Jacob: We've had some major developments in the Middle East region lately, and I think we need to talk through them. The last podcast that you came on, in December, was titled "The End of the Iranian Regime." Maybe the end of the Iranian regime is still somewhat in sight, but the regime seems to be kicking - it's not gonna go down without a fight.
Last week there was big news across the board, and just to recap, on Thursday there was a Wall Street Journal report that Saudi Arabia is cool with normalizing relations with Israel. That's if the United States gave Saudi Arabia some security guarantees, and if the United States supported the Saudi Arabian civilian nuclear development program. If you put that in your cap and you think about it, you find that the next day, in China, Iran and Saudi Arabia announced renormalization of ties. To give some perspective, ties have been closed for something like seven or eight years and suddenly there's Iran and Saudi Arabia in China saying, "Nope, we're gonna reopen embassies and China was essential in brokering all this."
Everybody's talking about this summit that China wants to help host between the GCC countries and Iran, and China stepping up into the role of being this diplomatic heavyweight. As far as I know, there are no conditions for China, but I want to lob this over to you. Can you help us make sense of those developments, because at least superficially, they seem like they're pretty tectonic.
Kamran: I'm not gonna be shy about saying that I think that most of the world, including the Western media and observers, are making too much out of this entire event. There's no way that the Saudis and the Iranians are kissing and making up. The deep-seated geopolitical hostility isn't because of Arab versus Persian necessarily, or Sunni versus Shia. I would love to frame things in those terms, but it has to do with raw power and… Who has the upper hand? Who is more assertive in the region?
In this case, it's Iran. Iran has its tentacles deep inside the Arab world, and that's the strategic environment in which we see these two sides coming together to form a deal, brokered by the Chinese. Think of this as a very temporary ceasefire in a long conflict that has been going on for a while and will continue for a while. Both sides need this truce, but we’ll dive into the details later.
Let’s quickly shift over to the Chinese angle. You know this more than I do, because you've looked into China far more granularly than I have over the years, but China's economy isn't doing great.
Ji has turned China from a bureaucratic authoritarian state into a personalized dictatorship. He needs to demonstrate what China is getting out of all of this, so this agreement turns into a quick win. This is low-hanging fruit for him. Saudi Arabia, alongside Russia, are the major exporters of crude to China so there's already a relationship there.
The Saudis are upset with the Americans for a variety of reasons, and that right there is enough incentive to work with the Chinese. Meanwhile, Iran has no friends. Russia is its only friend, and that friend needs more help than Iran does at the moment. The US does not have a relationship with Iran, which leaves China as the only viable option for a partnership. That’s how you end up with China using this photo op as an opportunity to make a splash on the global media stage.
But, ultimately, there's nothing substantive there. China is doing all of this because the US, for all practical purposes, is providing security for the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf region.
I'll draw you an analogy.
The Chinese built BRI all around Afghanistan because it the American dollar and American forces were doing the heavy lifting for them, making sure that whatever happens in Afghanistan stays there and does not spill over. That created this environment for China to play around in and build up BRI, but following the US withdrawal, they've been left in a pickle.
These things have to be kept into the context as opposed to Wang Ye having a photo op with Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, poaching with the Saudi National Security Advisor on his right and left.
Jacob: I take your point and would extend your point on sort of the China-US aspects of this, because you mentioned that China's the most important customer of Saudi Arabian oil and Iranian oil - they're importing lots of oil from those two countries.
I would say here that China as a customer has all the leverage. So it's not actually that China's dependent on Saudi Arabia and Iran, it's actually that Saudi Arabia and Iran are dependent on China. When China says to Saudi Arabia, “Hey, we're gonna need to start considering paying for our oil in Chinese Yuan,” Saudi Arabia has to say “yes.”
Now the media can spin that as the decline of the dollar, but China is Saudi Arabia's biggest customer and they have to listen. If Wang Ye wants to have a photo op in China with Iran and Saudi Arabia, both of those countries really have to seriously consider it.
There’s another key thing here. We can talk about the personality differences between the Biden White House and between Mohamed Bin Salman, and Reishi, all these other things, but it wasn't that long ago that a US president was doing sword dances and having Tobi Keith concerts with Saudi Arabia, so the hatred doesn't necessarily run that deep. The biggest thing is that the United States just isn't importing oil from the Middle East anymore. As long as the United States isn’t importing almost any Saudi crude, then it doesn't matter what the United States does or says because Saudi products are going elsewhere and that leverage is lost.
