Jacob Shapiro: Rob, the big news of the week is not geopolitics for once. I feel like I'm not the prettiest girl at the dance.
It's you, it's Silicon Valley Bank. Is it Lehman 2.0? Do the European Banks get a crash in sympathy with this, are we headed to another financial crisis? I know some of the answers there and that's intentionally a little sensationalist, but let's just rehash very quickly for those who’ve been living under rocks. Can you tell them what exactly has happened with Silicon Valley Bank in the last week or so and what's been spreading to Europe and why fear has been reverberating throughout financial markets?
Rob: Sure. The TLDR here is, this is not that big of a deal, and maybe that's gonna be famous last words, but really this isn't Lehman 2.0, it's not 2008, it's not even the savings and loans crisis from the 1980s. It's much, much more contained.
So what happened was Silicon Valley Bank, which is the 16th or was the 16th largest bank in the US, catered primarily to VC firms, startup companies and technology and biotech that whole area. They were a very rapidly growing bank during the tech bubble years, which, in some sense ended about a year ago, they collapsed and they got bailed out. Well, they got taken over by the government and they're seeking a buyer right now.
Their depositors have been largely guaranteed by the government, which is a controversial issue to some extent that people are fighting over. But the reason is boring and technical, and in short, it's because the tech sector has been shrinking. They leveraged their entire business to a very volatile part of the economy and after the tech bubble burst, a lot of startup companies and VC firms were drawing down their deposits as their businesses shrank and as they didn't replace them with new capital. And this sucking out of the liquidity out of Silicon Valley was sufficiently rapid and strong that Silicon Valley didn't have assets available that they could sell without triggering themselves into insolvency in order to meet those deposits. So people began to realize this.
They got scared. Word got around real quick, especially because everyone who was a customer of the bank, For the most part, they all know each other. Everyone rushed to get out their deposits before it was too late. So the bank experienced a classic deposit run and had to shut. That's the short version.
Jacob Shapiro: I see what you did there in short. There's something here about the psychology of bank runs too. It reminds me of everybody going to the store at the beginning of Covid and buying 500 rolls of toilet paper cuz they thought that the end of the universe was nigh.
There must have been some psychological tipping point or something that happened where somebody had trouble or somebody called somebody and said, “Hey, I can't get my money out. Do you know what's going on here?” Or heard something bad. Because it took that psychological bank run moment to bring Silicon Valley to its knees, right?
It's not like it was just out there and something happened and it slowly happened over time. It happened fairly quickly.
Rob: They had been experiencing deposit declines for a few quarters, and they had accelerated in the recent couple of months. Their deposits went from $95 billion down to, oh, something in the high sixties I think it was.
So that’s a pretty significant drawdown on deposits and it's a snowball effect where it starts out small as certain people see the deposits are going down and recognize that maybe there's gonna be some issues. More and more people begin to withdraw, which makes the deposits decline faster, which causes more people to panic.
It's a self-reinforcing spiral. That's usually how these things work, just like any financial panic. That's why in order to stop these things, you need government intervention to come in and essentially provide a circuit breaker - provide a huge foot on the ground to say, “Okay, now it stops. Here is the self-reinforcing factor that's gonna push things in the other way.”
So that's what the government did when they came in and provided the deposit liquidity support above the $250,000 guarantee. Just as a reminder, if you have a bank deposit, you're only guaranteed it's only insured by the FDIC up to $250,000.
But in this case, the government waived that maximum and extended it much higher because of the circumstances. That helped stabilize the situation, but the bank failed nonetheless, and they're seeking a buyer and they were taken over by the FDIC (which is what happens when you have a bank failure.)
Jacob Shapiro: If one was an idealist or an ideologue, one could argue that another way to prevent this type of issue from happening is not making it so clear that a bailout would be inevitable. But that's a conversation for armchair politics and probably not for the podcast.
I think this is a good opportunity for us to take a step away from the content and talk a little bit about ourselves, how we're structured.
