the city itself. And. Eventually recapturing the City of Donuts, which has been in the hands of Russia or pro-Russian separatists since 2014.
That to me is perhaps an even bigger challenge than Crimea. So yeah I think that's where we might end this year essentially having territory recovered and Being in a position where the pressure is being raised towards either those, the city of Donnas or perhaps Crimea, if that's the direction they go into.
But I, I don't think that we'll see the full recovery of the occupied territories within this year. I think that would require an immense collapse of Russian military capabilities or complete political abandonment of the operation
Jacob Shapiro: altogether. And that, that's the, so I hear you on the Ukrainian side.
So you're also saying there that you're not expecting though a collapse of Russian capabilities over the next six day months, even though we are seeing some of that tension brewing within Russia
Sim Tak: itself. I think significant attrition on the battlefield but I don't think that we'll see a, a. Full stop to Russia's ability to mobilize at, within this timeframe within the next few months essentially.
Cuz the forces that'll be on the battlefield by December are forces that are being recruited now. So I, I don't think that's going to cause any big shortages, any big changes. The only real big qualitative change that I could see on the Russian side is if the political The political factions completely turn around when it comes to the offensive, if they were already invasion, rather if they decide that they're no longer supporting it, that they're no longer willing to carry the cost of it that might put things to an end, but I'm also not expecting that to happen so quickly.
Honestly, I think whatever the Ukrainian offensive causes on the ground is going to. Take months, if not longer, to reverberate into all of those political decisions.
Jacob Shapiro: Yeah. I know I said that was gonna be the last question, but one more. Sam, I know, you and I usually talk about the Russia, Ukraine war, and that's what I've relied on you here on for the podcast.
But you're not just a Russia Ukraine expert. You're a military expert, security expert in general. There's a civil war in Sudan. Yemen is still sitting there. What is. An example of another conflict that listeners maybe are not paying attention to, that they should be paying attention to that may be crowded out by debt, ceiling news, or any of the, any of these other things.
Or is it really just, Hey, it's the Russia, Ukraine war and that's where you should be focused from a security perspective in
Sim Tak: the world right now? So I'm actually still very interested in the direction that the security situation across the entire Sahel is is evolving. Just to try and keep it brief, not to go into an entire additional hour of discussion because we could talk about this a lot.
We can
Jacob Shapiro: definitely have you on for a whole nother episode and that, so how about you te tease up the next episode where we just do the style? Oh, that's a great
Sim Tak: idea. But essentially between the conflicts in Mali Nigeria central African Re Republic and other, the Civil War in Sudan and the continuing conflict in Libya.
There's a lot of conflicts in that area that have a lot of different local ethnic elements playing out in them that have a a jihadist element playing out into it. And then it's it's essentially something where. It's been dealt with in, in separate operations, separate approaches in different parts of the Sahel neither of which has been really successful.
We've seen over the past year France getting pushed back little by little being being kicked out of countries that are actually aligning a little more. Towards Russia. So this is all tying into that whole Russia, Ukraine, Russia versus West discussion that we were having earlier, of course.
Just to wrap up the idea there the big question is will we be able to actually restore some kind of stability there? Or is this going to be another perpetual. Conflict against pockets of extremists in different countries, potential terrorist states rising.
I think when the United States was able to finally get out of Afghanistan out of out of Iraq to a great degree the expectation in Europe was that we'd be able to wrap up those operations in the Sahel in a similar way, but it's it's just not heading that direction.
Jacob Shapiro: No, not at all.
And as you said, there's a lot there to unpack and it's getting worse and this affects markets in ways I think that many observers don't understand. And I mean everything from, Nigeria is a great example. Nigerian oil production continues to dwindle because the Nigerian state just cannot in enforce the rule of law.
And stability on a basic level there. Angola just overtook Nigeria actually as Africa's largest oil producing country. Countries like Ivory Coast, Burkina Fasu, places like this that you may not have even heard of some of these countries, but if you're thinking about the price of chocolate and when you're buying candy at the store and things like that, this is where your cacao is all coming from.
And that all goes back to those farmers. I saw an article in the Wall Street Journal, I didn't know this, but the, some kind of gum that. Is crucial in the production of product. I was going to mention
Sim Tak: products. Gum, Arabic. Yeah.
Jacob Shapiro: Sudan. I had no idea. So 80% of that comes from Sudan. So apparently, if you're drinking soda out there, maybe you want to, maybe you wanna stash exactly the cola products right now.
It may feel like these conflicts are far away and who cares about a bunch of jihadi rebels in the middle of the desert. But actually you do. That's what it means to live in a globalized world. But yeah, as you said, sim let's not let's save that hour for the next time. We'll have you back on soon and let's, next time you come on, let's not even talk about Russia, Ukraine.
We'll do a, we'll do a Sahel and a Yemen check-in and some other I don't wanna say fun things, cuz that's macabre even for me. But we'll have you back on and we'll talk about some other hotspots,
Sim Tak: but I, I'd love to, yeah. Thanks. Sorry. Thanks.
Jacob Shapiro: Thank you so much for listening to the Cognitive Dissidents Podcast, brought to you by Cognitive Investments.
If you are interested in learning more about cognitive investments, you can check us out online@cognitive.investments. That's cognitive.investments. You can also write to me direct. If you want@jacobcognitive.investments, cheers and we'll see you out there. The views expressed in this commentary are subject to change based on market and other conditions.
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