Where I would push back against you, and where I'd ask you to sort of dig in a little deeper, is the fact that this wasn't just a photo. The embassies are reopening again, the lines of communication are gonna be open again. They are gonna have this summit next year. When you compare that with Israel, which has been expecting normalization with Saudi Arabia for years now and thought it was in this anti-Iranian coalition with Saudi Arabia. The Israelis are sitting there going, “Well, wait, I thought the Abraham Accords meant something. I thought that we were gonna open up embassies with Saudi Arabia.”
Perhaps the lines of communication won't stay open that long, maybe something will happen in the Yemenese Civil War or Iran will bomb some Saudi oil infrastructure and it’ll all collapse in three to six. But there are some actual moves on a diplomatic level attempting to change things around the board. The last point I'd make is that Saudi Arabia isn’t really playing with the US any more, it's doing geopolitics on its own. Maybe Saudi Arabia has seen its expectations with US intervention in Iran being dashed time and time again, all while burning through cash to fight this Yemeni War, and has decided that Iran isn’t going anywhere. Maybe they like Iran's version of the world. Maybe they like a multipolar world with China and Russia and Iran. A world where not everybody has to bow down to the United States and do things. Tell me where I'm wrong. Tell me where I'm drinking the Kool-Aid.
Kamran: No, you're not drinking the Kool-Aid. You rightfully point out that it's more than just a photo op and there are some genuinely actionable items. The opening of the embassies and the communication channels and whatnot.
What I'm perceiving is that we really just need to wait and see. I can't imagine the Iranians pledging to no longer play in Iraq, in Syria, in Yemen, in Lebanon. They now have a relationship with the Saudi and I just don't see that happening. I don't see the Saudis trusting the Iranians after being at the receiving end of Iranian assertiveness and aggression in the Arab world.
They got some respite during Trump where they had the sword dance and whatnot, but the bottom line is that the United States, regardless of administration and presidential personality, has to manage the whole region. Beyond Saudi Arabia, in Israel for instance, we're seeing this divergence of interest. It's been going on for years now. It's become more acute now because the developments that were in play years ago have now matured.
You’re right. The Saudis are trying to figure out a way in which, without the help of supporting actors (namely the US), they can manage a relationship with Iran. They’re realizing that they need to develop a strategy on their own. Iran is changing internally, and so the United States will have to deal with Iran, but they don’t want to rely on that any more. The failure of the JCPOA, the Iran Nuclear Deal, demonstrated that to them. They can't depend on that, which is why they're saying, “You know what? I don't care if Russia invades Ukraine. I'm still gonna do business with Russia and the, the, the UAE is also doing the same thing.”
As for Israel, I really have a doubt that the Israelis ever hoped to have an embassy in Riyad anytime soon.While the Israelis are definitely looking at this and saying, “What are the Chinese up to?” “What are the Saudis up to?” “How does this benefit the Iranians?” “Are they coming out from the cold and is their isolation decreasing?” These are all valid questions, but I don't think the expectation was that Saudi Arabia was heading their way and has now completed an about face and gone in the opposite direction.
This is all made more complex by the US’s relationship with the Saudis over the last decade. In 2013, the Saudis were quite happy at the Obama administration’s decision to execute airstrikes in Syria in response to the use of new chemical weapons. Not only did those airstrikes end up getting called off, but the US government turned around and began negotiating with the Rouhani government about establishing the JCPOA. That really bruised the Saudis. It made them realize that the US isn't necessarily abandoning them, but that they also can’t rely on them the way they used to. The Saudis are also living in an increasingly dangerous neighborhood, with fires burning at their northern and southern flanks and Iran barging through multiple doors at once. So they're gonna go with China, they're gonna go with Russia, they're gonna work with UAE, they’re going to try to stop the fighting with Qatar.
Look, you keep your friends close and your enemies closer. I don't think that the Saudis are an exception to that principle.
Jacob: Obviously this means has implications for the US and for Israel, but also for India and Turkey. There are a lot of regional players here that have stakes in it. Before we get there - what do you think Saudi Arabia gets out of this? Even if it's a short term thing, even if it's just a photo op, what’s the calculus here? And then on the flip side, what does Iran get? Why did they agree to do this? Because I take your point that neither one of them would've done it if they didn't see something in for themselves and for their geopolitical interests, which are often divergent in that region.