Why, you ask? This was actually something that was on our radar a long time ago. Most of you know us, we're coming to you from Cognitive Dissidents, which is a Cognitive Investments podcast. I also have Perch Perspectives, which works directly with companies giving them geopolitical insights on supply chains, offering them research bespoke products, monitoring things like that.
Rob, the other hat that you wear is at a firm called Off Wall Street. I think this is an instance where we need to talk about Off Wall Street a little bit because you guys were putting out reports over a year ago about SVB that we're saying, “Hey, there might be a problem here.”
Give the listeners a very short take about what Off Wall Street is and what you're doing over there and how we use both those macro and micro insights to do things here at CI.
And then tell us, what did you see at Silicon Valley Bank a year ago? Why was off Wall Street saying, “Hey, this doesn't look so kosher and people should be watching this.” It turns out you were vindicated in those views.
Rob: Okay first, I promise we're not gonna sit here and promote our wares too much.
But this is such an extraordinary case. I'm so sick of hearing about SVB because we've been talking and writing about it for a very long time.
On May 17th, 2022, we wrote a report for our clients at Off Wall Street pointing out that these guys were going to experience significant problems. At that time, the stock price of Silicon Valley Bank was $448 compared to $0 today.
What we said specifically was,”Investors may be failing to appreciate the negative implications of the current downturn in private markets. SBS business, they're levered to a deeply cyclical end market and the cycle appears to be turning.” We had a whole analysis of why these guys were probably gonna see their balance sheet shrink and experience all these problems.
We did not say, “Oh, they're gonna get taken over by the government” cuz that's a fairly extreme outcome. Our clients were aware of this and were prepared and many of them profited from this because we were there well in advance. Okay, so the back patting part of this segment is now over.
Why does this matter? Why does it matter? Because it's so tiresome to hear all about Silicon Valley Bank this week, and it really brings up something that I've been talking about on the podcast and something that is really fundamental to what we do at CI and at Off Wall Street.
In a world where information is abundant, where information is just coming out of your ears, real value presents itself in the form of attention. What do you pay attention to?
How do you find those things, both positive and negative? It’s not just The Big Short, there are also very positive opportunities that are emerging. And no one is paying attention. No one is writing about them. No one cares.
THIS is really fundamental to what we do at CI and at Off Wall Street. At Off Wall Street, we provide research and insights to other money managers. And CI is the business where we take those insights and apply them for clients ourselves.
We specialize in both places. We help people keep an eye on what's going on in the world and identify issues that may arise before they arise. We prepare your business to deal with issues before they're on the front page of the Wall Street Journal.
Jacob Shapiro: While you were talking, I went back and looked at the front page of the business section of the New York Times on May 17th, 2022. And besides a couple articles like, “Are you happy with your boss,” the main topics of interest seem to be Janet Yellen going abroad to get the global tax deal back on, some scare-stuff about natural gas prices and how Cutter could become a Middle East giant because everybody was gonna have an energy crisis coming up.
Ha. Something about a JetBlue hostile takeover bid for Spirit Airline and McDonald's announcing that it was gonna sell its Russia business. To your point, lots of stuff there, none of it important today. You were looking at the Silicon Valley Bank thing at that point. What did you guys see at that moment that tipped you off? Take me through the method that allowed you to say, “Okay, this was the thing that we wanted to focus on at that moment. Was it really just that broader, “Hey, we're in the macro cycle.”
You and I have been talking about how tech is gonna be in a rough place for literally years, and because the Federal Reserve was finally signaling that it was gonna hike interest rates, that meant that certain companies or banks that were exposed to the tech sector were going to experience trouble.
Was it that simple? Was there something else that was going on? How did you land on that, and what information were you cons consuming at the time? That made you not worry about all those headlines I just said, but had you publishing a report about Silicon Valley Bank?