So just very specifically for Saudi Arabia and Iran, what does each side see that it gets out of this? Why was this a good move for each of them?
Kamran: They both have an interest in lowering the temperature. It's been high for a very long time. They both need to recuperate. They both need to reassess. They can do with the reduced tensions, even if it is for a brief period of time. A crude and somewhat awkward analogy is what happens between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip. You fight and you fight, and then you all agree and get the Egyptians to broker a truce until the next time.
This is a cycle. I know it's crude. I know it's not exactly what's happening between Iran and Saudi Arabia, but you get my point. My point is they both can benefit. The Saudis need to find a better way to manage Iran when they have a very dynamic and changing global environment.
And if the Chinese can help them achieve this, why not? If you're the Saudis, can you lean on the United States to make Iran behave? No. The Israelis know that as well. The biggest problem between the Israelis and the Americans is that the Americans say, “Hey, don't do something on your own. We got this.”
And the Israelis say, “Sure,” but then the Americans don't do anything. They can't do anything because they have no leverage over the Iranians. If you're the Saudis, who do you know that has leverage? The Russians? Right now Putin is more worried about Ukraine. What about the Chinese? They want to prove themselves as an emerging power and they have the heft to make demands. The Saudis know that the return on investment in this deal is limited, but they'll take what they get.
Now, flip over to the Iranians. You are under sanctions. You have an unprecedented domestic uprising. Your leader is about to kick the bucket. You don't know what is going to happen. Russia now needs your help, as opposed to Russia helping you. If China comes to you and says, “Let me help you with this,” this is an opportunity to move out of isolation and stick it to the US.
They get to show the US that they’re making peace with their historic adversaries with the help of another global superpower. Additionally, they get some needed respite. It's not like they're pulling out of Syria. Are the Chinese going to broker an agreement between the Saudis and the Iranians over power sharing between the Houthis and Yemen and their opponents that are pro-Saudi? I seriously doubt it. They're not gonna do that. That's way above the Chinese pay grade. This is as far as it goes.
The Iranians will take what they get, and in the meantime they can sort out other issues and they don't look like the bad guy. Currently everything is going poorly for them so this is a little bright spot. They have the Turks and the Azerbaijanis on their northern flank, the Taliban on their Eastern flank, a very distracted Russia, and they’re currently still under serious sanctions. Their currency has slid 30% since the beginning of this year and inflation is at 50%. So that’s a lot of bad. As I said, they'll take what they get.
Jacob: When Russia, China, and Iran begin to emerge from isolation, and then you get countries like India or Brazil on board, even if it's not geopolitically and just for trade, there’s something there. Definitely worth watching.
To buttress what you were saying though, there was a Wall Street Journal report that dropped the day before the Saudi Arabia, China, Iran deal, that essentially outlined the Saudi goals for a civilian nuclear program. I mean, Israel has nuclear weapons. Iran, if it doesn't have them already, will have them soon. So did the Saudis just telegraph that they're gonna get nuclear weapons too?
If you don't trust the United States anymore and you're living in this very precarious geopolitical environment, I would think that the next move would be a nuclear weapons program to protect against all contingencies because nobody else is gonna stop Iran.
Do you think I'm being too alarmist there? Or do you see the shadow of a nuclear arms race budding in the Middle East?
Kamran: Oh, absolutely. Not that I believe that the Saudis are going to gain access to nuclear technology anytime soon. Look at the Iranians, they've been at it for decades and they still haven't reached that. According to a top Pentagon official, if Iran made the political decision, they could have enough fissile material worth one bomb in about 12 days. But that doesn't mean they have a bomb, just the materials.
Compound that with the fact that if they're not careful, they could accidentally irradiate a significant portion of their own population if they don’t master the tech. So the Saudis do want to have a counterweight, but I just don't see how a civilian nuclear program will help the Saudis against the Iranians, who are already at the cusp of nuclear weapons.
Jacob: Well, it would help because they'd be lying about it being a civilian nuclear pro. I guess they could use the nuclear power, but they already have enough oil so I don’t think that’s likely. They can just point to Iran’s claims that it has a civilian nuclear program of its own and lay down an ultimatum for the US and try to garner civilian nuclear expertise.
I bet the Chinese are gonna give them “civilian nuclear expertise.” I wouldn't think that the Chinese are gonna be shy about giving that to the Saudis.
Kamran: No, no, you read my mind. I was gonna say that this civilian nuclear program seems to be a euphemism for the Saudis to say, “Hey, we want nukes.”
If you say to the western press, "I want nukes,” guess what will happen? But if you say, “I want a civilian nuclear program,” you’re well within political correctness and there's nothing wrong with it. That is, unless people like you and I start to pick it apart and say, “well, what does that really mean?” Yes, you're absolutely right.
I will also draw your attention to another report that came out just in the past few days while all of this was going on with China. The Saudi Sovereign Wealth Fund, is allocating money for the Saudis to purchase a large fleet of Boeing jets, so the dependency on the United States isn't going. The United States still provides and will continue to provide for security. We're not pulling the fifth fleet out of Bahrain rain. We're not pulling out of Kuwait. We're not pulling out of any of those bases in Qatar and the facilities that we have in UAE.
The Saudis don’t need to worry about the US pulling out after they’ve gone to China for help because the US is in the region for their own purposes. What I'm saying is that this isn't a zero sum game, and if the Chinese are getting a small piece of the action, sure.
Let's ask why this hasn't happened before. It's not like the Chinese got to the point where they decided, “Hey, you know, we're gonna get the Iranians and the Saudis together and we're gonna be seen as this mediator and peacemaker.”
The Chinese have been importing oil from Saudi Arabia for a very long time. The Iranians have been leaning on them for a very long time. The Chinese have a need to show that they can compete with the United States, and that the United States does not have a monopoly over different regions.
So, why is it finally happening now? My view is that it has a lot to do with Ji. What’s in it for him? We already talked about what's in it for the Iranians and what's in it for the Saudis, so what are the Chinese getting out of it? They could have done it just to demonstrate that they’re now playing major league geopolitics, but then I think that they would have done this a while ago. So I think there's something there and I think it’s about their domestic situation. I mean, we hear about the impending invasion of Taiwan. Okay, great. You know, when is that going to happen?
They did BRI, that didn't go anywhere. After 62 billion, Pakistan is about to default, and the Chinese are about to lose their money. The Pakistanis are saying, could you restructure our loans? And they're saying, we're not the IMF, you know, are you crazy?
So if you look at all of this and then you look at Sri Lanka, you look at this string of pearl strategy in the ocean, none of this is really panning out. Even if you look at the strategic poking of India on the Himalayas, they’re not using live firearms. It's more posturing. There's more fist fights with Indian forces.
So I think this is a low cost way of trying to distract from what's happening on the domestic front. It's of value to at least the Chinese leadership, led by XI himself.
Jacob: Yeah. I think there's also something to the idea that China benefits if Iran is welcomed back into the world order and if it's not tight with the United States. So if there was a chance of sort of an Iran-US agreement and the JCPOA, maybe it doesn't mean as much for China, but if China can bring on all of Iran's oil and natural resources and can be credited for being the one that brings Iran back in, that could be interesting too. Let's turn to some other players here because you're right that it is interesting for other countries in the region.
The first I think we have to talk about is Turkey, which is having a very difficult year already, and it doesn't look like it’s going to get any better with their elections coming up in May. There’s a sort of lack of certainty of what's gonna happen with Erdogan. Do you think that Turkey views this as threatening?
Do you think that Turkey nods at this and says, “good, in a multipolar world we need Iran and Saudi Arabia balancing against each other and we like having China around. We think we can export things to China and we have our own deals with China on the side.” Do you, do you think Turkey likes the idea of China, which is gonna be a less assertive power than the United States in the region? Or do you think that Turkey looks at this and maybe looks back towards the United States and is like, “Ah, maybe we shouldn't turn our backs on the US so much?”
Kamran: I think that this isn't something that the Turks are looking at and leaping with joy. They are looking at this and they're saying, "We're busy with our internal stuff. We just had a major earthquake. We're dealing with the fallout of Ukraine. We're trying to get into Central Asia. We're just trying to normalize relationships with Egypt, Israel, UAE, the Saudis, and now we have this."
So I wouldn't be surprised if they're still trying to figure this out. If there's going to be a competitor or someone that's going to challenge Turkey, it's Iran.