Rob: I would love to be able to tell you a story about, “We conducted this intelligence operation and we could see what was going on inside the bank and we got tipped off and the back alley by the guy saying, ‘Hey, they're really gonna have problems.’” But it's nothing like that. The reality is plodding and banal.
The reality is that Silicon Valley was a bank that had extraordinary growth because they bet their bank on this one narrow part of the economy, which is the startup economy, tech, biotech, VCs.
As a general rule, when we look for bank shorts or financial services to short, we look for asset assets that grow a lot, balance sheets that grow a lot, because it's hard to grow fast in financial services without doing something stupid. And, these guys were doing something stupid. They were taking too much risk on what was inherently a very cyclical and volatile customer base and that risk looks good on the way up. People believed in them and were extrapolating their growth off, far into the distance. It was gonna be from $448 to $1,000, because people tend to do that in a linear fashion.
Over and over again, people fail to visualize the downside of these deeply cyclical industries. This is a recurring pattern. It happens over and over again. All you had to do was analyze their numbers to do a little field work, talk to people in the banking industry, and talk to people in the VC industry who could see what these guys were doing.
It’s worth noting, they weren't doing something nefarious. This wasn't the subprime bubble. They weren't lending to people who didn't exist or to projects that didn't exist. They were just taking way too much risk and they were being complacent. So it didn't require some genius analysis to see what was going on.
It just required paying attention to see the little bubbles that everyone else was ignoring.
Jacob Shapiro: That's the value add. Before I was a partner at CI in July of 2020, when we had barely just met, we had a webinar where you really spearheaded the idea that, while there’s a huge run up in tech and the runway might extend a little bit longer, fundamentally this is probably not where growth is gonna be going forward. You talked about your interest in other parts of the economy and I found it really interesting.
That's now starting to be in the mainstream. I saw cousin Marco out there declaring tech is dead, at a conference last week. That narrative's already out there.
Two years ago we were saying this tech situation doesn't look so good, not that it’s dead. Which is, I think, is also a good way to pivot cuz there's a lot of schadenfreude out there right now about Silicon Valley Bank, and I get it. I don't have any schadenfreude about this, but I still can't get enough Sam Bankman-Fried content. I just love sitting there wallowing in the schadenfreude of Sam Bankman-Fried. But let's not do that.
Tell me or let's talk about what people should be looking at now. Because it's easy to rehash everything in the past. But what are we looking at today? What are some of the things that we think people should be looking at that they're not looking at? And in two years, we'll make headlines like this.
Rob: Yeah. You should be spending your time researching the thing that no one is talking about, right?
Jacob Shapiro: And, just a reminder to listeners, we come on and explain when we're wrong all the time too. Like we had a bet on Russian equities because I thought Russia wasn't gonna invade Ukraine. Now I'm proud that we got out of that before the Russians closed the stock market. We were watching and we were like, “Yeah, this thesis is wrong,” we're not always right. But I think the listeners know that.
Rob: And again, it's not just negative things, it's positive things too. Because the big opportunities are things like Bitcoin. No one paid attention to it for a long time. You can argue whether Bitcoin is positive or negative, but clearly that became a social phenomenon over some period of time. And there was a time when you could have learned everything you wanted about Bitcoin. There was no lack of information. It's just about what you pay attention to, right?
On the negative side, here's something that no one is talking about. We wrote about it a few months ago. I don't know if this will be in the news, but we've prepared ourselves, our clients at Off Wall Street, and at CI for a scenario in which this does happen. And that is the issue of air traffic over the Black Sea.
This is actually timely because, lost in the shuffle here, there was a collision between a Russian fighter jet and a US drone.
Jacob Shapiro: Nope, you got it.
Rob: Yeah, that's what I thought. So what's the story with that? What people don't realize is that the entire airspace over Ukraine and Russia has essentially been shut down to almost all global aircraft carriers with the exception of some of the Chinese carriers in countries that have good relations with Russia or relatively good relations with Russia.