They're not going to take a look at this and say, “This multipolarity is good for us.” The other thing here is that China's efforts with respect to Iran are tied to Central Asia, if you just think spatially. Three or four months before the Taliban took over Afghanistan, there was this big photo op between the then-foreign minister of Iran and the former top diplomat of China, Mr. Wang,
The occasion was the signing of an agreement where the Chinese pledged to invest 400 billion over a 25 year period, bringing BRI into Iran and extending it to the Persian Gulf.
Now, where do you extend it from? You extend it from Turkmenistan, you have to connect through Tajikistan, that whole central Asian network of BRI infrastructure. So yes, there's long-term value for China to play with Iran. The Turks are also eying Central Asia for their own purposes. They want more than the Europeans, and I would say the Americans want this trans-Caspian energy corridor because it will allow them to reduce dependency on Russia.
It would make them the energy transit state that they've always dreamed of becoming. And if China's coming in and playing with Iran, then there's competition there. And it's kind of like, we just kind of made a gain against Iran in the South Caucasus and now we're having the Saudis and the Iranians helped by the Chinese working on some sort of an agreement.
That can't be good for the Turks. I mean, at least I don't see what benefit that the Turks can get out of it. I can see how they might feel that they no longer have the edge. One of the things that I've been arguing for some time is that as the Russian ability to project influence is waning, whether it's in Central Asia, the south Caucasus, the broader Black sea region, and beyond. The Turks can come in and fill that space.
So if China is upsetting that calculus or coming into that space and creating conditions that the, that have forced the Turks to recalculate and re-strategize, then that can't be go good for them.
Jacob: Maybe Ankara will start giving a damn about the Uyghurs and Xinjiang as well if they see that as a rivalry.
Do you think it's a bridge too far to suggest that Saudi Arabia may start to think that Turkey is actually the bigger, long-term rival to its interests than Iran. Is that too pie in the sky? I say that because Saudi Arabia is a Sunni Muslim country primarily, although, you know, the Wahabi stuff is very strange, and the areas of the Middle East thatTurkey seems to be muscling into are the areas where you would expect an Arab Sunni Muslim leader to emerge. Whereas there are just, you know, Iran's already experienced this, there are constraints to how much Iran can push because they're not Arab.
They're not even Sunni. Like they can do little tiny things in places like Lebanon and Syria. But that control is very tenuous and it's always gonna be hard for Iran to project power over that much geography. So is it crazy to say that maybe Saudi Arabia's thinking Turkey is the threat?
Kamran: Yeah, look, I mean, you're absolutely right. And I don't know if you were on leave at that time in 2015 and doing your graduate degree, or it was earlier, but in early 2015, just before I left Stratford, I did a series of, long pieces on how there are limits to how far the Iran Iranian power can extend itself because they're run into natural barriers.
You're up against the Arab ethnicity. You're up against the other side of the sectarian divide. There are linguistic issues and so on and so forth. But the Iranians had a benefit in the sense that the Sunni camp was divided or still is divided.
At the time ISIS was vying for the leadership of the Sunis, Turkey was trying to emerge as a Sunni power. The Arabs were worried about Turkey pushing in while they were dealing with an aggressive Iran. So to answer your question, I don't think that the Saudis would like to fight Iran in a way that empowers Turkey.
It makes sense intuitively that if Turkey plays a bigger role in the Middle East, then at least Iran can be countered. Assuming, you know, the situation in Syria can be reversed and Iraq, where right now the Iranians have the upper hand and somehow Turkey gains the upper hand.
But then in order to neutralize the Iranian threat, the price is too high for the Saudis and the Arabs, which is to go back to Turkish hegemony, if you will, or giving Turkey too much influence in their region. So I think that yes, the Saudis, want balance as opposed to this singular fear of the Iranians. They also have to be careful about, uh, not empowering the Turks in the process right now. And increasingly so since the Arab Spring uprising, Saudi Arabia is the only Arab state that is a major country that (along with UAE, which is much smaller) is shouldering the responsibility of representing the Arabs.
All other Arab powers have declined. Iraq has fallen into Iran's orbit. It used to be a big power. Syria is no longer that power that it used to be. Egypt has tanked. Egypt is now, you know, only so many years behind Pakistan in terms of becoming an economic mess.
In that circumstance, on one hand you have the Iranians, on the other hand you have the Turks. And if you're Saudi Arabia, you need balance. You can't be comfortable, you have to be able to have a plan to manage both.
Jacob: Yeah. This is an aside; I want to ask you about India as well in this context, but in a second.
Cousin Marco Papp, who comes on this podcast a fair amount, compared the nation building that's happening inside of Saudi Arabia to the Maji restoration in Japan, in the late 1800’s . His point being that, you know, Saudi Arabia is really going through incredible socioeconomic evolution and it's becoming a modern nation state in a way that it hasn't for hundreds of years.
Do you buy that? I instinctively think that that's nonsense. But I will say that, and maybe it's just because oil prices are high, but when you look at some of the things that Saudi Arabia's doing, it's kind of hard to disagree that something major is changing. I don't think you have to go to Maji Restoration hyperbole, but do you feel like something is fundamentally changing in Saudi Arabia? Are they becoming a modern nation state or is that just not in the card's for their sort of weird theocratic compromise between tribes and Wahabi and everything else?
Kamran: So I think Cousin Marco has a point. I wouldn't call it the Maji restoration, but he does have a point.
I do see Saudi Arabia evolving, and that's been accelerated under MBS, at least since 2015-2017. Look, the first Saudi state that laid the foundations for the Saudi Wahabi Alliance was in 1744, even before the founding of the United States. That state lasted well over eight decades, and then, the Ottomans, through the Egyptians, came in and knocked it down. A few years later, there was a second Saudi state in 1820. 1818 is when the first Saudi state collapses, 1824 is when it's restored. It's not the same scale or size, but it remains, and it lasts until about 1892.
Then you have that period between the decline of the Ottoman Empire, World War I, and the inter-war period, and then in 1932, you have the modern kingdom established. The point that I'm making is that traditional Saudi Arabia, was Wahabi, was tribalistic, and was built on petro dollars.
You just can't do away with that legacy in a short span of a decade. So the jury is out, you know? But yes, there is significant change in the climate. I mean, one of the things that I wanna point out is in many ways, MBS has basically neutered a boogeyman called the Wahabi establishment.
You know, put them under lock and key for the time being something that was unthinkable for the longest time. The idea was that there are three pillars of the Saudi state: there is oil, there's tribalism, and then there is Islam, the Wahabi version. And if you mess with any of those, this state, this edifice, will come tumbling down. That hasn't happened and in many ways MBS has basically said you guys were afraid of nothing. You have a situation where Saudi, so society has evolved. There are a lot more women out there in society and the workforce. There is a large youth population and not all of them want to be under the tribal ultra-conservative, religious paradigm, if you will. So he has something to build his modern Saudi Arabia on. We just need to see how long this goes.
And the one thing that he also has is economic prosperity. He's given social freedoms. But for all of this to endure, he needs a political system. Will Saudi Arabia become a constitutional monarchy where you provide for some sharing of power with the public so that it doesn't sort of snatch it from you in some form of rising, especially if the economics don't really pan out?
So that's still out there. So Cousin Marco isn't, you know, wrong, but I think that maybe he is getting a little ahead of himself.
Jacob: Yeah. The cart before the camel, if you will. The second thing you said there is very interesting, which is the idea that women have a freer role in Saudi society. And I think relative to the role that women play in Western societies, we would still characterize how women are treated in Saudi society as fairly medieval. But I think you're right, that relative to what they experienced even 10 years ago, there has been a big change. And I'm not sure that there is a bigger force for economic development in the end of poverty than empowering women.
If you're empowering women even a little bit in Saudi Arabia, maybe you get that wind underneath your sails. I would just think that once you give the population a little bit of freedom, they're gonna want more. And I don't know how somebody like MBS handles that, but let's not get too tied down at that.
You talked about Turkey a little bit. I wonder if you have a perspective on India and how India might react to this. Does India care? Does it not care? It seems to me that India is this other country that's gonna be importing oil from the Middle East. If China's in front of the line dictating terms with Saudi Arabia and Iran is, does India have to worry about a future in which China can say to Iran and Saudi Arabia, “Don't export to the Indians because they did something mean to us in the Himalayas or because they tried to block us at the Strait of Malaka?”