That hasn't been a huge problem because all the traffic is being diverted over the Black Sea. The amount of traffic going over Azerbaijan, for example, is up 120% from where it was pre-pandemic. So we've been learning a lot about the Baku air traffic control technology and… they're struggling.
They're struggling to manage the sheer amount of planes that are flying over their airspace. because everything that would've previously gone over Ukraine, gone over Russia to go from Asia to Europe is now being squeezed through this tight little pipe over Baku in the Black Sea. Until recently, that hasn't really been a huge issue.
It's been very congested, but it's been manageable until now. Now things are getting put to the test because of China's reopening. So there's two issues there. The first is the passenger traffic. So China had a significant amount of passenger traffic that was going from Hong Kong, Shanghai, hubs like that to Europe.
And let me tell you, the Chinese tourists are back in full force. In places like Paris, I see them emerging now for the first time in a long time. And the volume of planes getting squeezed through that little choke point is now increasing even further. The other issue is air freight.
Air freight comes in two types. There are dedicated freighters, which are planes that just carry cargo, that accounts for about 50% of all the air cargo. The other 50% is in passenger airplanes, where they put cargo in the belly of the plane. So it does double duty. Now you're seeing air freight volumes increase again after being at a cyclical low. We've talked about the inventory cycle in the US and how that was really depressed and how the ships aren't even bothering to go to China, etc, etc. All those Chinese factories that are making stuff, a lot of that stuff gets shipped in airplanes.
So last week we talked about the China PMI exploding and rebounding as China gets up off the mat and the economy gets going in a major way again. That's further increasing the congestion through this tiny Baku choke point.
So what happens? Maybe nothing, but if there's any sort of breakdown in traffic, if there's any sort of issue, if there's any sort of Russian incursion into this airspace because of what's going on right next door, it's literally right next door to an act of war.
The global freight economy is dependent on a very small geographic space. So maybe that will never turn into something, but it's sufficiently high risk that people should be preparing for it and thinking about it and coming up with contingency plans and thinking about what kind of assets get affected positively and negatively if something should happen there.
All these things, that's what you should be paying attention to, things like that. Cuz the Silicon Valley thing, everyone's all over that. Now. That's done. So what are all the other hidden things? ?
Jacob Shapiro: No, the Silicon Valley bank thing is history. And this is where this point broadens beyond markets and you could apply it to geopolitics or just about anything you want.
Two great examples of this, I'm here at a Dairy Producers conference. They export a lot of their milk to China. They're seeing all these headlines about China invading Taiwan. I keep on getting tons of questions about that, but most of the milk that US exports goes to Mexico. China is big, but Mexico is bigger.
When I get on stage and I brush past the cartels and kidnappings, the Taiwan thing, and instead start talking about, “Hey, here's what President AMLO did last week. Here's what it means for the Mexican government to be attacking the institutions that protect democracy in the Mexican state. That could mean good things. It could mean bad things in general, but your most important customer is right across the border here,” people are confused.
I asked the room to raise a hand if the AMLO coverage is something that you've heard about. And there wasn't a hand that was raised in the room. So across the spectrum, there’s all kinds of that clutter that you have to sort through.
What's a positive example? I know that at an innovation level we telegraph some of the things we're looking at by the kind of guests that we have. Like we had Miles on that nuclear fusion podcast. That's as much a podcast for the listeners as it is a reference point for me to go back and say, that was the beginning of my nuclear fusion research. I took homework, 10 different questions, that I have to research and I'll bring back Miles when I've actually done the research.
What's an example of a positive one that you're thinking about right now, or something that you're thinking about that's gonna be an opportunity rather than a downside?
Rob: The potential for hidden assets in the defunct coal fired generation facilities of US utilities that no one likes.
So what do I mean by that? If you look at a company like Dominion - Dominion Energy is a kind of crappy utility. Most of their businesses in Virginia and West Virginia, the mid-Atlantic states, have a lot of coal fired capacity. They're in coal country, of course. A lot of that is not running at high utilization or it's actively just mothballed.