Do you think they're playing that sort of long-term game? Or is India really just pragmatic and is like, “Great China, we'd rather have a power that doesn't care so much about Iran, we want to import their oil as well.” Do you think India sees any threat in this at all, or thinks this is fundamentally a good thing?
Kamran: That's actually an excellent question, and it's something that's not being discussed, at least in the public conversation around this whole China brokered Iran/Saudi Arabia deal, which is the role of India. Look, India and China are competitors. The Chinese, as I said earlier, their strategy for the Indian Ocean Basin hasn't panned out.
They're already trying to ensure that the Indians do not project power because India's economy is rising. While the Chinese economy’s heyday is behind it. I'm Not saying it can't happen again, but you know, at this moment the Chinese economy isn't looking hot and the Indian economy is. So they're poking them strategically in the Himalayas to force them to devote and dedicate resources that could go into maritime power projection.
They're both competing for influence in Iran. So yes, this bothers India both because this could be a way for the Chinese to counter India aligning with the United States. And there is the component of this that sinks in with the Four Nation alignment called U2I2 which is India, Israel, UAE, and the United States. So, yeah, this is worrying the Indians that if China is going to start playing diplomacy, then what does it do?
I don’t think they’re too worried about it because the Indians have their relationship with the Gulf States. It is pretty robust. India also just made the biggest ever deal for 500 jets from both majors, Boeing and Airbus for $135 billion.
So India isn't that worried, but it has to keep an eye on what China is doing to circumvent it, to prevent it from rising, to prevent it from playing in the Persian Gulf. I mean India has a lot of influence in UAE and Saudi Arabia to the point that in the past 10-15 years, the Saudis and the Arab states are now more friendly with India than they were, than they are with their traditional ally Pakistan.
In fact, you know, there's been a snubbing of Pakistan on the part of the GCC states, which has worked in India's favor. So India has its own relationship in this region, both on both sides of the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Peninsula states, with Iran. It'll be interesting to see how India and China compete.
I would argue that at this point, despite the fact that China imports most of its crude from Saudi Arabia, and has a far bigger economy than the Indians, I think that the Indians are far better placed in the Middle East. The Indians are comfortable inside the Indian Ocean basin because they're native to it, whereas the Chinese are an outside power.
Jacob: Well, the Indians don't import as much oil as the Chinese. I'm pretty sure I'm right about that. But they did overtake China as the fastest growing oil importer. So their growth cycle is kicking off. I take your point though, and this is why, if I was advising someone in the Indian government, you know, my alarm bells would go up a little bit here, because if you go back hundreds of years when, you know, before India was taken over by the British Empire, India was a center of economic gravity for parts of East Africa, the Horn of Africa, parts of the Middle East.
I mean, there were times where Indian currency was the dominant currency in these parts of the world. So if China's gonna try and cut in front of the line and you ERP India's role here, I would be a little worried about what that says about China's intentions going forward. Kamran, before I let you get outta here I also have to ask you about the future of the Iranian regime, cuz the last time we talked, the protests were rolling. Hami was sick. He was sending his son out to do his bidding. It looked like the knives were coming out and everybody was sharpening up for a conflict.
It looks like. I don't know, HAI got a steroid shot, he seems to be around again and giving speeches and saying things. The protests, even though the economic situation there has gotten worse, have died down a little bit. So there's protest fatigue or the Iranian security forces cracked enough skulls. I'm not sure. I'm sure you saw that big announcement of amnesty for tens of thousands of protestors too. So they feel confident enough that they can give an amnesty and still have control of the situation. So, you may be right that the regime is sclerotic and will eventually fall apart.
But, I was sort of readyto count them out. And it looks like they're not quite dead yet. They're still kind of moving along and still pushing back. So where are you at on your assessment of where the Iranian regime is at?
Kamran: Look, the protests can't overthrow the regime. The protests are just making it worse for the regime. The regime's fundamentals are flawed and weak, and there's no way for them to turn it around, because there are processes that are gnawing at the structure of the Islamic Republic that just can't be reversed. I never expected the protest to continue ad-infinitum until the end of the regime, but I think that this should be treated as cyclical. I think that there's this huge course of apparatus that people run up against. And then when the euphoria drops and rubber meets the road, then you do see a petering out of the protest, which is where we are right now.