So they have a whole host of problems and no one really likes them and not too many people care about them, and not too many people care about this area in general. The interesting aspect of this story that no one seems to talk about is the growing consensus in the fusion and nuclear fission generation community that these coal assets are hugely valuable to this new crop of small modular reactors, including the new fusion ones. Some of the very early stage fusion companies, they've already done this on the West coast.
They've launched prototype reactors and located them in disused coal facilities. And why are they doing that? Because the coal facility has all of the interconnect in place. So the existing grid that has all the permitting, that has the workforce right there, all of the stuff that you need that is so expensive to build, they've already got.
It's being valued at essentially nothing. So if you think Fusion has a future, if you think that there's the opportunity to use nuclear as part of a broader mix, where are you going to build these facilities? In all likelihood, you're gonna take advantage of the space that's already provided and slot them in.
In the case of Dominion, it's particularly relevant because, some of the biggest growing energy consumers in the Mid-Atlantic, especially around Virginia, are data centers because that's one of the largest areas for data center construction in the us. And all of those guys have committed to using renewable or zero carbon energy to power their facilities.
So where are they gonna get it? That's the opportunity.
Jacob Shapiro: I think it perfectly underscores your point because this is not some top secret thing. It's not like you dressed up in a tuxedo and you were wandering around West Virginia bars and you found out from the coal miner who lost this job.
You can find this in the newspaper. I think the Wall Street Journal had a story about this a couple weeks ago, but it was buried amidst all sorts of other crap.
I wanna zoom out a little bit and I think I know the answer to this question, Rob, but it does look like the Silicon Valley bank thing has gone beyond Silicon Valley Bank. I don't know how much of a line to draw between Silicon Valley Bank and what's happening at Credit Suisse and what's happening with some of the European banks in general.
I think what you're gonna tell me is that we've talked about how the ECB was behind the Federal Reserve and hiking rates because of the Russia-Ukraine war. Now they're starting to hike rates just as in the United States as the macro environment changes and have put pressure on Silicon Valley Bank.
If you're a bank like Credit Suisse and you've been circling the toilet bowl for literally years already, does that spell danger for a larger cycle or group of European banks? They seem to have caught a cold from our panic here in the United States.
Do you see anything concerning, do you think it's part of the story? Do you think it's a completely separate story? How are you seeing what's happening in Europe?
Rob: I think you do have to connect what's happening in Europe to what's happening in the US. So let's get into the banking situation, take a look into the particulars and the implications for policy and economies, right? The closest corollary to today is 1994, which most people don't really remember.
People remember 2008, they remember there was a huge tech bubble. They remember maybe the savings and loan crisis in the 1980s, which most people remember existed, but they don't remember what it was exactly. No one really remembers 1994. And that's partly my point - this is not a Lehman moment. This is a very particular issue that's arisen and it's much less nefarious. The issue here is primarily around liquidity, not a larger systemic failure.
Banking crises usually emerge when people operate with a certain set of assumptions and then all of a sudden one day they wake up and they say, “oh shit, that's not what I thought it was.”
And then there's an enormous amount of uncertainty. Uncertainty is what kills in banking crises. So if you think of Lehman Brothers for a moment, the whole banking system was operating on the assumption that mortgage backed paper was of the highest quality, that it was not gonna default, that it was AAA.
Then one day people woke up and said, “Oh, that's not true at all,” and you had to reevaluate everything. It's being married to someone for 30 years and you wake up one day and they're a crocodile. You have to change some of your plans.
The Silicon Valley Bank crash is not a credit problem. There's not uncertainty about the quality of assets in the banking system, which is the most nefarious kind of difficult banking issue to deal with. The issue here is super similar to 1994. Just to put the historical context around this, in 1994, we were coming out of the savings and loan crisis, which caused a very sharp recession that we experienced in 89 and 90.
We were coming out of that period, and Alan Greenspan started raising rates very aggressively because the economy was really ripping out of there. By raising rates so aggressively, bond markets sold off viciously and a lot of banks and bond funds that were holding these bonds started experiencing significant losses on a mark to market basis.
That's basically what we've seen today. Interest rates have been jacked up very aggressively for reasons that we've talked about and everyone knows. And as a result banks that are holding a lot of bonds have suffered mark to market losses on those portfolios. I say mark to market because bonds are not like stocks, bonds, if the issuer doesn't default.
As long as you hold the bond until it matures, you get your money back. So when I say mark to market, it means that the bonds are trading below par, below 100% of face value now. So, if you tried to sell them today, you wouldn't get all your money back, and that's a problem for banks. But if you hold onto them, you're fine.
So the banks are not fundamentally insolvent, what they're facing is a mark to market problem and there's a whole bunch of accounting stuff about how they classify certain things and how they have to show them, which we won't get into because it’ll bore the listeners to tears, and I'm sure you can read about it elsewhere if you're interested.
The fundamental problem is they own a lot of bonds because they're banks. That's a big part of what they do. The value of bonds has gone down a lot because interest rates are getting hiked. Fundamentally, it's not a major problem. The reason why someone like Credit Suisse is running into problems is because they were already weak.
They were experiencing significant problems already and they're experiencing deposit withdrawals. Not because they were tied to the VC sector or startups, but really just because they suck and they've been so bad for so long that they've had this bleed of withdrawals that's gotten progressively worse for them.
You have these sort of idiosyncratic cases emerging, but this is not a case where the whole banking system is in danger, where the whole liquidity situation is in peril. That's not really the case at all. In fact, the big banks are getting a lot of deposits now. Without going on and on, that's essentially the situation from a banking standpoint.
Jacob Shapiro: Shout out to Charlie if he's listening cuz he called me yesterday and asked “Is this the end of regional banks? Is this the end of smaller banks? We're all just gonna have to go to bigger banks because this kind of environment is just gonna kill what's left of these smaller regional banks cuz they're gonna be the ones who can handle this.”
Do you think that's an outcome here where we get consolidation in these big banks? Is that healthy for the economy? Is that something you would worry about?
Rob: I think a lot depends on how the regulatory environment evolves. But I think there's a strong desire for that not to happen on the part of regulators in the first place and in the second place, banking is a commodity but it's not totally a commodity.
If banking were a pure commodity, we'd all be banking with JP Morgan and call it a day cuz, we want our money and we want it quick and easy. That's all we care about. But look at companies like First Republic or Silicon Valley, which ironically are the two that ran into problems.
They built franchises by focusing on servicing a specific type of customer. They found a different way of doing things, which in Silicon Valley's case was not a great outcome. So it's possible to differentiate based on that.
I don't think smaller or regional banks are necessarily going away even though the current environment right now is going to help the Goldmans, the JP Morgans, the Bank of Americas, if only because they're scooping up some of the flighty deposits that are currently worried and asking these kinds of questions.
Jacob Shapiro: Yep. Before we get outta here, as a rule, I don't read much hate mail. If people come at me on Twitter and I think they're stupid I usually just mute them. If I respond to you with like multiple gifs in a row that are making fun of you, by the way, that means I'm not taking you seriously. If any of you haven't quite figured that out yet.
But we did have some hate mail last week that you informed me about. Somebody heard us talking about wheat and soy and said, “Who are these guys? They think that AG traders don't know all these things about wheat and soy, they think that they've just discovered the industry. There's no way that they're gonna be able to trade this in any kind of meaningful way.”
We wanted to close off on this because it relates to that point we made earlier about paying attention to important information. Our point, Mr. Haterade, is that “Yes, we do think we can spend a couple weeks getting really smart on something and then generate insights that actually lead to actionable strategies.”
Again, I can use geopolitical examples here too.Who were the last people in the room to realize that the Soviet Union was collapsing in the late eighties, early nineties? It was the experts on the Soviet Union in US intelligence agencies because they were so focused on small, very granular things that they couldn't see the forest for the trees.