But I think that it is not like the people can be cowed down. There's gonna be some other shoe that's gonna drop, and then something else will spark more riots. So I look at public unrest as in waves, and that's what we've seen since at least 2017. There have been multiple waves of protests, each subsequent one bigger than the last one.
So I look at the public unrest as something that's still unfolding. There are other chapters to be written in this saga, but the biggest thing is that there is no way for this regime to continue as it is. Something's gotta give. Once Khamenei is no more, there's gonna be a restructuring of the state.
If it doesn't restructure, then it's gonna run into problems. From what I'm hearing from people who are organizing on the ground- there is an effort now to develop leadership as opposed to having spontaneous protests. Expat Iranians are syncing up with Iranian groups inside to try and develop an indigenous leadership to be able to take forward their demands on the regime.
And they're trying to make allies in the government because there are people inside the state, stakeholders, both in the revolutionary guards and, the civilian side, who think that whatever's been going on is very, very dangerous. And there's a need to reconnect with the masses. So I think there's a lot that is going to unfold in Iran. And, the process of evolutionary regime change that's been in play, uh, we'll see it accelerate, we'll see it slow down. There'll be turns and twists. It's not linear, like everything, uh, else is not linear. But I think there is a trend line that's not reversible, and the trend line is this state has to evolve, and if it doesn't evolve, then it cannot endure.
Jacob: Yeah, it wouldn't be too hard on yourself. I mean, the title of that podcast was the End of the Iranian Regime, and that that could still be a play. There was a reason you weren't talking about Iranian Revolution 2.0 because you're really not talking about a revolution.
The depressing part of what you're saying is the most likely scenario is that whenever the Supreme leader kicks the bucket, the I R G C will successfully engage in state capture and they will be the ones that control the Iranian regime and they will appoint whatever puppet they want in that theocratic role.
The IRGC will basically take over the country, cuz it doesn't seem to me like Ruhani and the pragmatists and the centrist and the reformists have the juice to compete, especially with all the state capture and economic capture they've already been doing. You could see it the other way. I mean, I know Ruhani tried a little bit to defang parts of the IRGC and reverse some of their gains, but I think the thesis that you have is that's what's gonna happen. One of these factions will probably take over and that will be a fundamentally different regime than the one that was there before. Is that fair or am I misreading you?
Kamran: No, no, that's fair. That's a good summary and I would just add that the trick for the IRGC is that it can't do it alone. And we discussed why it can't do it alone in the last podcast. Therefore I think that it has an interest in syncing with disaffected portions of the public.
Some of the protesters, some of those who aren't interested in total change and, you know, are non-compromising, but those who are looking for allies within the state to affect meaningful change. And I wouldn't count the pragmatic conservatives and the reformists out just yet. Cause the I R G C needs to look like it's a constitutionally supported system. It needs to seem like it's actually voicing the needs of the people if it's to succeed as this center of gravity for a new Iranian system. It needs allies.
So I wouldn't count out the likes of Ruhani or others. Maybe not Ruhani himself. He may not be around by then, or, you know, he may not be much of a political player, but you get my point. I mean, they need actors like this who have some following in society, and they need to find new friends, I mean friends among the protestors who aren't as non-compromising and are willing to be pragmatic.
So this will be interesting to watch because if that doesn't happen, I doubt that the IRGC can deal with pressures from below and from above, or laterally. You know, there's the regular armed forces that are numerically larger than the IRGC. They have to worry about them. They're not gonna play ball. They're already very upset about the privilege and influence lying with the IRGC. Then there is the million man militia that technically is under the control of the IRGC at least since 2009.They're really ideological zealots, so they may not be as compromising. So this is going to be a balancing act for the IRGC if it can engage in it.
Jacob: Well, the IRGC never really liked the JCPOA to continue our acronym thing. So, if I was the IRGC, China and Mohamed bin Salman are the types of friends that I would also need in place to make some sort of move.
Rethinking wealth
Copyright 2023
Cognitive Investments LLC is a registered investment advisor. Information provided in this report is for informational and/or educational purposes only and is not, in any way, to be considered investment advice nor a recommendation of any investment product. The statements and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author. Cognitive Investments cannot guarantee the accuracy or completeness of any statements or data. For current information on Cognitive Investments, please visit the Investment Advisor Public Disclosure website at www.adviserinfo.sec.gov by searching with Cognitive Investments' CRD# 308306.