Now, I'm not knocking on expertise, and we have experts in our network and everything that we're doing. We're going and talking to experts and saying, “Hey, is this lunacy, is this crazy? Can you give me a gut check here? What is this from your point of view?”
In general, part of our entire strategy here as geopolitical analysts, as financial analysts, as people who are managing money, is that if you can understand the thing that happens in China and how it connects to the thing that happens in Brazil, and then how that relates to the West Virginia coal, that's where real opportunity is, and nobody's an expert in that. It's about having enough expertise and paying enough attention to things that are going on around the world and saying, “You know what? I think if I do a little bit more on that, I think I have a perspective here that maybe the people that are in the moment aren't getting.”
Let me also say, we get plenty of things wrong.
We also get some things right. We'll see. Performance over time will dictate our results. I wanted to riff a little bit on that and also let you get back on your soapbox because you were the guy who read the hate mail . I think it bothered you a little bit.
Rob: I wouldn't say bothered, but I think it reinforces one of our core precepts - the idea of being generalists. The value of being a generalist in a world where information is abundant is going up and up. We've seen this, I'm not just speculating, you see this every day.
I’ll bring up an example. George Soros is arguably the most successful financial trader in the history of the world. He was not a specialist in anything in particular, he would employ some specialists or go and talk to specialists. But he famously said, I have 48 hours to learn everything I can about something, as soon as I determine that it's the important thing to learn about. He would call that going for the jugular.
So that's what generalists do, and I think the value of that is getting proved out over and over again. In this case, wheat and soy. Yeah. I think in two weeks you can make a better judgment about that than someone who’s in the field counting each stock of wheat.
Jacob Shapiro: Or who's livelihood is based on that wheat. If you're a farmer or if you're somebody who's actually growing the wheat, it gets personal in a way that it's not if you're just out here looking at the fundamentals.
Rob: Yeah, I think over and over again you see examples showing that people who are siloed specialists make poor judgements about the subject of their specialty.
So you mentioned the Soviet Union specialists in the late eighties. That's a classic example. Look at Silicon Valley. As I said at Off Wall Street, we were writing about this for our clients over a year ago, and it wasn't some brilliant analysis. You didn't have to be some grandmaster chess genius to put the numbers together and figure it all out.
You just needed some common sense and the ability to understand how banking works and how to model it out. We're not banking experts. We're generalists. The banking experts are the Wall Street analysts who covered the stock and said nothing and realized nothing. Even now, I find this very funny.
Most of the analysts had buy ratings on the stock for their clients, and even on the last day as Silicon Valley was going down the tubes and going down to zero, one of the analysts reduced his recommendation from buy to hold. Really a lot of foresight and bravery with that kind of call.
Jacob Shapiro: It probably took a lot of courage to, to break from the buy pack and say, “Eh I don't know about this.”
The reason I wanted to bring it up was not because I care about the hater. In general with American academia there is such emphasis on specialization and I don't want to demonize that. It's important to specialize in things. And if you're like Miles or somebody else and you are passionate about nuclear fusion and you wanna spend your life understanding this small thing as much as you possibly can. That's great. That's how scientific progress happens.
And we wouldn't have scientific progress if we didn't have people who are willing to spend their time knowing everything about this really small thing and handing it off to a baton of future scientists or, future philosophers or this, that, or the other thing.
I think there's also a place, though, for deep generalists, and I don't like the way that we put so much emphasis on specialization, on small things. We almost shame generalists.
I think that there is room for specialization and there is room for deep generalists. And the only time you go off the rails is if you say the other side is wrong. I agree with the guy who sent in the hate mail, we're not experts, but you can be sure that I talked to at least four different experts to gut check my theory before I came on the podcast and risked embarrassment for myself and my company. I'm not out here shooting the breeze.
We need both. We need macro and we need micro, we need forest and we need trees. We need all of it working together.
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